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OF

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

FOR

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OF

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FOR

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ANNUAL RETROSPECT

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1831.

CHAPTER I.

PROGRESS OF BELGIC DISAFFECTION. — INSURRECTION AT BRUSSELS. — THE BELGIC INSURRECTION. — PROPOSED SEPARATION OF BELGIUM AND HOLLAND.

WHILST the prosecution and trial of De Potter and his associates, of which we gave a brief account in the concluding chapter of the first volume, kept up the agitation in Belgium about the freedom of the press, and gave occasion to the greatest licentiousness in proving that it was enslaved, other causes of irritation and distrust were perpetually occurring, from a misconstruction of the king's intentions, or from the wilful misrepresentations of faction. The debates in the popular chamber of the states-general became more vehement in their language, and more hostile to the government in their general character, than towards the end of last year. The meeting of the states after the recess

was appointed for the 1st of February, but little public discussion took place before the beginning of March; the various measures submitted to the chambers having been referred to the secret committees or sections for previous examination.

The chief topics which occupied the discussions of the second chamber for the five months of its session, from the beginning of February to the beginning of June, were, 1st, a great body of petitions complaining of grievances, and calling for the enactment or amendment of laws; 2d, the new law for checking the licentiousness of the press; 3d, a law for regulating public instruction; and, 4th, the financial measures rendered necessary by the refusal of the original budget at the close of the preceding year. All these subjects were discussed between the government and its antagonists as between hostile nations, whose interests, views, and feelings were opposed; in short, between a Dutch ministry and the Belgic union. The latter had now a new grievance to add to those which already existed. They considered the dismissals from office which had taken place in consequence of votes in the chamber as an attack on the independence of the legislature; and baron de Stassart became more factious, without being less efficient, by the loss of his pension.

I. The machinery of petitioning, which had been mounted the year before, was now repaired, enlarged, strengthened, and wrought with greater activity, and with much additional force. Though the priests had encouraged such representations to the states-general on the former occasion, and had

exerted themselves to procure signatures, they had abstained from signing any themselves. Hence the government had praised their caution, and even used it as an argument against their understood interests or views. They maintained, before the chamber and the country, that none but the uninstructed and the ignorant classes of society had joined in this clamour of grievances; and congratulated themselves that the priests, or the persons capable of forming a judgment on the conduct of their rulers or the defects of their institutions, had reproved their fellow-citizens by their silence. This silence was soon broken; and the priests afterwards not only encouraged their flocks to petition, but headed the lists of petitioners with their own names. By the beginning of March, addresses signed with about 300,000 names had been sent to the president of the second chamber. Of these, 188, numerously signed, came from North and South Brabant, demanding, generally, the strict execution of the concordat, a liberal law of public instruction, the free use of the French language, trial by jury, freedom of the press, and ministerial responsibility; 187 from the provinces of Hainault, Namur, Luxembourg, and Limbourg, with nearly the same complaints and the same demands; 262 from East Flanders, 200 from West Flanders, and 96 from the province of Liege, with very little variety in their contents. From the two provinces of Flanders 22 counter-petitions were sent, and from the northern provinces 27 of the same kind. All these representations were submitted to committees, who, after reading and classifying them, reported their con-

tents to the chamber, and proposed that they should be deposited in the hands of its clerk; or, in other words, that their prayer was worth attention, and their record worth preservation. On the other hand, it was proposed that the chamber should not entertain the subject, but pass to the order of the day. On this a discussion commenced which lasted four days, namely, from the 8th to the 11th of March inclusive; when the former proposition was adopted, by a majority of eighty-eight votes to eleven, only a handful of the most violent Dutch members standing out against the general disposition of the chamber to treat the prayers of the people with respect.

All the chief speakers in the chamber on both sides took part in this discussion, which was, in fact, a trial of the conduct of government as regarded Belgium, a contest between the two divisions of the united kingdom, and an angry litigation of the advantages or disadvantages of the union which had existed for the last fifteen years. The speeches of M. Surlet de Chokier, baron de Stassart, M. de Barthélemy, M. de Bourckere, M. de Langne, M. de Gerlache, count de Celles, and baron de Secus, who are all members of the present national congress, were distinguished by an uncompromising hostility to the government. The chief advocates of the ministry, who were all Dutchmen, were M. Doncker Curtius, who had been formerly in the liberal opposition, and M. Luzac.

II. The new project of law for checking the licentiousness of the press had been introduced at the beginning of the session, and, from the

extent of its restrictions, and the severity of its penalties, had excited general opposition. It was avowedly intended to supply the defects of a law passed in May the preceding year, which was found, according to the ministers, to be too lenient, and entirely inefficacious in controlling writers whose object was to attack lawful authority, or to provoke to breaches of order by inviting to a disobedience of the laws. Under this law several prosecutions had taken place; and the banishment of De Potter for eight years, for an alleged attempt to excite to an overthrow of existing order, probably showed that the statutes already enacted were sufficient. The new project, after being examined and modified in the sections, was brought forward for public discussion on the 17th of May, in the following shape:—

"Art. 1. Whoever maliciously, in whatever manner or by whatever means, shall have attacked the royal dignity, the authority or the rights of the king or of his dynasty, or who shall in the same manner have insulted, outraged, or calumniated the king's person, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of from two to five years.

"Art. 2. Insult, outrage, and calumny towards one of the members of the royal family shall, in the same cases, be punished by imprisonment from one to three years.

"Art. 3. Whoever shall wickedly (with the exception of a suit or defence in justice) have attacked the obligatory force of the laws, or excited to disobey them, or shall in any manner whatever have endangered the public tranquillity, whether by fa-

vouring discord, fomenting disorder and distrust, or by outraging the government, its authority or its acts, shall be punished by imprisonment from one to three years.

"Art. 4. In case of a repetition of the offence, the penalties inflicted by the present law may be increased by one half of the *maximum*.

"The same may be done with regard to the penalties decreed in articles 1 and 2. of the law of 10th May, 1829, in case of repetition of the offences therein mentioned.

"Art. 5. Persons accused of the offences stated in articles 1, 2, and 3. of the present law cannot be brought to trial without the preliminary forms of *Instruction* and *Renvoi*.

"Art. 6. Art. 6. of the law of the 16th of May, 1829, is not applicable to the offences of insult, calumny, or outrage towards the king, the members of the royal family, the constituted authorities or their members, or towards public functionaries; these offences shall in such cases be prosecuted *ex officio*, even without any previous complaint of the persons calumniated or insulted.

"Art. 7. The prosecution of the offences mentioned in the present law, and in Art. 1. sect. 2., Art. 2 and 3. of the 16th May, 1829, cannot be prosecuted after the lapse of three months from the time when the offence was committed."

The discussion lasted for six days, and furnished an additional opportunity for the most unmeasured abuse of the government. On the part of its opponents it was contended that no additional law was necessary; that the two first articles, destined to

protect the king and royal family against published insults or attacks, were uncalled for; and that the third article, which denounced a punishment of from one to three years' imprisonment against attacks on the obligatory force of the laws, or provocations to disobedience by outraging the government or its acts, was too vague in its description, and too severe in its penal effect. In what way, they asked, can the courts determine whether the public tranquillity is endangered? Must there be a commencement of the action? No; it was an estimate entirely political, entirely arbitrary, that the public prosecutor was to place before the eyes of the judge. It was no external manifestation, — no ostensible character of turbulence, which was required to convict the accused, but the feeling of the public, its disposition to excitement or its prejudices, which were to be made the test of the writer's culpability. This was to transform justice into virulence; it was to throw the judge from the bench of criminal justice into the arena of politics. The law of May, 1829, required that the article charged with excitation to disorders should stimulate to some crime or offence described in the penal code, or to some action which the penal laws in force declared to be a crime or a misdemeanor. This was enough for the protection of all parties against calumny and injustice by the press. By the words "outraging the government and its acts," was meant attacking the ministry; so that after this law passed there could be no political criticism safe, however moderate or useful. It might be construed into an outrage on an unpopular minister that the character of his

administration was exposed, though the most imperious duty required such exposure. On the other hand, it was contended by the friends of the government, that the statute of the preceding year was insufficient for the guarantee of order against the violence of the periodical press; that, since it was passed libels had become more frequent; that the journals daily contained abuse of the government; that they had even attacked the king and the dynasty; that their sport was to sow disunion and discord among the citizens, as well as to provoke to a disobedience of the laws; that by their description the ministers were perverse men, the tribunals unjust, and the king himself an assassin, whom they would rejoice to see driven from the throne.

After two days' discussion, the minister Van Maanen perceived that the chamber would most likely throw out his bill, unless it received some modification. Accordingly, a royal message was sent, on the 19th of May, proposing the following as the amended version of the 3d article:—"Whoever shall wickedly and publicly, in any manner or by any means, have attacked the obligatory force of the laws, provoked to disobey them, or excited trouble or disunion, shall be punished with an imprisonment of from six months to three years." The debate continued for two days more on the other articles of the bill, and the amendment proposed by the ministers; and on a vote being called for, 52 were found for the measure, and 52 against it. There being thus no decision, the minister again withdrew his project, and amended the third article by omitting the vague words "excited to

trouble or disunion," when the bill passed by a majority of 93 to 12. Thus was the ministry compelled to yield step by step, till they scarcely retained any of the ground which they originally designed to occupy; and they at once showed their own weakness, and provoked their enemies to a trial of their strength.

III. The law for regulating elementary instruction, which had been proposed at the beginning of the session, met with so much opposition in the sections on the part of the Belgic Catholics, that its public discussion was at first postponed, and its final enactment indefinitely adjourned. The king had done every thing on the score of religion to satisfy the most scrupulous conscience, or the most suspicious bigotry. In 1825, he had indeed, at the suggestion of the liberal Catholics, established a philosophical college at Louvain, for the better education in languages and science of the Catholic priesthood. The professors were of the same faith with the pupils who attended them to receive their education. No attempt was made to disturb the faith of the latter, or to interfere with their subsequent theological studies in the establishments of their bishops. All that was required of them was, that they should be subjected to the necessity of acquiring a little more secular knowledge, preparatory to the commencement of their clerical career, than they had been accustomed to receive at the episcopal seminaries. Whereas they were before generally very ignorant, and, from being ignorant, were so superstitious as to disgrace their own profession, and to retard the improvement of their flocks, his

majesty thought that, by compelling them to raise their standard of literary qualification, he might both elevate the respectability of his clergy, and improve the character of his people. To this apparently innocent and well-intentioned measure the inferior clergy raised a powerful opposition; while his majesty, strong in the conviction of his honest desire to do good, struggled for some time against their passions, prejudices, or interested views. He, however, at last yielded, and on the 9th of January issued a decree to abolish the seminary which he had been at so much pains to erect, endow, and superintend. Thus he had removed one main cause of distrust, or one common pretext of complaint, before that multitude of petitions were sent to the states-general, falsely complaining of interference with religious convictions.

The complaints on the score of elementary education were equally groundless. The "monopoly" complained of consisted merely in exacting from the teachers, maintained at the public expense, or pretending to instruct under the public authority, certificates of moral character, and the possession of the requisite qualifications for teaching. The Catholic religion was never a title of exclusion; nor was there any appointment of Protestants in order to make proselytes. The objections of the clergy, therefore, were directed not against the "monopoly" of the government, but against the government itself for not placing the said "monopoly" in clerical hands.

The king, though a conscientious Protestant, was far from being a religious bigot. He was not only tolerant towards his Catholic subjects, but delighted

to witness their sincere attachment to a communion different from his own. If any measures were taken with respect to the church, or any restraints imposed on the clergy, of which latterly, in the heat of opposition, no evidence was produced, they proceeded rather from an error of judgment than a defect of liberality or a want of toleration. Towards the beginning of the year a Catholic was appointed to the ministry of public worship; and even the most factious Catholic demagogue could not complain, that the concordat was either broken in the most trifling point, or executed with apparent reluctance.

IV. The financial measures of the government were converted by the Belgic opposition into sources of national jealousy and misunderstanding, as well as those relating to the exercise of religious worship, and the securities of civil freedom. When the tax on the grinding of corn had been abolished, the southern provinces were thrown into raptures of joy; but when it became necessary to supply its place with some other duty, they could scarcely find any subject of taxation, from which an equal levy of money could be made, without giving their Dutch fellow-subjects an advantage over them. The relative pressure of an impost upon home-distilled spirits and beer, upon sugar and coffee, created nearly as much dissension in the chamber as the character of the minister Van Maanen, the prosecution of M. de Potter, or the expediency of trial by jury. Even the project for reducing the interest of the public debt from 4½ to 3½ per cent, by which the Dutch would be the chief losers as being the

greatest holders of stock, was opposed most strenuously by a Belgic minority.

In this state of mind, it was not likely that any partial concession to the inhabitants of the southern provinces would restore their confidence in the king, or secure their gratitude to his government. If any one act could have produced this desirable effect, it would have been a decree issued on the 7th of June (some days after the prorogation of the states-general), for repealing the interdict issued in 1825 against the use of the French tongue in the official proceedings of the Netherlands. Nothing could have been more unwise than this proscription of a language in common use. It was felt by the nation whom it affected as a direct insult inflicted upon their patriotism, for an advantage of doubtful realisation or remote attainment. To persons accustomed to use no other language than the French, the prohibition was an immense hardship; to those who spoke Flemish, it was a useless restraint; and to all others it appeared an impertinent interference.

The extent of the practical evil, however, has been very much exaggerated by foreigners who are imperfectly acquainted with the Netherlands, or by natives whose pride or prejudices lead them to misrepresent every thing connected with Dutch ascendancy. The four Walloon provinces of Liege, Luxembourg, Hainault, and Namur, where neither Dutch nor Flemish was ever spoken, were not affected by the decree of 1825. French, or a dialect of French, was the language used in these provinces before the decree above mentioned, and ever since. Accordingly, the sixth article of the decree of June last

declares, that "the use of the French tongue is *maintained* in the provinces of Liege, Hainault, and Namur, and in the arrondissement of Nivelles, in all affairs administrative, financial, or judicial; and that the French and German are *maintained* in Luxembourg, according to interior arrangements, which shall be strictly observed." In the four important provinces of East and West Flanders, Antwerp, and Limbourg, the language in common use is Flemish; and during the time that they were French departments, and that the business of the tribunals was conducted in French, it was necessary to have interpreters at each, to act between the witnesses or the parties and the court. In the only remaining province of Belgium, that of South Brabant, of which Brussels is the capital, the Flemish and French are equally spoken, though, from fashion and daily intercourse with Frenchmen, the latter tongue is generally used in the middle and upper classes of society. Thus the prohibitory decree of 1825 did not affect at all the Walloon provinces, and could not occasion any serious inconvenience to four out of the five remaining great divisions of the country. That it included Brussels,—the seat of the supreme tribunal, the head of the administration, the southern capital of the kingdom, where French was the language of the bar, of the court, of public business as well as of fashionable society, of the journals, of the stage, and, in short, of all classes of the people whose language could be of any consequence to government,—was a piece of great precipitancy and imprudence. The inconsistency will appear still more striking than the imprudence, when we reflect that though Flemish

was only allowed to be spoken from the bench, or in official communications between the government and the people, yet that in the legislature both French, Flemish, or Dutch might be employed indiscriminately.

The liberty of using any of the languages most convenient to the parties, secured by the decree of the 7th of June, is most complete; and had the decree been issued sooner, it might have produced a salutary effect. The first article states, that "all acts, without distinction, may in future, in all parts of the kingdom, be drawn up in the tongue of which the parties interested desire the employment;" and the third extends the same right to parties in their process or pleadings before courts of justice in the five provinces of the two Flanders, Brabant, Antwerp, and Limbourg, which had formerly been subjected to restrictions in the use of the French. The Belgic periodical press, though in general disposed to receive with little gratitude any boon of a Dutch government, could not help expressing some satisfaction at this concession; but immediately checked the coming eulogy, upon remembering the recent trial and banishment of De Potter and his associates.

During this trial, and in the proceedings of the states-general which had just closed, some odd and grotesque incidents occurred from the use of two languages in the same assembly, and from the unaccommodating pride of parties, as much disposed to mutiny against the Dutch vocabulary as against Dutch politics, which perhaps induced his majesty to relax his system of persecution against the French tongue.

The accused parties, in the trial of De Potter, insisted on the interpretation of the language of the law officers and the court into French, although they understood Flemish as well as that language. In the states-general nothing could be more ridiculous than to hear the president announce the subject of debate in Dutch, then to listen to a flaming oration in French, followed by an interpretation of it into Dutch; and the latter answered by a Dutch oration, followed by an interpretation into French.*

This was generally done in good humour; and the Dutchmen generally condescended to use French for the benefit of the southern deputies: but they sometimes grew refractory; and the following is a literal report of an altercation at one of the last sittings of the second chamber: —

"*M. Van Dam* made a report in Dutch on the petition of the distillers of Charleroi, and added, that if the chamber asked him the favour of repeating it in French, he would do it.

"A great number of Belgic voices. — No; we want no act of complaisance.

"*M. Fallon.* If you do not read the report in French, we can take no part in the deliberation.

"*M. de Bourcker* insisted upon the use of the two languages, unless French was employed.

"*M. Van Genechten* said, the report was in Dutch, because the petition was written in that language.

"*M. de Barthélemy* contended that both languages should be used; and when a member of the commission refuses to submit to this condition, the president should name another reporter.

"*M. Pyke*, the reporter of the commission, said, that he had it not in his power to take petitions out of the hands of members to whom they were intrusted; but the commission had resolved, in the month of November, to read the report in the language in which the petition was written.

"*M. de Stassart.* In a similar case, two years ago, the

Towards the end of June the government, notwithstanding the factious opposition with which it had to contend, gave a striking proof of its con-

chamber decided that the report should be made in the two languages.

"*M. Van Dam.* This is a task which ought not to be imposed on the members of the commission.

"*M. Van Reenen.* It is the practice for the reporter to explain the affair in the two languages, and then to give greater developments in either of them.

"*M. Trentesaux.* The chamber cannot pronounce without knowing the subject. The report should be made in French; but it is impossible to constrain a refractory member. In such a case we ought to get the document translated by the register.

"*The President.* This discussion is without object. The chamber is surely sufficiently enlightened on the subject to order the petition to lie on the table.

"*M. de Barthélemy.* If the question is put to the vote, we shall quit the hall; and if the practice is persisted in, of giving explanations in a language which we do not understand, we shall return home, and declare to our provinces that they can no longer be represented."

After some further discussion, conducted in a manner equally animated, it was referred to the secretary to read the report in French. The sturdy Dutchman, Van Dam, thus maintained his point, and immediately afterwards treated Belgic ears to a number of other reports in the language of his country; sometimes the secretary, sometimes the president of the chamber, acting as his dragoman. Scenes like these, it is true, did not often occur, because, though the representative of the southern provinces did not always understand the language of Holland, every Dutch member understood French, and could explain himself in that tongue; but the very necessity for using two languages in any part of their proceedings was an inconvenience of so ridiculous a kind as must often have interfered with their gravity and dignity, and suggested the expediency of a division of the legislature into two assemblies.

fidence in the loyalty of the people, by dispensing with the services of the Swiss troops in its pay; and, in order to make up for this diminution of military force, by putting arms into the hands of the communal guard. The consequences of the latter measure were felt in the disturbances which occurred two months afterwards.

The association of the union, however, never relaxed in its operations; the press continued as hostile as before; and the country was agitated from one end to the other, because the king, with an obstinacy, which has been the cause of all his misfortunes, resisted the demands of a whole people for a change of counsellors, and retained the obnoxious minister of justice, Van Maanen, in his service, as if it had been a point of conscience, and not a measure of expediency, to continue a particular individual in the management of his affairs. The result was the necessity of new prosecutions of the press, and indictments preferred against five journals at once (Le Belge, Le Catholique, La Politique, Le Courier de la Maese, and Le Courier de la Sambre) for attacks on the authority of the king under the law recently passed.

Such was the state of public feeling in Belgium — such was the relative position of the government and people, when the report of the Paris insurrection, and the sight of the French tricolour, struck the ears and the eyes of the people of Brussels. Thus disaffected, they hailed the revolutionary movement of their neighbours as a domestic victory. Their enthusiasm announced a fraternity of sentiment, and a community of views, which waited only an oppor-

tunity for displaying themselves in a similar series of action. In the streets, in the public walks, at the theatres, in the coffee-houses, and in private societies, congratulations were exchanged on the success of the French revolutionists, as if Belgium had recovered its independence, and secured the redress of its real or imaginary grievances, behind the barricades of Paris. One edition of the journals which every day gave the French news was not enough; editions were multiplied; and the bureaux of the journalists, of the post office, and of the diligences, were surrounded with eager crowds, clamorous for intelligence of the events happening on the other side of the Belgic frontier. The effect was electric; and hopes of a similar political regeneration could not be concealed. On the other hand, the government and its supporters were equally sensible of some coming change, though they did not meet it as they ought. They felt that "power had gone out of them," and their instinct of danger was as strong as the seditious anticipations with which it was exercised. "Where is the force that can resist revolutionary France?" exclaimed one of the Orange journals; "or what resistance can be offered to those principles which the French revolution will propagate in Belgium?"

It was not, as we have seen, French "principles" that were wanting to be propagated in Belgium; it was not a body of alleged grievances as great as those of France; it was not decided resolutions of attempting redress; it was not a press and a legislature equally hostile to the government, and threatening every day an equal catastrophe; it was not

a ministry as obnoxious as that of Polignac; it was not, in short, any of the elements of turbulence and insurrection which were wanting, but only the example of France, and that security from the apprehension of foreign intervention, which the success of France was calculated to afford.

The lower classes of the people, and the workmen connected with the manufactures of Brussels, were suffering from the dearness of provisions and the want of employment. It was easy to persuade them that they owed all their misery to the tyranny of the government and the effect of Dutch monopolies. They were thus ready instruments in the hands of any disaffected party who might choose to direct them. Already their clamours for bread and their complaints of want, directed by the press against the authorities, had created such a fear of disturbance, that expensive fireworks which had been prepared in the park, and extensive illuminations which had been provided by the magistrates in the city, to celebrate the king's birth-day, had been abandoned.

As if to add the crowning grievance to the exasperating accumulation of petty wrongs which were daily exhibited by the journals before the eyes of the people, a decree was issued by the king, amid this unpopularity, which prevented the celebration of his birth-day, to transfer the supreme court of the Netherlands from Brussels to the Hague.

His majesty furnished no immediate occasion for an explosion, and gave no justification of resistance, by the publication of any illegal ordinances, like Charles X.; but, among a population so prepared, opportunities of tumult, and eventual revolt, could not

be long in occurring. Accordingly, on the morning of August 26., exactly a month after the publication of the Polignac ordinances, the riotous proceedings of an exasperated mob became, at Brussels, the harbinger of a revolution, which still threatens greater dangers to the peace of Europe than the mighty parent convulsion of France.

A theatrical French piece, entitled the *Muette de Portici*, which had been prohibited on account of its political allusions, was allowed to be played on the evening of the 25th. The representation attracted greater crowds than could gain admission. The theatre was surrounded, and the square before it occupied the whole evening, by the disappointed spectators, who attracted others. When the representation ended, these mischievous groups, increased by the spectators issuing from the house, began to wreak their vengeance, at the instigation of some leaders, on the office of the government paper called the *National*, in the vicinity of the theatre. They had broken the windows, and were forcing in the door, when a cry was raised among the assailants to proceed to the house of the chief editor, Libry Bagnano, a foreigner, who had given great offence by his attacks on the Belgic union. Thither the furious mob proceeded, though the house was in the *rue Madelcine*, at a considerable distance from the scene of its first operations. The crowds had now increased to such an extent as to fill that spacious street, and to render nugatory the interference of the police to prevent devastation. The windows of the house were instantly smashed; the doors were burst open; the mob entered—broke the furniture—

demolished, defaced, or destroyed every article of value—tore the papers and books which fell in their way (for the victim of their fury was likewise a bookseller), and threw in showers into the streets the fragments of their devastation. A party descended into the cellar, and, by getting intoxicated, were better prepared for further acts of violence. After having sacked, pillaged, torn, or broken every thing in the house, and left the interior a heap of ruins, they set fire to it, and marched off to further demolition with a banner, or standard, made of the tattered window-curtains of the ruined publicist and bookseller. Happily, he himself was absent, or he must have shared the fate of his furniture, and have fallen a sacrifice to the savage fury which destroyed his property. While this work of devastation was going on, the police and gendarmes remained inactive spectators of the scene, on an assurance from the leaders of the mob, that their inaction would secure themselves from molestation, while their interference, though it might occasion bloodshed, could neither disperse the rioters, nor protect the objects of their indignation.

Having succeeded in this first excess, apparently with the approbation of the respectable inhabitants, and without any interruption from the civil or military force, the rioters divided themselves into two bodies; one of which proceeded under their new colours, shouting "Liberty and justice," towards the place Royale, where they were arrested, it is said, by the firmness of the officer on guard, and the pathetic speech of one of the sentinels, who besought his fellow-citizens to save his detachment

from the necessity of shedding Belgic blood. The mob was as yet unarmed themselves, and therefore yielded to the appeal. Another division of the rioters descended by the rue Ruysbroeck; and as they passed the palace of justice (lately the place of their rendezvous during the numerous political trials which had taken place), broke the windows of the court of assize, amid the shouts of "Down with Van Maanen!" and "De Potter for ever!" A more numerous body directed its course to the rue de Berlaimont, in which the director of police, M. Van Knyff, resided, and vented their fury upon his house, as upon that of M. Libry Bagnano. The windows and doors were broken; the furniture was shattered to pieces, and thrown out into the street; but, from a burlesque imitation of the people of Paris, not an article was carried off by the perpetrators of so much wanton mischief.

These tumults had now continued for two hours: The inhabitants, who took no part in them originally, alarmed by the threatened devastation, had come forth to learn the cause of the disturbances; and their presence increased the crowds, without restraining the rioters. Every moment the unchecked fury of the mob became more menacing, and called upon the authorities to adopt some decisive measure to restore order. The commandant of the garrison repaired to the Hôtel de Ville, to concert the necessary steps with the magistrates, about one o'clock; when the troops were put under arms, and detachments ordered to patrol the streets. It was then, for the first time, that a collision took place between the military and the rioters, and some shots were

fired. The troops, however, were in too small a force to disperse such crowds; and therefore their interference, and the report of their musketry, only increased their numbers, and exasperated their rage. In this disposition, and with this ascendancy of power, their next object of vengeance was the hotel of the minister of justice, Van Maanen, situated in the square called the *Petit Sablon*, opposite the prison of the *Petits Carmes*, where the alleged victims of his oppression had been immured. Before the residence of a minister whose name was loaded with the accumulated execrations of a whole political press, and almost of a whole nation, the exasperation of the rioters knew no bounds. They threw themselves on the doors with frenzy, amid the shouts of "Down with Van Maanen!" "Long live De Potter!" and in half an hour the building was completely sacked, the furniture thrown out of the windows in fragments, and the interior converted into a heap of wrecks, in the presence of a military force, whom the mob disarmed and forced to remain inactive. They then deliberately set on flames the timbers within, and made a bonfire of the furniture without; remaining for three or four hours to enjoy the conflagration, and cutting down the trees in the square to form barricades to keep off the military, or to prevent the access of the fire engines till their brilliant entertainment was finished.

This vast burning pile, the flames of which were seen at a great distance, served as a rallying point to the rioters till four o'clock in the morning, when crowds of workmen and labourers from the suburbs and the environs collected to swell their groups.

The chief danger to the public peace had only now begun. The mob, in the course of the night, had broken open some gunsmiths' shops for arms. They had disarmed the corps of *pompiers* or firemen, and some detachments of the troops, and thus were provided with the means of resisting the military, or of overpowering their fellow-citizens. These people, many of them intoxicated, ran through the streets firing at random, and threatening pillage and massacre. To check and disperse them, two battalions of infantry, besides the usual force of the gendarmerie, were ordered out at day-break, who patrolled the streets in companies, sometimes firing in the air, and sometimes among the mob, according to the degree of provocation which they received. In the *place du Sablon*, an officer ordered a volley to be fired on a crowd which refused to disperse, when several persons were killed, and a considerable number wounded. The contest now threatened to become as destructive to life, as the tumult had hitherto been to property. The town was in universal consternation, unable to calculate the extent of its danger, from neither knowing the amount of the military force present for its protection, or the quantity of arms in the hands of the rioters. The continued discharges of musketry, from the detachments of soldiers which patrolled the streets, sometimes fired in the air, sometimes upon the mob, — the rush of shrieking crowds of men, women, and children from the one street or square to another, as the military advanced upon them, or pointed their guns towards them, — the groups of ferocious-looking, half-intoxicated, half-clad wretches, armed

with muskets, sabres, pikes, and every kind of war-like instrument, lurking in corners from the sight of the troops, or vociferating seditious cries in the open street, and brandishing their weapons in the air,—the terrified shutting of gates, doors, and windows, as each ragged group or military band passed by,—gave Brussels, for two or three hours, the frightful appearance of a town taken by storm.

About six o'clock in the morning a number of the most respectable inhabitants repaired to the Hôtel de Ville, and requested the burgomaster and his council there assembled to give them arms to protect their lives and property. They likewise besought the magistrates to prevail with the military authorities to withdraw the troops, leaving the restoration of order to the armed citizens. Their representations were favourably received. The magistrates gave orders to deliver to them the arms prepared for the communal guard, which had lately been organised to a certain extent by the government. On arriving at the depôt, they found it guarded by the troops of the line, drawn up in order of battle in the court. The command of the magistrates was obeyed, the citizens received arms, and their patrols began to circulate in the streets. Meanwhile, the mob likewise proceeded to the barracks to demand arms; and having entered, after some resistance and bloodshed, provided themselves as well as the more respectable citizens. This was a misfortune which threatened greater dangers than that which the respectable inhabitants had just averted. But it was impossible instantly to deprive these furious men of their weapons, without great

carnage. They were therefore allowed to retain them for the present; and, in the course of the day, were induced to sell them for trifling sums, to those who could make a better use of them.

The work of devastation had now relaxed; but, before the rioters altogether desisted, they had demolished the furniture and set fire to the house of the commandant of the garrison, situated in the same square as that of M. Van Maanen. The hotel of the governor of the province was likewise partially sacked, and cart-loads of official papers and registers torn, thrown out at the windows, and scattered about the streets.

The citizens having armed with great rapidity, and having begun to parade the streets in imposing numbers, the military were induced to retire to their barracks, and leave to the former the protection of the city. The amount of persons killed in the course of the morning did not probably exceed a dozen; but a more considerable number were wounded, and carried to the hospitals. The exasperation of the mob ceased as soon as the troops were withdrawn; and the lower class of rioters had to deal with their more respectable fellow-citizens, who knew their habits, who humoured their temper, and who reduced them to order more effectually by offering to relieve their wants, than by firing among their ranks.

* The military commandant of the province, major-general count Bylandt, has published an account of the insurrection which broke out at Brussels on the night of August 25., and of the events which took place between that time and the arrival of the prince of Orange, on the 1st of September.

By ten or eleven o'clock all fighting and destruction of property had ceased. Most of the rabble,

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Great suspicions have been entertained of the general's capacity; and some parts of his statement are denied by the commanding officers of corps who acted under him on the occasion. The general says, for instance, that he yielded to the desire of the regency in withdrawing the troops from the town, and that, in doing so, he consulted the generals and superior officers. Two of the superior officers, the colonels who commanded the grenadiers and the chasseurs, deny this, and declare that they were never consulted. But the more important points on which they are at issue are the following: — The general says, that when the rioters, on Friday the 27th, burnt the triumphal arches and framework for the illuminations in the park, the civic guard protested against interference, and let the mob do its worst. These superior officers, on the other hand, say, that the civic guard asked the assistance of fifty soldiers to clear the park, and were refused. The park, as these officers very properly observe, ought to have been occupied by the troops, for their own security, from the beginning, as they might have been fired upon from the thickets and alleys of trees during the night. On Saturday, the 28th of August, a strong reinforcement arrived from the neighbouring stations to strengthen the garrison, consisting of three strong battalions and a battery of field artillery. The general says, that he issued the proclamation, in which he promised the inhabitants that they would not enter the city, after consulting with his superior officers. None of the officers were consulted on this measure; and they all declare that they highly disapproved of it. This is a most important contradiction. Had the troops taken up their former position in the city before the burgher guard was organised, instead of bivouacking for a week before the palaces, the scorn and derision of the people, the revolutionists might have been checked in the beginning, and the son of their sovereign would not have been insulted, by being at first refused admission into his father's capital, and, when admitted, by seeing himself sur-

who had been out all night, had retired to their homes, and delivered up their arms or sold them to the burgher guard. This force was now sufficiently numerous to undertake the protection of the public peace; and its leaders (the chief of whom was baron Vander-Linden Hoogvorst) negotiated, through the medium of the magistracy, with the commandant of the garrison for the total abandonment of all the posts of the city by the troops, and their confinement to their quarters. The shops, however, still continued shut; the streets were deserted; and business was at a stand, from an apprehension of a renewal of the tumult. About eleven o'clock the burgomaster issued a proclamation, to soothe the irritation of the lower classes, by the remission of the obnoxious tax on flour, and restore confidence in the higher, by the announcement or suggestion of measures of security. In this proclamation the people were told, that the disturbances which had afflicted their city must be put a stop to, whatever was their cause; and that, to gain this end, the magistrates had resolved on requesting the troops to retire; that the troops had ceased to interfere; that the tax on flour, which had been imposed as a municipal tax when it was abolished last year as a government duty, was to be suppressed, and not to be replaced by any similar impost; that if any other reasonable demand were made, it would be attended to; that nothing would, however, be gained by tur-

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rounded only by gaolers or executioners. The powder magazine, and the arms of the soldiers, were given up from the same want of capacity or honesty.

bulence; and that tranquillity was necessary to realise any good. The better classes were reminded that their co-operation was necessary to effect the work of peace. Every one of them was invited to defend his home; they were requested to form a burgher guard in every quarter; and they were desired to light their houses by a spontaneous illumination, to prevent disorders in the night. In conclusion, the magistrates tell their fellow-citizens, "that to them is intrusted, provisionally, the protection of property, public as well as private; that they appeal to their honour and their patriotism; and that they confide in both."

Hitherto the disturbances at Brussels had been only a riot, though of an alarming and aggravated kind. They had originated with a turbulent populace, who gratified their love of vengeance, or their desire of mischief, by the sack and conflagration of their enemies' houses. Though sometimes, in the first night, the word "liberty" was mixed with vociferations against Van Maanen and in favour of De Potter, the active rioters seemed to have no political theories to establish,—no political objects to gain. It was only when the original tumult had been quelled that the real revolt began, under pretext of supporting lawful authority and suppressing imaginary disorder.* It is of con-

* A pamphlet was published in September, called "An Appeal to the Inhabitants of Brussels," in which it was stated that the rabble of the first night were hired to break the peace, and to begin the work of conflagration and pillage, to furnish a pretext for the interference of the revolutionary party. It even says, that the bands of the populace were led on by abbés,

siderable importance to the right understanding of subsequent events, to keep in mind this double character of the transactions of the first twenty-four hours, which was afterwards repeated at the final crisis of the revolution; when the populace again came on the scene, after the flight of their leaders, to finish a revolt in fighting the king's troops, which they had begun in burning the houses of his servants. In both cases the revolution was left to the unguided efforts of popular passion, looking at other objects than political improvement: in neither was there any cause for revolt in any tyrannical act of power—any denial of ascertained right—or any clear announcement of conditional demands, by the refusal of which the ties of allegiance ought to have been broken.

The members of the political union, the late framers of petitions to the states-general, the enemies of the Dutch connection, instantly saw the vantage ground on which their unconscious pioneers, the mob, had placed them. The citizens, at their instigation, had asked and obtained arms to put down the rioters; and they prepared to use them for putting down the dynasty, or changing the government.

They had induced the king's troops to retire, on

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by nobles, by advocates, and journalists. The workmen of certain manufactories were employed to create the tumult, and paid for their attacks against the houses of Van Maanen, the director-general of police, and the governor of the province. This we think by no means improbable. We at least saw all these classes of priests, nobles, advocates, and journalists, looking on, and enjoying the demolition and the fire.

pretence that in their absence they could best restore order; and when order was restored, they refused to let them return to their former positions, on pretence that order might be again disturbed. Instead of taking the part of the military against the mob in supporting the laws, they took the part of the mob against the military to overawe the king. They had hitherto petitioned for a redress of grievances without success, because they did not enforce their demands with any display of physical power: they now resolved to use the arms which government had given them to bring the government to their terms. The magistracy and civil authorities remained at their post, as if to legalise disobedience to the government under pretext of serving it; and for nearly a month, Brussels, and the towns which joined it, presented the anomalous appearance of a rebellion under the forms of law—of opposing camps under the same commander—of resistance to the king's authority in the king's name—of the organisation of troops, and the preparation of arms against the government, under colour of keeping the public peace—and, in short, of a bloodless civil war, where there was no admitted civil enemy, and where both parties limited their declaration of war to a crusade against a non-existing mob.

The burgher guard was armed and equipped as if by magic; and by the evening not less than five thousand men were ready to watch over the peace of the city, and to fulfil the pledges which they had given to the authorities. All respectable citizens enrolled themselves in their different sections; parishes or streets, and even foreigners, were not

refused arms, if they chose to join in preserving order.

The first symptom of political feeling which appeared, after the cessation of the riot, was the display of the Brabant colours, instead of the Orange, from the Hôtel de Ville. This change of colours, which in itself was an act of revolt, was justified by the leaders of the movement on the ground that, as the populace had displayed in the tumult the French tricolour, it was advisable to detach them from any project of a French union by giving them a national tricolour of their own. The pretence might be jesuitical, but the practice of wearing cockades and scarfs of the Brabant tricolour was instantly and universally adopted as a rallying sign for the redressers of Belgic grievances.

The troops in the afternoon were all marched from their different posts or quarters to the *place du Palais*, or the open space between the royal palace and the park, where they were joined by some reinforcements which had been called in from the neighbourhood on the first breaking out of the disturbances. In that position they remained, in the open air, night and day, with only the royal palace to guard, and restricted by special treaty from entering any part of the town, from Thursday the 26th of August to Wednesday the 1st of September. Unless attacked, their commanders gave their word of honour that they should not move till they should receive instructions from the king; and they kept their engagement. In this distressing situation, bivouacking on the bare ground, without being allowed to leave their lines for food or changes

of linen—on the alert as in the face of an enemy, the troops were condemned to remain encamped for a whole week, to see the patrols of the civic guards pass them to relieve their posts, and observe the corps of whole sections exercising, probably ultimately to attack their position.*

* The conduct of the military authorities, on the first night of the insurrection, was strange, and almost inexplicable. They cannot be accused of treason, because they were in the interest of Holland, and are still subjects of the king of the Netherlands; but they can only escape from that charge by pleading an extraordinary incapacity, indecision, and confusion of intellect. We have, luckily, the fullest evidence on this subject in a pamphlet published by general de Bylandt, the commander of the military division of South Brabant, in his own vindication, and the answers given to it by those civil and military officers whose characters are implicated in his statements. By these documents it appears, that though troubles were expected for some days before they broke out, no precaution was taken against them by increasing the force of the garrison. The director-general of police, le chevalier Van Knyff, tells us in his vindicatory statement, published on the 5th of March, that, owing to his intimation of the intentions of agitators to take advantage of the assemblages collected to witness the illuminations on the king's birth-day, he had advised the magistracy of the city not to celebrate the fête. He expressed a similar apprehension of disturbances at the representation of the *Muette de Portici*, and requested an additional military force to prevent tumult, or to preserve the city from pillage. The commandant of the province, who said that he had a regiment of cavalry at Malines, and could send for artillery from Mons, ordered no reinforcement to the capital.

But even the force which he had at his disposal on the spot was either refused in aid of the civil authorities, or was employed in a manner that must have been inefficient. It consisted of about 1500 men, troops of the line, gendarmes, and *pompiers*, quartered in different barracks. The director of the

This convention with the military was to last till an answer should be received from the Hague. To

police desired to have a strong party of troops in the neighbourhood of the theatre: this was refused; but the general engaged that four pickets, of 50 men each, should be ready from the beginning of the representation, in the court of the barracks, ready to start at the first call. The disturbances took place as the police had foreseen. Great crowds had assembled before the end of the representation. When they proceeded to break the windows of the office of the *National*, the director of the police despatched messengers for the troops, ordering two detachments of the gendarmerie to aid the civil power in dispersing the rioters at the office of the *National*, and at the house of its proprietor, in rue de Madeleine, and the rest to rendezvous on the Grande Place before the Hôtel de Ville. When he expected these orders to be executed, and the band of pillagers and incendiaries to be dispersed, he was informed that the gendarmerie had refused to leave their barracks, and that the pompiers had rode past the mob in the street of *Madeleine*, while demolishing the house of M. Libry Bagnano, the obnoxious editor, without attempting to interfere.

The three generals who had command of the troops, namely, general de Bylandt, the commandant of the province; general Vauthier, who commanded the garrison; and general Aberson, who commanded the gendarmerie, met the civil authorities at the first noise of the tumults. They proceeded to put themselves at the head of the troops, but seemed afraid to act. The populace had begun to break open the gunsmiths' shops for arms. M. Van Knyff ordered a picket of gendarmerie to disperse the crowd before one of these shops, and to protect the house. The commanding officer refused, saying, he had no orders from his general (Aberson). Another picket of gendarmerie, and a detachment of pompiers, gave the same answer. The groups of rioters had now become so daring, that one of them, after plundering a gunsmith's shop, passed before general Aberson, at the head of the gendarmerie, stationed in the *Grande Place*, and shouted *Liberty!* at which the general, instead

the king, of course, both parties immediately preferred an appeal. A budget of grievances to redress was easily found for a people who had been complaining of the government so vehemently for two years. It was therefore arranged that a deputation of the *notables* of Brussels should proceed to the Hague, to lay before his majesty the state of public feeling, to explain the motives of the occurrences which had taken place, and obtain his assent to those changes in his policy towards Belgium, without which order and confidence could not be restored,

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of testifying anger at their insolence, took off his hat, in token of assent to their acclamation. When the rioters began to demolish the house of the director of police himself, he asked for troops to protect his property, but was refused. The work of pillage continued for three hours in his house; and no force was sent to disperse the rioters, till they were about to retire of their own accord. When general Vauthier arrived at the *Hôtel de Ville*, with part of the troops of the garrison, he had lost his decorations, and had been struck in the face with a stone, while ordering his troops, in the Place Royale, to take off their bayonets; an imprudence at which the soldiers were enraged. The three generals, at the head of all the force of the garrison, arrived at the Hôtel de Ville about day-break. The hotel of Van Maanen had then been burnt down, without molestation from the civil or military authorities. The troops soon afterwards were drawn away to their quarters by a convention with the magistracy, and the town surrendered to the civic guard. In the whole of this proceeding the three generals seem to have evinced the utmost timidity and imprudence. Having the recollection of the events of Paris before them, they seemed to be afraid of offering any resistance to incendiaries and robbers, because they seemed not to be discountenanced by the people. The orders given to the subaltern officers were, "Do not draw your sword, though they spit in your face."

or his crown secured. But before this deputation had determined on the nature of its demands, or had prepared to set out on its journey, other events occurred, and stronger manifestations of popular feeling took place, which gave their mission additional importance.

The populace had been restrained from farther devastation or pillage in the town, but they were allowed to display unmolested their hatred of the Dutch government. They therefore every where either pulled down or ordered to be removed the royal arms, after the fashion of the Parisians, and proscribed the Orange colours and cockades. The arches and framework for illuminations and fireworks, which had been erected in the park to celebrate the king's birthday, were broken down, collected into heaps, and burnt in the presence of the garrison, who made no demonstration to prevent such a display of popular disloyalty. In the journals and in the clubs of the popular party, the changes which had taken place in consequence of the riots of the 26th of August were considered as a revolution; and the independence of Belgium, or a dictation to the king of the terms of its future union, were announced without reservation or disguise. The spirit which animated the people of Brussels spread to Louvain, to Liege, to Ghent, to Mons, to Antwerp, and other towns of the southern provinces. Though these towns had not, like the inhabitants of the capital, any pretence in the existence or dread of riots to change the guardians of the public peace, they formed themselves into civic guards, demanded arms from the willing authorities

and engaged the commanders of their respective garrisons to keep the troops within their quarters. In effecting these changes, some disturbances took place, and some lives were lost, at Bruges, Antwerp, and other places.

The burgher guard at Brussels was organised with astonishing rapidity. In the course of three or four days all the respectable citizens were under arms, and acting with an extraordinary degree of discipline. The numerous posts were regularly relieved, and strong detachments patrolled the streets in all directions. No distinction of rank or fortune exempted those who were able to join the ranks from doing their duty. Their active interference, though not so necessary as on the first day of the disturbances, was still requisite to protect property, or to preserve order; and their firmness and presence of mind were sometimes put to a severe test. The populace, being restrained from burning the houses of ministers of state because they were alleged to be the authors of their calamities, proceeded to destroy the machinery of the manufacturers, which they concluded with certainty had deprived them of employment. They therefore spread themselves into the suburbs, and for two or three nights committed excesses which neither the vigilance nor exertion of the civic guard could prevent. In some quarters of the town, likewise, the rioters assembled to disarm the guard to the cry of "Bread, or work!" and lives were lost in attempting to check the violence of turbulent groups, stimulated to outrage by the corrosive action of seditious principles on empty stomachs. In the *place Royale*, and before the palace

for the exhibition of the works of industry, the guard were obliged to fire upon the mob, and killed and wounded a considerable number. To prevent similar disorders, all manufacturers, shopkeepers, and master artisans were invited by the authorities to keep their people within doors, or to employ them, and were offered tickets on the magazines of charity, by which they might be supplied with bread at their own houses. The authorities, in order to give employment to those who had been thrown out of work, collected funds to support numbers of them in digging the canal in the neighbourhood, and in completing the improvements on the boulevards. We mention these things so minutely, to show—not that it was necessary in the wealthier and more influential classes of society to discard the king's authority, to create a committee of public safety, and to take the management of their affairs into their own hands;—but to demonstrate that the accidental occurrence of public distress, by which a great body of the lower classes, from being idle and wretched, became the ready instruments of demagogues, was a more powerful cause of the revolution than their feelings of patriotism or their impatience of oppression.

A deputation, composed of count Felix de Merode, whose name appears so often in the subsequent history of the Belgic revolution; of M. de Secus, one of the members of the states-general; of baron Joseph de Hoogvorst, formerly mayor of Brussels; of M. Gendebien, an advocate; and of M. Palmaert, a merchant, was chosen on the 28th, by a meeting of notables, to proceed to the Hague with the re-

presentations of the people to the king. The meeting from which this deputation emanated consisted of the chief officers of the burgher guard, of the members of the provincial and general states, of advocates, merchants, and manufacturers. The address which they intrusted with their deputation to be presented to his majesty informed him, that "the good inhabitants of Brussels had calmed in three days the most menacing effervescence, and had put down grave disorders; but that they could not conceal from him that the discontent which had produced these disorders had struck deep its roots in the public mind, and that the consequences of the fatal system pursued by his ministers were every where felt." It then represented, in a very hypocritical manner, that these "good citizens" might become the victims of their efforts to keep the peace, which they alone endangered, if something was not done to appease the nation. The only means which the address suggested for that object was the prompt convocation of the states-general. But the deputation itself, which was to act in the name of the citizens, was instructed to press upon his majesty the necessity of dismissing his obnoxious minister, Van Maanen; the establishment of ministerial responsibility; the institution of jury trial in all criminal matters, and particularly in offences of the press; unlimited freedom of teaching to be consecrated by statute; the abolition of the late act for restraining the freedom of the press; the establishment of the high court of justice at Brussels, or in one of the towns of the south; the equal division of public employments between the northern

and southern provinces; a new electoral law establishing direct elections, and allowing the right of *patents* (licenses) in the electoral census; and, in other respects, the frank and unreserved execution of the charter or fundamental law. Neither in these instructions, nor in the formal address to be presented to the king, was there the least hint of a proposition to dissolve the union between Belgium and Holland, which in the following week was substituted for all other demands. All declared that they wished the fundamental law—the whole fundamental law, and nothing but it.

A deputation had set out from Liege, on the 27th of August, with a similar address, and a similar list of grievances. It was elected with the unanimity of the notables of the city, and consisted of members equally respectable; namely, Messrs. Raikem and Deleeuw, members of the states-general, and M. Deschamps, an advocate of the Liege bar. The Liege deputation was likewise instructed to demand the speedy convocation of the states-general, but was intrusted with no commission respecting the repeal of the union.

When they arrived at the Hague, they were received with promptitude and treated with kindness by his majesty, who announced to them that their main demand had already been complied with, and that he had convoked the states-general for an extraordinary meeting on the 13th of the ensuing month. In pressing the other parts of the representation with which they were intrusted to his majesty, they found him disposed to take them into

a favourable consideration. It was plain that in many of them he could not give satisfaction, except with the concurrence of the states-general, as they implied the repeal or enactment of laws which did not lie within the unaided competence of the executive. His majesty, however, had it in his power to change his ministers: and as the dismissal of Van Maanen was declared an indispensable condition of peace,—of a return to a better order of things,—this concession ought to have been made instantly. But in this case his majesty unfortunately hesitated. With his characteristic obstinacy, where any conscientious conviction stood in the way, he resolved to retain his minister, and dismember his kingdom. He did not, however, declare that this was his inflexible purpose. He only told the deputation that he was willing to attend to the demands and representations of his Belgic subjects, but that they must not strip him of his just rights; that they must not make their demands in arms; and that he must not appear to yield with a pistol at his head. Unfortunately, his armed petitioners placed their chief reliance upon the pistol; and, having primed and loaded it, held it to his head, demanding the surrender of his prerogatives, till it accidentally went off, and blew away his crown. Both the deputations of Brussels and Liege published, on their return, an account of their mission, of which simultaneous events diminished the importance.*

* We insert the following report of the *Brussels Despatch*, to show, in the first place, that the king was disposed to make

His majesty, without waiting for any representation from the disturbed provinces, took the re-

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reasonable concessions; and, in the second place, that there was at first no talk of the repeal of the union: —

"Having arrived at the Hague on Monday at one o'clock, we asked for an audience of his majesty. Half an hour had scarcely passed when we received a favourable answer. On Tuesday at noon we went to the palace. His majesty received us with kindness, asked us for our powers, and did not object to the title by virtue of which we presented ourselves.

"After we had read to him the address with which we were intrusted, his majesty told us that he was very happy at having been able to anticipate our wishes in convoking the states-general for the 13th of September, — a legal and sure means of learning and satisfying the wishes of all parts of the kingdom, of doing justice to their complaints, and of discovering the means of remedying them. After some general observations we proceeded to the exposition, and then to the discussion, of the several points which in your meeting of the 28th you charged us to communicate verbally to his majesty.

"A discussion arose on the theories of ministerial responsibility and of the *contré seing*. The king said that the fundamental law did not authorise our theories: that they might be just, and even useful; but that they could not be established except by a change in the fundamental law, in concert with the states-general, convoked with double the casual number of members: that, as an extraordinary session would be opened on the 13th of September, there would be an opportunity, either at his desire, or at the invitation of the second chamber, for a proposal on this point, as well as on all the others which we had discussed, and might be thought useful and advantageous to the country.

"To the demand of the dismissal of some ministers, and especially M. Van Maanen, his majesty did not say a word in their favour. He expressed no displeasure, and did not contradict the complaints which we enumerated at length against

solution—a fatal one, as it turned out—of sending his two sons, the prince of Orange, the heir apparent,

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them. He observed that the fundamental law gives him the free choice of his ministers; that, besides, he could not take any determination so long as he should be constrained to it; that he set too much value on the honour of preserving the royal dignity, to appear to yield like one to whom a demand should be addressed with a pistol to his throat. He let us plainly see, as well as the deputies from Liege, that he might take our demand into consideration.

"With respect to the supreme tribunal, his majesty said that it was upon mature deliberation that the place for its establishment had been chosen; that he would, however, consider of this request, and of the means of reconciling all interests.

"To our application respecting the unequal distribution of officers of the great establishments and public departments, his majesty seemed afflicted, and, without disputing the truth of the facts, he said that it was very difficult to divide the public offices, that it is still more difficult to please every body; that, however, he would attend to this subject as soon as good order should be re-established; that it was necessary, first of all, that the princes, his sons, should enter Brussels at the head of his troops, and thus put an end to the apparent state of constraint, to which he could not yield without giving a pernicious example to all the other towns of the kingdom.

"After long discussion on the inconveniences and the probable disasters which would ensue if the troops entered by force, and the advantages of a convention, and a proclamation for their entrance, maintaining the partial occupation of the posts of the city by the burgher guard, his majesty desired us to see the minister of the interior, and to present ourselves to the princes on our return to Brussels. In conclusion, his majesty expressed a desire that all might be calmed as soon as possible. He told us, with much emotion, and repeated several times, what a horror he felt for the shedding of blood.

"After an audience of two hours, we took our leave of his majesty, and went to the minister of the interior, who, having to

and prince Frederick, commander-in-chief of the forces, with discretionary powers to redress the complaints of his Belgic subjects, and with a military force to restore obedience to his government. Troops were accordingly ordered in haste from the frontier garrisons of Holland to march upon Brussels; and, for greater expedition, some were even sent by steam-boats up the Scheldt to Antwerp, from the interior of the northern provinces. The princes arrived at Antwerp on Sunday the 29th of August, where they were received with considerable enthusiasm by the upper classes and commercial body, whose interests had prospered in an unparalleled manner under the Nassau government since their union with Holland. Here, as at Brussels, a civic guard had been formed for the purpose of preserving order, but with no design of resisting the constituted authorities. The princes made extraordinary efforts to render themselves popular among the inhabitants of this important city. Their attempts to secure attachment by the condescending affability of their manners, and to inspire confidence by their liberal promises and ready concessions, showed the sense which they entertained of the dangers with which they were surrounded, and of the necessity of counterbalancing the disaffection of one district by the increased devotion of another. They

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go to the king, appointed us to be with him at eight in the evening.

"Similar discussions arose on the several points laid before his majesty. All was done with a frankness and openness which gave us the greatest hopes."

issued, however, no proclamation calculated to calm the general effervescence. After receiving at a grand levee all the authorities, the provincial noblesse, and the chief merchants, they proceeded on Monday the 30th of August to Vilvorde, a town about five miles from Brussels, where a considerable detachment of troops had halted, by convention, on their march to reinforce the garrison of the capital, and on which a more considerable corps with a park of artillery was advancing in the rear of their royal highnesses. On their arrival at this place they were waited upon by the minister of national industry, who came to Brussels for the exhibition of manufactures, by the three generals commanding the troops, and by other public functionaries, who gave them a vivid representation of the state of affairs in the capital. Thus instructed, the prince of Orange on the following morning sent one of his aid-de-camps to request the attendance of the baron d'Hoogvorst, the commander-in-chief of the burgher guard, that he might concert with him the means of allaying public discontent, satisfying public opinion, and restoring the custody of the public peace to its former guardians. This officer obeyed the summons, but did not choose to go alone. He was accompanied by a deputation of five other gentlemen, namely, MM. le baron Vandermissen, le comte Vanderburch, le cheyalier Hotten, Rouppe, the old mayor of Brussels, and Van de Weyer, subsequently member of the provisional government. They were instructed to invite the princes to enter the capital unattended with their troops, to concert measures for the restoration of

confidence, and to see with their own eyes the excellent spirit of the civic guard, "equally resolved to secure order and to defend liberty." The interview was long, the discussion animated, the result unsatisfactory. Neither party could repose confidence in the views or intentions of the other, though neither was prepared for an open rupture. They could not therefore call things by their right names, or properly define their relative differences. The heir apparent saw before him the chiefs of the insurgents, ostentatiously displaying colours hostile to his dynasty, but could not treat them as rebels. He was even obliged to thank them for interfering to send away his troops, and for organising a civic army to resist his authority. On their part, the deputation took the liberty of loyally disobeying his commands, and of dictating the terms on which he would be allowed to enter his father's capital. The former, when he wished to express his indignation at existing disorders, was obliged to ascribe them to rioters no longer turbulent, while the peacemakers were his real enemies; and the latter, in resisting the king's commands, affected the most lively interest for the honour of his crown, which their arms had protected against a misguided populace. "Troops march against us from Holland," cried they; "they come to subdue the Belgic rebels! There are no rebels in Belgium; the citizens have themselves suppressed all disorders."

The deputation had insisted, the greatest part of the day (Tuesday, August 31.), that the princes should enter their city *alone*, and trust the protection of their persons to the burgher guard.

Their royal highnesses refused to comply with the invitation, unless they could be accompanied with their troops, who were to resume their different posts as before the tumults. The long absence of the deputies had excited some alarm; their return with this message, to the conditions of which they had refused to accede, created a noisy indignation. The report was rapidly propagated from the Hôtel de Ville through all the sections of the civic guard, and among all the partisans of revolution (over whom the committee had an unlimited command), that the princes had refused all concessions; that their Dutch troops were about to enter the city by force; that the guards were to be disarmed; and that their houses were to be exposed to pillage. On the spread of such alarming news, encouraged by the deputation, who were well acquainted with their falsehood, the people, under the guidance of the leaders of the movement, began to form barricades across all the streets through which the troops could enter. The pavement was torn up, the stones were formed into mounds across the streets, waggons were overturned and laid across them, and the most approved method of Paris barricading was followed under the direction of Parisian practitioners. As the deputation had engaged to submit the proposition of the princes to the civic guard and the authorities of the Hôtel de Ville, and return with an answer as to their admissibility, they went back to head-quarters about midnight with the description of this universal alarm and these formidable preparations for resistance. On hearing the statement, the prince of Orange agreed to give up

that part of his plan which regarded the entrance of the troops, and engaged to proceed through the city to his palace under the escort of the civic guards alone, accompanied with only two aids-de-camp.

Now was the time for giving his royal highness an impression of the spirit, strength, and determination of his Belgic petitioners. A general order was issued the same night to the commanding officers of all the sections of the civic guards, to assemble on the Wednesday morning (the 1st of September) in the *grande place* of the Hôtel de Ville, in their respective divisions, and under their national standards. The summons was obeyed with alacrity; and never, probably, was a finer or more formidable-looking body of men collected in arms from the population of any town of the same size—organised and disciplined in the course of a week—than that which appeared under the old Brabant colours in the ancient and picturesque square above mentioned, whose gorgeously ornamented Gothic structures had already witnessed so many grand historical scenes. Having formed in the square to the amount of between 8 and 10,000 men, with two squadrons of horse volunteers, this civic force defiled along the streets to the gate of Laaken, by which his royal highness was to enter. He was there received by the staff of the burgher guards, and had to pass along their whole line ranged on different sides of the streets, over barricades formed the evening before to resist the entrance of his troops, and accompanied on both sides with a jealous escort, who had refused to take off their seditious

cockades in his presence, and who studiously exerted themselves to repress every token of applause or sign of congratulation which the spectators, as he passed, wished to show to the son of their sovereign. He seemed rather a captive in the hands of his conquerors, than a prince come to redress the grievances or to receive the homage of his father's subjects, and must have seen, in the cold reserve and humiliating suspicions with which he was treated, an evidence of the slight tenure of Nassau power in Belgium. Anxious to proceed directly to the palace, he was driven, after a struggle of half an hour, into the square of the *Hôtel de Ville* by the populace, where he was obliged to make a speech to the provisional authorities, whom he regarded as rebels; and, in escaping from this scene of humiliation over the barricades, was in danger of being shot by one of their guardians, who thought, from the speed of his course, and his separation from his escort, that he had deserted the citizens, and was hurrying to call in his troops.

On his arrival at the palace he immediately relieved the body of troops which had for eight days kept their station before it, ordered them to retire, and intrusted that quarter of the town, as well as the rest, to the burgher guard.

His first care was to invite the attendance of the chiefs of the insurrection, to learn the grievances of which they complained, and to make the necessary arrangements for the restoration, not of order—for that now was not disturbed—but of lawful authority and civil obedience. As it was difficult, where opinions were so diversified, to obtain any general

understanding from isolated individuals on the measures to be adopted, his royal highness nominated a commission to sit in the name of their fellow-citizens, and to make such propositions as would allay the public ferment. The names and appointment of this commission were announced on the same evening, in a proclamation signed by his royal highness. It was composed of the duke d'Ursel; of M. Vanderfosse, the governor of the province; of M. de Wellens, the burgomaster of Brussels; of baron Vanderlinden d'Hoogvorst, the commander-in-chief of the burgher guard; of the duke d'Aremberg, who had taken no part in the previous proceedings; of general Aubramè, and of M. Rockaert, member of the Brussels regency. After two days' deliberation, after consulting with the deputies of the states-general who had arrived at Brussels, and with the deputation which had returned from the Hague, this commission came to his royal highness on the morning of the 3d, with the proposal of a measure which had never before been hinted at—a measure which had not been suggested to the king by any of the deputations which had waited upon him with complaints—a measure which included the redress of every grievance which the Belgians could trace to Dutch ascendancy—a measure which, probably, in the state of public feeling, and after the excesses to which national antipathies had been carried, was probably the only one which could beget confidence or restore order,—a dismemberment of the kingdom—a total separation between the northern and southern provinces, with no point of

political contact or dependence, except by the crown, common to both! The members of the states-general then at Brussels, the staff of the civic guard, and deputations from its different sections, together with a deputation from Liege, were present, along with the commission, when this report was to be made; and the *Courrier des Pays Bas* gives the following graphic account of what it calls the "touching scene:"—

"The prince asked the assembly what were their wishes.

"All present, by an unanimous acclamation, demanded the separation of Belgium from Holland. M. Moyard spoke first in the name of the burgher guard, and asked, besides, the removal of the troops.

"*The prince.* But, then, do you promise to remain faithful to the dynasty?

"*The assembly*, with enthusiasm. "We swear it."

"*The prince.* If the French entered Belgium, would you join them?

"*The assembly.* No! no!

"*The prince.* Will you march with me for our defence?

"*The assembly.* Yes! yes! we shall.

"*The prince.* Will you say with me, God save the king?

"*The assembly.* Not before our wishes are attended to. Long live the prince! Liberty for ever! Belgium for ever!

"The prince burst into tears. They embraced each other in the midst of a general enthusiasm; and the

old generals, who mixed in the group, could not contain their emotion."*

From this moment the two portions of the kingdom were in effect separated, and nothing but conquest could re-unite them, as conquest alone had formed their original union. The heir apparent to the throne had agreed to submit the proposal to his father, and to support it with all his influence. The proposal was no sooner known than it was enthusiastically adopted by the Belgians. The Dutch, who disliked their Belgic connection as much as the Belgians disliked the Dutch, could oppose no obstacle to the separation. The king, though unconscious of having done any thing to render neces-

* The following is the original :—

" Le prince demanda à l'assemblée quels étaient ses vœux ?

" Tous les assistans, par une acclamation unanime, demandèrent la séparation de la Belgique et de la Hollande. M. Moyard parla le premier, au nom de la garde bourgeoise, et demanda en outre l'éloignement immédiat des troupes.

" *Le prince.* Mais alors promettez-vous de rester fidèles à la dynastie ?

" *L'assemblée,* avec enthousiasme. *Nous le jurons !*

" *Le prince.* Si les Français entraient en Belgique, vous joindriez vous à eux ?

" *L'assemblée.* Non ! non !

" *Le prince.* Marcherez-vous avec moi pour notre défense ?

" *L'assemblée.* Oui ! oui ! nous le ferons.

" *Le prince.* Direz-vous avec moi, *Vive le roi ?*

" *L'assemblée.* Non pas avant que nos vœux ne soient écoutés ; mais Vive le prince ! Vive la liberté ! Vive la Belgique !

" Et le prince fondait en larmes, et l'on s'embrassait mutuellement au milieu d'un enthousiasme général ; et les vieux généraux qui étaient mêlés à la foule ne pouvaient contenir leur émotion."

sary so important an alteration in the fundamental law of his kingdom, and overpowered with grief at the ingratitude of his Belgic subjects, could not withstand the desires of both parts of his dominions; and the allies, who by their treaties had attempted in vain to effect a lasting incorporation between such heterogeneous materials, could not again put provinces and states into their political mortar, to bruise them into a more uniform and consistent mass. Nothing, therefore, seemed to remain but the settlement of the necessary conditions of the separation, and the establishment of regulations for the government of both states under the same crown, through the legal and recognised forms prescribed by the fundamental law itself. This, of his own power and by his own authority, the king could not accomplish; but the states-general had been convoked, and with their aid the project was to be effected. The Belgians boasted that their revolution was accomplished by the mere display of physical force; that they had attained every thing for which they took up arms; and that, satisfied with administrative, judicial, financial, and military establishments distinct from Holland, they would willingly continue subjects to the king by whom they had hitherto been governed, and whose government was only hateful to them by being administered on Dutch principles and for Dutch interests.*

* Eight of the deputies to the states-general, who met his royal highness at Brussels, issued a proclamation to their "dear countrymen" on the near prospect of obtaining all their wishes. The names of these eight ought to be recorded, as they are, we believe, all now members of the national congress, and the

It would be difficult beforehand to conjecture by what accident of fortune, or by what effort of faction, such a reasonable arrangement was defeated, and such prospects of peace dissipated.

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most violent enemies of the Nassau family. They are the count de Celles, baron de Secus, M. de Barthélemy, M. de Langhe, M. de Brouckere, count Cornet de Grez, M. Huysman d'Annecroix, and M. de Roisin. They tell the people of Belgium that they had represented to the prince, "that the dynasty of Nassau had never for an instant ceased to be *the unanimous wish* of the Belgiums; that the difficulties of their situation, the impossibility of reconciling opinions, manners, and interests which were irreconcilable having ceased, the house of Orange might count upon the attachment and fidelity of all."

CHAP. II.

THE BELGIC REVOLUTION. — EXPULSION OF THE DUTCH.

THE prince of Orange having engaged to support with zeal the proposed separation of the north and the south, as the only means of reconciling the latter to his dynasty, and having ordered the troops to withdraw from Brussels till the question should be decided, set out on the 3d of September for the Hague, to lay the proposal before his father and his government.

In the circumstances in which he had placed himself, he had probably no alternative but to make the promise; and having engaged his word, he ought to have had no after-thought or hesitation. It was perhaps, imprudent to trust himself alone in Brussels, where he could deny nothing; but, having conceded every thing, without protesting against the compulsion to which he was subjected, it became indispensable to the existence of his dynasty that his pledges should be fulfilled. A frank avowal of his obligations, and a manly support of his engagements, however unpalatable at the court of his father, was his only safe policy — his only honourable course. The time for half measures of concession — for compromise between conflicting interests — for repentant liberality or timid reserve, had passed by, The question was no longer the removal of this or that person from office, or the redress of this or that

grievance, but the removal of Dutch influence from Belgium—the redress of the great grievance of the union. After his declarations to the Belgic patriots, the prince was no longer entitled to remain neutral on this question,— to be a Belgian at Brussels, and a Dutchman at the Hague. By agreeing to the proposal of a separation, he had left only the alternative of throwing all the odium of its failure on his father's government, or inducing his father to perform honestly and faithfully the pledges given in his name. He must have been sensible that there was in the Belgians a deep-rooted distrust of his family; that every part of their conduct was viewed with suspicion, and criticised with severity; and that the armed burghers of Brussels, who were in real, though not declared rebellion, could place no reliance on promises which appeared to be extorted, till by a frank and unreserved ratification they had obtained such a guarantee for their execution as would render the retention of their arms useless and burdensome.

As soon as the prince reached the Hague, and had given an account of the state of affairs in the south, the king issued an important proclamation, dated September 5., embodying the royal version of the engagement which his son had made at Brussels. In this proclamation his majesty spoke of the insurrection of Brussels as the parent of the numberless calamities which had visited two provinces, and threatened the quiet of the adjoining provinces. He then states, that, on hearing the afflicting intelligence, he had hastened to convoke the states-general to concert the measures which

the exigencies of the times required, and had sent his two sons to the disturbed districts to protect, by the forces placed at their disposal, persons and property, to assure themselves of the real state of things, and to suggest the means best calculated to restore obedience to the laws. This mission they had performed with humanity and generosity; and their report had convinced him, that even in the most agitated provinces, attachment to the dynasty and to the national independence was preserved and proclaimed. However afflicted, therefore, he was at the circumstances which had come to his knowledge, he did not despair, with the co-operation of good citizens, of succeeding in restoring order, and re-establishing the agency of the legal powers and the dominion of the laws. He then adds:—

"With this view we calculate upon the assistance of the states-general. We invite them to examine whether the evils of which the country so loudly complains arise from any defect in the national institutions, and if it is possible to modify them; and particularly *if the relations established by treaties and the fundamental law, between the two grand divisions of the kingdom, should, with a view to the common interest, be changed or modified.* We desire that these important questions should be examined with care and perfect freedom; and we shall think no sacrifice too great, when we have in view the fulfilment of the desires and to insure the happiness of the people, whose welfare has been the constant and assiduous object of our care. But, disposed to concur with frankness and fidelity, and by the most comprehensive and decisive measures, we are,

nevertheless, resolved to maintain with firmness the legitimate rights of all the parts of the kingdom without distinction, and only to proceed by regular methods, and conformably with the oaths which we have taken and received."

This proclamation was far from satisfying the expectations of the people of the southern provinces. It was represented as not sufficiently decided and explicit in its promise of separation. It confounded too much the two classes of men whom it was the interest of the agitators to keep distinct, and left doubtful whether the calamities which his majesty deplored were ascribed by him to the original rioters, whose burnings and pillage had been arrested, or to the armed petitioners, who, having put down the former, now used their influence to obtain the proposed separation. The "anarchy," which he describes as presenting itself under the most hideous forms, was precisely the exercise of that power on which the people prided themselves, and which had procured those concessions from the crown which were embodied in the proclamation itself. The very unnecessary announcement of a resolution to maintain "the legitimate rights of all parts of the kingdom," and to "proceed only by regular methods" to dissolve the union, inspired a suspicion that if the present ferment ceased, advantage might be taken of those "regular methods" to defeat the ultimate object at which the petitioners aimed. It could *not* be denied, that in all the towns where the citizens had taken up arms on pretext of preserving peace, the agency of the general government had been paralysed; but when municipal councils had joined

themselves to the armed inhabitants, and acted along with them—when the commanders of the king's troops had, in concert with the civil authorities, abandoned their post—when the crown prince himself had, though perhaps under duresse, sanctioned the movement—and when tumultuous disorder had been succeeded by the calm attitude of the nation, strong in the power of self-government, and resolved to be governed only on certain principles, a less offensive language ought to have been adopted towards the leaders, and a more explicit promise given of a compliance with the general wishes.

While the doubtful expressions of the proclamation were thus perverted by the revolutionists into a ground of suspicion against the intentions of the court, the halt of the troops sent from Brussels at Vilvorde, within two leagues of the capital, and the arrival of greater forces to join them in that position, were represented as a display of hostility and bad faith on the part of the government. If the king intended to grant the demanded separation, the satisfied people would return to obedience without compulsion, and a military menace would only be a cause of useless irritation. The presence of the troops was, therefore, construed into an indication of the king's intention to put down the insurgents by military force, and not by a faithful discharge of his son's engagements. The commander-in-chief of the burgher guard, actuated by these fears, proceeded to Vilvorde, and obtained the consent of prince Frederick to the breaking up of the camp at that place, and the removal of the troops to a distance in the rear.

In the mean time the separation became almost the universal rallying point of the Belgians. It appeared a satisfactory redress of all grievances to those who ascribed every evil of which they complained to Dutch ascendancy, and it did not alarm the friends of the reigning dynasty, whose power it would not diminish. It appeared the sign of a national regeneration to be accomplished without violence. It gave a kind of right to the people to remain in arms,—not as against the dynasty, whose prerogatives it did not pretend to touch,—but against the Dutch, from whom it was a political divorce. It was supported by representations sent to the king from the regencies or municipal authorities of Brussels, of Liege, of Namur, Louvain, Mons, Tournay, and, in fact, of all the considerable towns of Belgium, with the exception of Ghent and Antwerp, whose interests were involved in the continuance of the union. Already a Dutchman was considered almost a stranger in Belgium. Dutch officers commanding Belgic troops were regarded with aversion. Dutch law officers were prevented from executing their functions. Some of the taxes imposed since the union, and considered as Dutch, were discontinued; and all Belgic functionaries were appealed to to support the cause of their country. Though the separation had done nothing more than abolish pretexts for such antipathies,—than remove the necessity of keeping two people so irreconcilable constantly in the presence of each other, or of speaking two languages in the same legislative assembly, and allow each people to maintain its nationality unmolested by unsuccessful attempts at

amalgamation,—it would have had sound policy and good sense on its side. But so fearful were some of the Belgic deputies to the states-general that his majesty would resist the measure, unless compelled by further displays of power on the part of the people, that they had resolved, at a meeting of about twenty, which took place at Brussels on the 6th, not to proceed to the Hague, till the answer to the prince's proposal should be received, and his majesty's presumed obstinacy should be overcome. There can be little doubt that had that answer been in the negative, or had his majesty's determination been expressed against the separation, the states-general would have seen very few Belgic members, and that a kind of Belgic convention, composed of the deputies of the south, would have sat at Brussels. The appearance of the king's proclamation published at Brussels on the 8th of September, though it did not dissipate their fears, changed their resolutions. A party of them proceeded to the head-quarters of prince Frederick, and represented to him the vagueness of the proclamation, and the necessity of more prompt and decisive measures for allaying the public discontent than it seemed to promise. The prince demanded a statement of their observations in writing, and promised to transmit it to the Hague. They complied with his request, and resolved themselves to proceed to the opening of the states.

The prince of Orange had given ground to hope that he would return to Brussels with an answer in person to the demands of which he was the bearer. His non-appearance was charged as a breach of en-

gagement, and aggravated into a ground of supicion against his father's government. Van Maanen had been dismissed on the return of the prince; but, because he was not disgraced and banished from the Hague, as well as execrated and pillaged in Brussels, the Belgic patriots could not be satisfied. A factious press continued to agitate the country with the most sinister rumours, and to mislead the common people by the most treasonable doctrines. Under the pretext of supporting the legitimate demand for a separation, it openly invited the citizens to revolt, and provoked the troops to desert.* The mission of deputations to Brussels from the different towns which adhered to the principles acted upon in the capital, — the transmission of arms, which the government was too feeble to prevent, lest it should lead to a premature struggle†, — the arrival of the

* Even in the theatres, under the eye of the authorities, particular places were assigned to the Liege volunteers, who had come in arms to assist the people of Brussels; and verses were sung which contained the most direct incitements to revolt. On the 12th of September the great theatre was re-opened for the first time after the disturbances, and under the Brabant colours displayed from the roof, was sung the Brabant hymn, of which the following are the last couplets: —

" Mais malheur si de l'arbitraire
Protégeant les affreux projets,
Sur nous du canon sanguinaire
Tu venais lancer les boulets.
Alors tout est fini, tout changé,
Plus de pacte, plus de traité;
Et *tu verrais tomber l'Orange*
De l'arbre de la Liberté."

† On the 13th two cannon arrived from Liege, at the headquarters of the civic guard. " This patriotic gift is said to have

most hot-headed demagogues as volunteers from Liège and other places, kept up a perpetual excitement; while the misunderstandings between the military who surrounded the town and these itinerant patriots, on their respective rights and limits, gave occasion to frequent collisions and continued complaints.

As if resistance had not been sufficiently organised already, the agitators at Brussels proposed, on the 8th of September (the day after the arrival of the royal proclamation, and while about twenty of the deputies were in the capital), to establish a "commission of public safety," whose objects should be threefold:—1. To watch over the maintenance of the rights of the dynasty; 2. To secure the maintenance of the principle of separation; and, 3. To attend to the interests of trade and industry. This commission was formed with the consent of the regency, and out of a list of candidates presented by the different sections of the civic guard. The original list was sixteen, out of which the regency were allowed to select eight, whose names are of some importance as connected with future events. Their names were the prince de Ligne, the duke d'Ursel, M. Frederic de Secus, count Félix de Merode, M. Gendebien, M. Van de Weyer, M. Rouppe, and M. Meeus. The prince de Ligne refused to accept the commission; and we afterwards find all the proclamations of this seditious junta signed only

been received with enthusiasm." At Liege itself, an artillery corps of volunteers was organised and disciplined. For what? to act against a mob? No; to act against the government.

by the five last names. The announcement of the first object of this committee, namely, to maintain the rights of the dynasty, might from the event appear a cruel irony, if we did not know that at this time few of the upper classes of society in Belgium had entertained the idea of making any change with respect to the family on the throne.

Such was the situation of things in Belgium, when the extraordinary session of the states-general opened at the Hague, on the 13th of September. The king's troops were every where, by agreements with the citizens, confined to their garrisons, or assembled in encampments, apart from the people; the civil authority, in two or three provinces, was in the hands of men who had effected this dislocation of local power from the general government; the cry of separation from Holland had become as general as it was loud and enthusiastic; all the bonds of obedience, except in conformity with this master principle, had been broken by the sudden burst of national feeling; associations were universally forming, and bodies of citizens arming, to carry it into effect by force, should it be refused to peaceful solicitation; and, after a fortnight's insurrection, the Belgians seemed to consider their political change as completed in all but its legal and constitutional forms.

The Belgic deputies, who had at first resolved to absent themselves from this assembly, saw upon reflection, that they were not justified in taking such an extreme measure, and changed their purpose. They could not but admit that the king had called them together in virtue of his acknowledged right;

that he had promised to employ their deliberations on the subject of their grievances; and that the world would be entitled to condemn them, for attempting to gain by rebellion and violence those advantages which they might secure by quiet, and constitutional means. Some, therefore, from a regard to the welfare of their country, and others from an attention to their engagements — some from a fear of offending the king by their absence, and others from a desire of displaying their courage before their Dutch fellow-subjects, proceeded to the Hague. In taking this step they had to resist the representations and remonstrances of the revolutionary party, and the factious journalists of Brussels, who endeavoured to fix upon their compliance with the royal summons a charge of weakness, — who tried to convince the people that their deputies could not give an independent suffrage in the midst of Dutchmen vociferating "rebellion," — and who expressed the most alarming apprehensions that the national cause might be sacrificed, by being pleaded in a foreign capital, and under foreign bayonets. An attack which had been made on M. de Stassart by the populace, on his landing at Rotterdam with a deputation, after the first disturbances, was pointed out as likely to be repeated on the other deputies; while the near approach of the season (the 18th of October) when the court and chambers would, by the fundamental law, be transferred to Brussels, was represented as a reason why the extraordinary session should have been held in that capital instead of the Hague.

None of these motives prevailed. The mem-

bers of the popular chamber of the states-gener assembled, with the exception of five. Both Dutch men and Belgians, to the number of 105, wor orange cockades. The latter could scarcely insult their sovereign by continuing to display the colours of revolt; but they were under no necessity of adopting those of Dutch loyalty. None of the predicted violence had been offered them. They were insulted by no mobs, and menaced by no bayonets. Their persons were as secure, and their movements as free, as if they had been in Brussels.

The speech from the throne, which, by being delivered in Dutch, unfortunately afforded to the Belgic branch of the states-general another practical illustration of the inconvenience of their union with Holland, was entirely occupied with the recent insurrection, and the measures necessary to restore order. It began by stating that while his majesty, at peace with all nations, was delighted at witnessing his kingdom flourish by internal order, commerce, and industry, and was studying the means of still further alleviating its public burdens, and ameliorating its internal administration, tumults suddenly broke out at Brussels, "marked by scenes of pillage and conflagration," which afflicted his heart, and were revolting to the national humanity. His first care in these circumstances, he said, was to convoke the states-general, to co-operate with him in checking the progress of the evil, and averting the horrors of civil war. It was now less necessary, he added, to search into the causes and origin of the events alluded to, than to enquire into the means by which tranquillity may not only be re-esta-

blished, but permanently consolidated. As the chief means of accomplishing this object, his majesty approached the momentous proposal of the separation, in the following terms : —

" In many quarters it is thought that the welfare of the state would be promoted by a revisal of the fundamental law, and even by a separation between countries which are united by treaties and by the fundamental law ; but such a question can only be discussed in the manner which is prescribed by the same fundamental law, to the observance of which we are bound by a solemn oath.

" I require on this subject the opinions of your assembly, given with that frankness and calmness which its great importance so especially requires ; while I, on my side, wishing above all things the happiness of the Netherlanders, whose interests are confided to me by Divine Providence, am perfectly ready to co-operate with your assembly in the measures which may tend to promote it."

His majesty concluded by an allusion to the storm of revolutions which had passed over his head, his reliance on the fidelity and courage which put the sceptre into his hands, and his resolution not to yield to the spirit of faction. " Fully prepared," said he, " to meet reasonable wishes, I will never yield to the spirit of faction, and shall never consent to measures which would sacrifice the prosperity of the nation to passion or violence." This language, as addressed to the assembly whom he had convoked to aid him in putting down violence, and against whose decisions, if in favour of a separation, it would be a declaration of civil war to contend, was uncalled for

and imprudent. It was necessarily offensive to the Belgian deputies who had abetted the proceedings at Brussels, and tended to produce distrust of his frank disposition to make the concessions which he had previously announced.

The subsequent message, which was delivered to the chamber on the same day as soon as it was constituted, though as ample in its proposal as could have been expected, did not altogether remove the impression made by the speech. The message, after alluding to the proclamation of the 5th, and the tenour of the speech which the deputies had just heard, submits the two following questions to their deliberation, and requires a frank and free expression of their sentiments upon them as soon as possible:—

1. Whether experience has indicated the necessity of modifying our national institutions?

2. Whether, in that case, it is for the interest of the general weal to change the relations established by treaties, and the fundamental law, between the two great divisions of the kingdom?

The solution of these very important questions (the affirmative of which ought probably to have come from the crown in the shape of recommendations) had to be obtained by the concurrence of too many conditions, — had to be strained through too many formalities, and was liable to too many contingencies, to satisfy popular impatience, or to remove disloyal suspicion. The articles 229, 230, 231, and 232. of the charter or fundamental law, to which his majesty in his speech refers, as necessary to be observed in deciding on the proposed separation, and to the observance of which he conceived

himself bound by solemn oaths, required that, in all changes of the constitution, a law should pass in the ordinary form, describing these changes, and declaring their necessity;—2dly, That this law should be transmitted to the provincial states, who should return a number of extraordinary members, equal to the number of the ordinary members of the chamber, and chosen in the same manner as the latter, to decide upon it;—and, 3dly, That this double chamber should only deliberate on the project when two thirds of its members were present, and that it should pass its proposed enactment only by a majority of three fourths. A decision of the question of separation must thus have been the work of several months, and left the government in the mean time only the alternative of permitting the continuance of disorganisation and disaffection, or of putting down agitation by the dangerous experiment of military interference. The fundamental law never could contemplate so important a change in its provisions as the dismemberment of the kingdom, and therefore the articles above referred to could not apply. The contemplated separation arose from necessity, and necessity alone could dictate the mode of executing a measure which necessity imposed. Had there been any prospect of defeating the measure by delay—of wearing out the patience or changing the views of its supporters—of reducing the turbulent by force—of gaining over the selfish by corruption—of procuring a majority of the provincial states against the separatists—of inducing the Belgic deputies to renounce at the Hague the opinions which they had declared at Brussels,

then it would have been politic to have taken advantage of the tedious forms of the constitution to discuss propositions subversive of the constitution itself. But such a hope could not for a moment be entertained, after the consent of the prince of Orange to the separation — after the declarations of the majority of the Belgic deputies — after the display of national hostility in the Dutch and Belgic journals — and after the adherence of several Dutch towns to the project so ardently desired by their rivals. A Dutch member (M. Byleveld), even before the message was communicated, showed the necessity of the separation by declaring, on hearing the president speak in French, that he did not wish to be considered as understanding that language, and that he must in consequence leave the assembly.

The royal speech was received at Brussels and in all the insurgent towns with the same dissatisfaction as the previous proclamation. A meeting was called at the Hôtel de Ville of the capital, the morning after its arrival, to address — not the king, not the states-general as a chamber — but the body of Belgic deputies at the Hague on the subject. This address, proceeding from representatives of the different sections of the burgher guard, from the committee of public safety, and from such private individuals as chose to sign it at the meeting, complained in bitter terms that the king did not properly understand the state of the country — denied that the kingdom was flourishing when the insurrection at Brussels broke out — claimed for the citizens the merit of having put down the tumults which the measures of government had excited —

expressed indignation that the citizens, instead of being thanked for their tranquillising interference, had been, in the royal speech, confounded with the authors of the pillage and conflagration, whom they had reduced to order—defended the armed attitude which the citizens assumed, and the colours which they had adopted as their rallying signs to obtain their rights—appealed to the deputies whether they themselves had not, at Brussels, sanctioned their proposals of separation from Holland, and described their apprehensions at the designs of the government, when they saw Dutch troops in greater numbers occupying their fortresses and surrounding their towns. The length to which the discussion might lead, and the immediate danger of an appeal to force while the question remained undecided, was as forcibly drawn as if the petitioners had really been the friends of order. In conclusion, they prayed their representatives to obtain from the throne a tranquillising and decisive measure, calculated to restore the confidence indispensable to the interests of trade and industry; to press upon his majesty the necessity of terminating the hostile demonstrations with which they were menaced, and of sending back to their garrisons those troops which had been marched from the north to surround or to occupy their towns, the inhabitants of which had no desire to engage in civil war, and no object beyond that separation which the crown had submitted to the deliberation of the states.

The operations of the states-general were certainly slow, considering the urgency of the occasion, though their inactivity and procrastination were

rather to be ascribed to their own tedious formalities than to any obstacles thrown in their way by the government. They had not prepared their address in answer to the speech from the throne till the 23d of September; and their answer to the royal message, propounding the question of separation, was not delivered till the 30th, when, as we shall immediately see, it had been already decided in the affirmative by the volunteers of the provisional government of Brussels.

The king, in submitting the question of separation to the chambers, had done all that, in his opinion, his conscience or his oaths would permit him to satisfy the reasonable wishes of the Belgians, and conceived that he had now a right to speak to them as a sovereign, and to terminate their equivocal state of pretended defenders of the dynasty, and declared enemies of the royal authority—of keepers of the king's peace against himself—of loyal insurgents and menacing petitioners. He was urged to come to some decision respecting the disturbed districts, not only by the obvious danger and positive mischief of allowing their existing disorganisation to continue, but by the representations of some members of the states-general. Two days after their meeting M. Doncker Curtius made a proposition for the appointment of a commission of ten members, the half to be chosen from the deputies of the south, and the half from those of the north, to deliberate on the state of the southern provinces, and to propose the necessary measures to restore obedience to the laws.

Before any step was taken respecting the sepa-

ration, he conceived it necessary that "*the rebels* should be reduced to order;" and gave it as his opinion that nothing but a military force could effect that object. A similar proposition was made on the 18th by another Dutch member, M. Van Sytzama, and supported by some deputies from the same division of the kingdom. The language used on the occasion, though perhaps the only language that could be employed, excited great indignation, and tended to increase previous disaffection. The Belgic deputies took no part in these discussions, and announced no opinion as to the best mode of restoring order. These propositions of the Dutch members led to no result, but they showed the feeling of Holland on the subject, and confirmed the court in its intended policy. In addition to this incitement to a more decided conduct, the members of the chief embassies at the Hague, and some military foreigners, whose opinion had great weight with the king, advised an appeal to arms, on a question which, from the mutinous spirit and violent proceedings of the insurgents, arms must ultimately decide. Prince Frederick, the commander in chief of the forces, who had been called to the Hague about the opening of the session, joined in this opinion, and returned to Antwerp on the 16th, to prepare for the execution of his father's orders.

Never was a government more justified by every principle of right and order,—by a due regard to its own dignity and authority,—by the duty which it owed its peaceable subjects, and by a natural resentment, felt at continued insult and provocation, in appealing to force, than the government of the

Netherlands on this occasion. Every concession hitherto made had only led to additional exaction; and when at last the king had expressed his willingness to agree even to the ultimate wish of the insurgents, the dismemberment of his kingdom, provided the representatives of the nation agreed to the proposition, and allowed him to sanction it consistently with his oaths, by carrying it through in the forms prescribed by the charter, the factious partisans of separation only became more clamorous in demands, bolder in their defiance, and more hostile in their menaces.

Without paying the least attention to the expressed sentiments of the king on the question of separation, — without showing the least return of gratitude or confidence for his proposition to the states-general, the junta of agitators at Brussels, who were so enraged at the name of rebels, openly preached rebellion, and prepared resistance. "The situation of Belgium," said their organ, the *Courrier des Pays Bas*, on the 17th, "presents only this alternative: we must fight for our liberty, or submit to be slaves, by allowing ourselves to be restored to the order alluded to in the states-general." "Two nations, two adversaries, are in front of each other: the one desires its deliverance; the other endeavours to prolong its oppression. In the struggle which may ensue, justice is on our side — victory must be so likewise." "This is a decisive moment for Belgium; it must now be free, or enslaved for ever." In a letter of De Potter's, from Paris, published in the same journal about the same time, we find the following words, embodying his previous dreams and subse-

quent projects: "Should the chief of the reigning family refuse legitimate emancipation, let him bear the penalty—let him see rising beside his *Batavian kingdom, the federal republic of the Belgic provinces.*" Their representatives at the Hague came in for a share of obloquy and reproach; first, for obeying the king's ordinance, in repairing to the meeting of the states; and, secondly, for not returning instantly home after the king's speech. "Our timid deputies," cried the organ of the faction, "fail in the first of their duties—that of serving their country. They tremble in the midst of a Dutch populace, in a distant city, to which their *culpable imprudence* has carried them. They do nothing for the people, whose confidence they betray, after having obtained it by their declarations at Brussels. Let them return; let them listen to the voice of their conscience, the cry of the Belgians—their true, their only brothers—and to that of posterity, which will only spare them the name of traitors by giving them that of blind and shameful dupes."

Nor did they satisfy themselves with the mere words of rebellion. The committee of public safety, by its own sole authority, dismissed persons from their official employments, as if government had been dissolved, and desired one of the law officers of the crown (M. Schouermans) not to appear at his post, because he had been obnoxious to them in his pleadings or proceedings in the case of De Potter. It received deputations from all the disaffected provinces, and organised resistance to the government, as if the king had been an external enemy. It sent emissaries to the Hague, to examine the state of

things at the seat of power, and to concert with the deputies on the measures to be pursued, should the troops be ordered to put down insurrection. • It encouraged the formation of a society or club, called THE CENTRAL UNION, consisting of the most factious and revolutionary citizens, assembled from all the provinces, whose object was the discussion of political principles, and the proposal or execution of political measures. This association, which became a focus of sedition and treason, was installed after the arrival of the king's speech, on the opening of the session, and consequently when all reasonable motive for resistance had ceased. The people of Namur had been so excited by the instigations of the Brussels junta, that its governor, general Van Geen, was obliged, on the 18th, to declare the town and fortress in a state of siege; and at Liege, attempts had been made to take one of the fortifications from the king's troops. At Mons, the insurgents, on the 16th, endeavoured to possess themselves of the royal arsenal, and tore down the royal arms. At Louvain, on the 16th, the populace, with the approbation of the authorities, seized the cases of arms proceeding from Liege to the garrison of Antwerp. Similar acts were committed, and similar scenes took place, in the greatest part of the towns of South Brabant and Liege.

But it must be confessed, that immediately before the unfortunate attack on Brussels, on the 23d of September, which terminated in what is called the *glorious revolution* of Belgium, though the violence of the revolutionists had increased, the number and respectability of their adherents or dupes had sen-

sibly diminished, on hearing the reasonable concessions of the king, and seeing his determined purpose to restore order. Trade and business had been at a stand for nearly a month. Peaceful citizens complained of perpetual agitation and constant alarm. Credit was almost annihilated, from apprehensions of civil disturbances; industry was interrupted by intolerable exactions on the time of the citizens for military duty; the labourers and workmen, thrown out of employment by the destruction of commercial confidence, were at once a heavy burden for the expense of their maintenance, and a source of danger from their idleness and riotous disposition; and the great body of the middle classes of society, the shopkeepers, tradesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, menaced at once by the populace and the king's troops, had begun to repent of the countenance which they had given to demagogues, and to pray for the re-establishment of the royal authority. They saw their lives and their property — the safety of their families, and the peace of their country — exposed to the mercy of a set of foreign adventurers, seditious clubbists, and itinerant traitors, who had gained the command of the rabble, and who were prepared for any desperate enterprise, because they had committed themselves too deeply against the government to expect its clemency, and therefore thought that returning "was as dangerous as to go on." They had become tired of the fatiguing service of the burgher guard, and had begun to hire substitutes to perform their turn of duty. Their posts were less frequented than at first, and the patrols of the sections were executed

with more reluctance. The disgust felt at the hardships of the service was increased by the charges of treachery brought against the lukewarm guardsmen in the clubs of revolutionists, and the threats of being disarmed by the populace whom these clubs excited. To such a pitch of dissatisfaction had these dangers and hardships, this misery and distress, excited the citizens, that a petition against separation had been prepared at the exchange; and several addresses, pretty numerously signed, were sent to prince Frederick, offering to receive his troops into the city, and praying him to hasten his march.

By the 18th or 19th of September, all government, municipal or military,—permanent or provisional,—royal or revolutionary, was at an end in Brussels, and the city was threatened with a frightful anarchy. The burgomaster and council of the regency, who had pretended at first to act with the insurgents in the king's name, had deserted their post—the committee of public safety were about to consult their own safety by flight to the French frontier—and the council of the burgher guards, on whom measures of defence against the external enemy and internal tumult devolved, were paralysed with terror, and had prepared to follow their example. A body of Liege volunteers, whose ardour could not be restrained, had on the 18th proceeded from Brussels on the road to Tervueren, one of the royal palaces, to reconnoitre the position of the royal troops, and had surprised an advanced post held by four gendarmes, whose horses they seized and brought to the city. Another party of the same hot-headed young men had interrupted the progress of the Antwerp dili-

gence, which returned to town. These unauthorised acts of hostility were severely reprimanded and formally disavowed by the trembling members of the committee of public safety, who, in this last deed of their official existence, apprised the citizens of the measures which they had taken to prevent similar instances of insubordination. They even ordered the horses to be sent back to prince Frederick, and a letter to be written him expressive of regret at this infraction of their engagements, and offering all the reparation in their power. The proclamations announcing these orders were torn down by the sovereign mob, who, instead of feeling regret or alarm at what had been done, surrounded the Hôtel de Ville in great crowds, accompanied by the Liege volunteers, with their drums beating and colours flying, and by a considerable number of the more violent of the burgher guard, calling for the delivery of arms. This tumultuous assemblage was harangued by the chief of the Liege volunteers, an advocate of the name of Rogier (afterwards in the provisional government), who ordered arms to be distributed among them, and headed them through the streets, shouting liberty and singing seditious songs. In these riotous proceedings the burgher guard sometimes interfered, and were overpowered or disarmed, like the royal troops at the end of August.

On the 20th the populace broke into the Hôtel de Ville, threatened the committee of public safety, who sat there for the last time, and seized upon all the arms in the cellar or depôt of that place. With these arms, and those formerly taken from the burgher guard, a corps of about two thousand of the

lower orders was equipped, either for pillaging their fellow-citizens, or resisting the king's troops. An official announcement of the dissolution of the committee of public safety was then made in the following terms:—"The commission of public safety is dissolved, and the authorities exist no more. The central union has come to a decision, that it shall be succeeded by a provisional government, composed of three members." This provisional government, consisting of three nameless individuals, who were nowhere to be seen, and appointed by an authority whom nobody recognised, was too ridiculous to attract attention. In the course of the same day, a list of provisional rulers was handed about among the sections of the burgher guard, consisting of count Felix de Merode, M. Gendebien, baron de Stassart, count Oultremont, M. de Potter, M. Van de Weyer, and M. Raikem. Some of these gentlemen had already run away, others had not yet arrived, and those present would not accept of the proffered honours; so that from the morning of the 20th there was not the shadow of a civil or political government in Brussels.

The patriots of the central union seeing that their only reliance was to be placed on the lower orders, deserted by their superiors, put arms into their hands, formed them into regiments and companies, joined them with the guards of the sections who still continued their military duties, or organised them into volunteer corps to fight independently of the civic troops. But military chiefs were as difficult to be found as municipal rulers. Baron Vanderlinden Hoogvorst still continued the nominal commander-

in-chief of the civic guards, but declared himself disqualified for leading his troops against the enemy, though he gallantly promised to await them at the Hôtel de Ville, and to resist them in this last entrenchment of municipal independence. All persons of property were alarmed at the situation into which they had been brought, and prayed for the arrival of the royal troops, with an amnesty for their offences and protection for their properties. Thus the revolutionary party was nearly again reduced to its original elements* — a knot of mischievous fanatics, needy adventurers, or ambitious demagogues, acting on a brave, ignorant, and starving population; and the revolution becomes any thing but "glorious" for those who had placed themselves at its head, and who in the moment of danger deserted their post. The reports which hourly reached prince Frederick of this growing anarchy induced him to hasten the approach of the troops, as the state of the capital rendered the prospect of victory more certain, and the necessity of interference more urgent.

Preparatory to his entrance, his royal highness sent forward a proclamation, dated from Antwerp on the 21st, which, though it was not allowed to be placarded in Brussels, was very generally known, and exalted to the highest pitch the rage and alarm of the agitators. While it allowed due praise to the burgher guard for having protected public and private property, and announced that the king and the

"Un tas d'hommes perdus de dettes et de crimes,
Qui pressent de mes lois les ordres légitimes,
Et qui désespérant de les plus eviter,
Si tout n'est pas renversé ne sauraient subsister."

states-general were engaged attentively in considering their reasonable demands, it complained that order was perpetually disturbed within their walls, and that "a small number of disturbers of the peace excited the populace to pillage, the people to revolt, and the army to dishonour." It then stated, that he had come to put an end to a state of things so ruinous, by the establishment of legal order; and that the national army was about to enter their walls, in the name of the law, and at the *request of the honest and faithful citizens*, who desired to be relieved from their painful duties and to receive efficacious protection. After this preamble, it ordered the "municipal authorities" (who did not now exist) to remove all obstacles to the troops who were now about to enter Brussels. It commanded the burgher guard to give up their posts to the military, armed *strangers* to retire without arms to their homes, and all parties to give up the colours which they had worn since the 27th of August.

But the most alarming part of the proclamation was the exception made in the amnesty promised to the great body of the people: an exception perhaps unjust, when we consider the general fermentation of the public mind. of which the agitators partook; and an exception certainly impolitic, when we reflect on the number whom, in its vagueness, it might be made to affect, and their influence over the masses of the lower orders who were armed and ready for the most violent courses. "A general forgiveness," said the proclamation, "will be extended to those faults and irregularities which circumstances have produced. *Those who have acted as principals in acts*

too criminal to escape the punishment of the law will alone, and justly, be punished. Their cause has nothing to do with that of the great body of the inhabitants." This category included nearly all the stirring spirits of the insurrection. It embraced the journalists, who for a month had been preaching sedition; the members of the patriotic clubs, who had been haranguing the people into rebellion; the missionaries of treason, who had come to the capital with offers of assistance from the neighbouring provinces or the surrounding districts; the Liege detachment, which had for a fortnight stimulated the people to violence; and the more desperate members of the burgher guard, who had formed themselves into volunteer corps to skirmish with the troops. These persons saw in the proclamation no other alternative of safety but in flight, or in the chances of a victory gained by popular enthusiasm. The most eminent and wealthy demagogues adopted the former course; the more courageous and desperate remained to excite the people. The muster roll of those who were willing to fight, when the necessity for resistance drew near, was extremely limited. Scarcely a dozen of the burgher guard assembled at the different posts. When, on the 22d, the volunteers marched forth to skirmish with the enemy, not above 500 or 600 took up their arms. This was, in fact, nearly all the disposable troops of the insurrection. The agitators again looked to their barricades, and made some additional defences; but zeal for the work existed only among the poor and unemployed, who were paid for their labour, and were

assured that the Dutch were the cause of all their poverty and distress.

The magnitude of the force which encamped within a league or two of Brussels on the evening of the 22d of September was sufficient to intimidate the largest capital of Europe, and made the idea of resistance by a handful of undisciplined citizens, except in very favourable circumstances, almost an indication of insanity. Prince Frederick had collected from Holland and the northern garrisons of Belgium, on the Antwerp and Flanders roads, not less than 12,000 men, of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. They are stated in one account at ten battalions of infantry of the line, four battalions of guards, twelve or fifteen squadrons of horse, and nearly 24 pieces of cannon. The 9th and 10th divisions, chiefly consisting of Dutch troops, composed part of this corps; while another corps, commanded by general Kort-Heylegers, manœuvred between Louvain and Liege; and the garrisons of Namur and Mons had orders to put themselves in communication with the prince's head-quarters.

The volunteers who had left the city to skirmish with the advanced posts of the royal army, on the evening of the 22d, were driven back with considerable loss. It was then acknowledged, even by the most violent demagogues, that the citizens could offer no effectual resistance to such a force; but the persons who met at the Hôtel de Ville to deliberate on the prince's proclamation, were equally afraid to promise submission from a fear of the populace, as offer remonstrance from a fear of the troops. The

commander-in-chief of the civic guard therefore, to whom, along with the magistracy, the proclamations were addressed, and who alone remained at his post, returned for answer, that, in the state of popular excitement, he could not take upon himself the responsibility of attempting to execute the prince's commands. "The Maison de Ville," says Van Halen, "was again abandoned, its gates were closed, and every one in authority disappeared. The streets were nearly deserted, the magazines closed, and the panic general; and the greater part of the bourgeois, intimidated by the proclamation of the prince, very far from endeavouring to defend their hearths, hastened to conceal their arms." *

In this state of panic, M. Ducpetieaux, a young barrister, who possessed the merit in the eyes of his fellow-citizens of having been imprisoned for a libel on the government a year before; who was one of the most factious writers in the *Courier des Pays Bas;* who had been, from the beginning of the disturbances, a most furious partisan of independence; and who, of course, considered himself of sufficient importance to be exempted from the amnesty, set out for head-quarters, to make an attempt at capitulation with the prince. He had read a proposed manifesto at the last meeting of the Hôtel de Ville, in which the prince was assured that he could only march into Brussels through ruins and over heaps of slain; but he could find nobody to sign it. He therefore resolved to represent again the cause of his fellow-citizens to the consideration of the commander-in-chief, and proceeded to Vil-

* See "The Four Days of Brussels, by General Van Halen."

vorde late at night on the 22d. It was difficult for him to say in what capacity he appeared — from whom he derived his authority to negotiate — what were his instructions — or how far his guarantee could bind those in whose name he acted; but it is to be regretted that his message was not received, and that the exceptions in the amnesty, which probably would have satisfied him and his party, were not cancelled. It is still more to be regretted, that the apprehensions of the more violent party were confirmed by the arrest of their negotiator in spite of his diplomatic character, and that his treatment as a rebel showed them, while resistance was yet in their power, how little they were to expect from submission. In some conjunctures of fortune the chances of success or failure are so nearly balanced that the most trifling circumstance may turn the scale; and perhaps the crown of Belgium has been lost to the house of Nassau because the prince sent M. Ducpetieaux to Antwerp as a prisoner, instead of sending him back to Brussels with the announcement of a general amnesty.

On the morning of the 23d, prince Frederick, whose head-quarters were at Vilvorde, about two leagues from the city, ordered the troops to march upon Brussels, which seemed perfectly unprepared for resistance; there being only fourteen men stationed at the royal palace, eight or ten at the hotel of the states-general, and ten at each gate. The plan of the prince's attack was not badly conceived, though it was executed in a cowardly manner, and ended in a shameful defeat. In order to understand it, it is necessary to recall in a few words the situation

and position of Brussels, — built at the foot, on the side, and on the top of a beautiful eminence rising to the south of the Senne, a small river which divides it into two unequal parts. On the slope of this hill, which ascends rather steeply from the Hôtel de Ville and the lower parts of the town, and stretches for about a mile from east to west, a very considerable portion of the city is built. The broad plain or platform which constitutes the summit is occupied by the park, an oblong pleasure-ground of about 500 by 300 yards, running on one side parallel to the edge of the slope, from which it is divided by the noble street called the rue Royale, and on the other by the boulevards of the south-east, from which it is separated by another superb street called the rue Ducale. The park, surrounded by a dwarf wall surmounted by an iron railing, is covered with wood, formed into thickets, or ranged into alleys, which are the great promenade of the capital. At the south-west end of this spacious and beautiful square is situated the royal palace, and at the opposite is the palace of the states-general. The whole sweep of buildings on all sides have more the appearance of palaces than of private residences. The rue Royale, which bounds the park on the side of the city, runs at one end into the place Royale, a magnificent square, occupied chiefly by hotels or public establishments, and on the other extends more than half a mile, by the Nouvelle rue Royale, to the northern boulevard, by the gate of Shaerbeck. From this long line of street, various streets descend to the lower parts of the town at right angles, the chief of which are those called Treurenberg, Montagne du Parc, and Montagne de la Cour. Brussels, it is well

known, is not now a walled town; but, for more than half its outward circuit, it is surrounded with boulevards, or broad elevated promenades between rows of trees, formed by levelling its former fortifications, and extending from the gate of Antwerp on the north, round by the heights, to the gate of Halle on the south. Beyond the boulevards on this range no buildings are erected, and the walk commands a view of the surrounding country. On this boulevard enter the roads from Namur, Louvain, and Shaerbeck, by the gates so called, all of them behind the park and opening into the higher part of the town. Gates are placed at the termination of all the other roads leading into the lower part of Brussels from the north and west; but as no troops approached it except on the Flanders or Antwerp road, it was not necessary to make any preparations for defence.

Had the prince ordered his forces to enter by the direct road from Antwerp, or by the Flanders gate, he would have been immediately entangled in crooked intricate streets, which had been barricaded with considerable care; he would have had to traverse the whole of the lower town, amid a hostile population of the classes best prepared to resist him; he would have found his artillery and his cavalry of little use in the short, narrow, and uneven passages leading to the upper town; and before he could have reached the palaces, or the higher quarters of the city, would have found them pillaged, or the people in so commanding a position, that it would have been difficult to dislodge them. He therefore wisely chose to enter by the heights, leaving only a small corps to penetrate by the Flanders

gate, and meet at the Hôtel de Ville the force descending from the other side.

At seven o'clock in the morning of the 23d a detachment, consisting of one battalion of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry, appeared at the gate of Louvain, near the corner of the park, and beyond the gate of Shaerbeck; but the great body of the army, amounting to near 10,000 men, ascended the northern boulevard from the Antwerp road only so far as the latter gate, and prepared to enter it.

The citizens had erected no defences at the entrance but a slight stockade, nor had they made any effectual preparations to prevent the occupation of the long, broad, and straight street which leads directly from the gate to the park, and commands all the upper part of the town. They had erected some barricades in the Nouvelle rue Royale, and planted two cannon against the gate; but the bourgeois, who ran to oppose the troops in that quarter, after firing a few shots, were obliged to retreat. The cannon of the royal artillery planted at the gate swept this street of the citizens, and the army entered without further resistance, to occupy ground which may almost be called the citadel of Brussels. By half-past eight o'clock the troops had established themselves in the park and the royal palaces, and had planted a battery in the avenues of the former. They had forgotten, in passing along, to take possession of the ends of the lateral streets on their right leading to the lower city, the barricades of which might have been easily forced in the first moment of panic and confusion; but they communicated by their left with the column on the boule-

vards at the Louvain gate. They had thus at once possession of the whole of the higher town without any thing like resistance.

Meanwhile the greatest consternation reigned in the city. The sections of the civic guard had been called out; but they neither obeyed the sound of the tocsin of the cathedral, announcing the dangers of their country, nor the voice of their more patriotic volunteer brethren. Small parties of four or five, or single individuals, were seen hastening to the scene of action with their muskets; but there neither appeared chiefs, nor combination, nor discipline. From behind the barricades, at the entrance of the streets leading to the lower town, bodies of sharp-shooters kept up a fire on the passing columns of the army, and the troops replied by platoon discharges of musketry, or by grape-shot; but little damage was done on either side. The four or five pieces of cannon which the citizens possessed were advantageously placed, and some of them well served, especially the one which defended the entrance into the place Royale. Neither the entrance into the park, nor the possession of the palaces, which might have been made into fortresses, was at all disputed; and the troops, in the first two hours after their arrival, had acquired all the ground which they ever gained in their struggle of four days. But they had as yet done nothing towards a conquest of the lower town. Four different operations were therefore arranged: one, to push forward along the boulevards, to the Namur gate; another, to take possession of the place Royale; a third, to force a passage through the street leading to the cathedral; and a fourth, to

throw down the barricades of the street called La Montagne du Parc. Each of these attacks was supported by two pieces of cannon; but they all failed, except the first, by the bravery of the sharp-shooters who defended the barricades; and their failure gave courage to the citizens, who thus saw that they could, behind their frail entrenchments, repulse regular troops.

In the mean time two columns, about a thousand men each, which attempted to penetrate into the city by the gates of Laecken and Flanders, on the opposite side of the town, were likewise repulsed and routed. The latter, consisting of a battalion of 600 or 700 infantry and 400 hussars, was allowed to pass a stockade unmolested; was permitted to advance past a barricade for a quarter of an hour into the interior*; and on arriving at a second barricade, defended by about 30 or 40 citizens, was attacked, not only with fire-arms, but with paving-stones, bricks, and other missiles, including boiling water and quick-lime, from the windows of the houses; was thrown in disorder, and forced to retreat, leaving the colonel of the battalion and the officer commanding the cavalry prisoners in the hands of the victors. No further attack was afterwards made on this side of

* The author of a pamphlet entitled "La Révolution de la Belgique" says, that this corps was treacherously invited into the heart of the town before it was attacked; that the people cleared the first barricade, and hailed the troops with deceitful acclamations of welcome; and that it would have entered further, and been totally annihilated or captured, had it not halted at hearing the cannon in the upper part of the town, showing that hostilities had begun.

the town. This successful exploit not only raised the spirits of the civic combatants in that populous quarter, but, by relieving them from all apprehension of another attack on the side of Flanders, enabled them to proceed to the succour of their brethren in the upper part of the city.

We cannot find room to describe the irregular and desultory warfare which continued for four days between the troops and the citizens, or to detail the numerous acts of undisciplined intrepidity on the part of the latter which distinguished it.* We must confine ourselves to a few notices of the prominent proceedings which led to the general result.

Towards the afternoon of the 23d the fire slackened. A great part of the troops in the park were marched off to the palaces and the boulevards, and only such a force of infantry was left as could support the artillery and maintain the position. The object of this concentration was to avoid a fruitless skirmishing with the people, without leaders or discipline; to allow them to waste their energy and ammunition in vain attempts to capture an impregnable position, and to expose them to the galling fire of the sharpshooters and artillery in the avenues and hollows of the park, where the troops were protected from their assailants by the ranges of trees or the

* Besides the very imperfect accounts in the Belgic newspapers, various histories have been published of the defence of Brussels. Two of them are pretty extensive in their details: one by Van Halen, entitled "Four Days of Brussels," and another entitled "Bataille de Bruxelles." They agree in the principal facts: both may be a little exaggerated.

inequalities of the ground.* The great body of the troops remained thus at hand to support the division in the park, and to take advantage of any remissness, fatigue, or disorder, on the part of the people. The latter, whose powder had begun to fall short, saw through the stratagem, husbanded their resources, or restrained their impatience. As soon as the firing ceased towards nightfall, the people busied themselves in strengthening their barricades, in collecting arms, and in sending round to the neighbouring towns and villages to procure reinforcements of volunteers. Towards the evening an aid-de-camp of the prince advancing with a flag of truce was seized by the citizens as a hostage for M. Ducpetieaux, who had been sent as a prisoner to Antwerp on the evening before. In the night a deputation proceeded to head-quarters, to represent

* The author of the pamphlet entitled "La Révolution de la Belgique," to which we have already referred, gives a very different reason for this movement, and for the arrival of an officer with a flag of truce in the afternoon, than that given by the revolutionists, and mentioned in the text. He states, that prince Frederick, having seen, by the resistance of the people, that he had been deceived as to the power of the "good citizens" who had invited him to support them, was willing now, at this early stage of the contest, to withdraw the troops. He had been made aware, that though he might succeed, it could only be by devastation and massacre. He therefore sent the officer alluded to in the text, colonel De Gumoens, the chief of his staff, to have an interview with the chief of the insurgents, and to agree to stop the carnage. No chief could be found; the colonel himself was nearly massacred, and the work of slaughter went on. This important fact, if true, ought to have been officially announced in the prince's despatches.

to his royal highness the state of the capital, to declare the resolution of its inhabitants to defend themselves to the last extremity if he still persisted in his resolution to continue the siege, and to propose certain terms on which the further effusion of blood might be spared; but the negotiation had no result, as reports are said to have been subsequently brought to his royal highness that the city had exhausted its ammunition, and must yield on the following day at discretion.

All was as quiet in Brussels during the night as if nothing had occurred during the day, or as if the troops had retired from the siege. No discipline was observed on the part of the citizens: their posts were deserted, and some of their barricades left without a single sentinel. The volunteers, who fought all the day, went to rest from their fatigues, or met in the public houses to recount their exploits. As yet they had neither military leader nor civil government; and nevertheless, from the absorbing interest of a great cause, from the ascendancy of one enthusiastic idea—the defence of their liberties against the Dutch—there was no pillage or disorder.

The second day (the 24th) passed over without any striking military event, though the fighting began at nine o'clock and lasted till night. The people learnt, by a proclamation in the morning, that a provisional government had been established, in the persons of baron Vanderlinden d'Hoogvorst, the commander of the burgher guard; of M. Charles Rogier, an advocate of Liege; and of M. Jolly, an old officer of engineers. These persons declared that they "accepted the trust forced upon them by circumstances, and

were ready to resign it to more worthy hands as soon as the elements of a new authority shall have been reunited." During the night, the royal troops had possessed themselves of the gate of Namur. They were afterwards attacked in that quarter by a body of volunteers, and were obliged to fall back upon the palaces. All attempts of the royal troops to penetrate to the lower part of the town, by the streets leading from the rue Royale, and the place Royale, were again defeated by the barricades and sharp-shooters of the citizens. Bodies of volunteers arrived in the course of the day from Gasselies, Waterloo, Gemappes, Nevilles, Halle, and other places. As soon as they arrived, they immediately joined in the struggle, and tried the precision of their rifles.

The first act of the provisional government was an attempt to organise resistance, by appointing a commander-in-chief to lead their forces. Their choice fell on general Van Halen, a Spaniard of Belgic extraction, whom they decorated with the sounding title of "commandant-in-chief of the effective forces of Belgium." Several other foreigners, afterwards known in the Belgic army, had distinguished themselves on the first two days, by displays of superior courage, or by proofs of military knowledge, which astonished the brave but undisciplined insurgents. Among the rest was general Mellinet, who had been an officer in Bonaparte's army, but who now earned a precarious subsistence at Brussels by painting. Out of these, Van Halen formed a kind of staff, by whom he was enabled to give some combination and unity to the subsequent

operations of the contest. On this day the troops obtained more exclusive possession of the houses surrounding the palace of the states-general, and penetrated on the other side of the park, from the royal palace to the hotel de Bellevue, at the corner of the place Royale, and commanding that square. Towards the evening, the artillery, who had set on fire several houses opposite to the Botanic garden, near the gate of Schaerbeck, where they had entered, threw a shell into the manège or riding-school a little below the *place Royale*, and set fire to that building. The intended vengeance was aimed at the office of the *Courier des Pays Bas* in the immediate vicinity, which had been one of the main causes of the present conflict. The conflagration of this edifice, which was seen from all parts of the capital, and the destruction of which could not by possibility benefit the royal cause, only exasperated the minds of the people, and prepared them next morning for a more vigorous resistance.

The third morning opened under happier auspices for the citizens. The troops had begun to be discouraged by their failure, and the Belgic regiments to be thinned by desertion. On the other hand, volunteers hourly flocked from the country to fight under the Brabant flag. Early in the morning, while the drum was beating to arms, and the tocsin of the cathedral was announcing to the besieged city the continuance of its danger and its calamities, two envoys arrived from the prince, whose propositions for an accommodation were instantly rejected as vague and suspicious. The battle was therefore renewed with more ardour than on the preceding

day. A violent struggle took place at the corner of the place Royale, and around the hotel de Bellevue, which was captured by the citizens.

The provisional government had ordered a general attack to be made on the park; but the troops were too well posted for defence to render this operation desirable. The commandant-general Van Halen, however, rode into the enclosure along with some volunteers, more with the design of inspiring his followers with courage, than of making a *reconnoissance* of the enemy's position. Having got possession, however, of the neighbouring hotels looking into it, the citizens kept up a galling and destructive fire on its defenders. But the rue Royale was still in the possession of the troops, who occupied its whole line of houses in front of the park. It was necessary either to dislodge them, to attack the latter, or to counteract them by an unseen movement; and perhaps the ablest, boldest, and best-contrived operation of the whole struggle, was the formation of a passage on the roofs or through the garrets of these houses and the houses adjacent to the palace of the states-general, by which the people succeeded in firing from above on the soldiers. A party of them by this means were enabled to pull down the Orange flag from the front of the palace.

On the return of the evening, as usual, the firing ceased, and the civic heroes, with no regard to discipline, again abandoned their posts, to recount their exploits to their families at home, or to their comrades in the public-houses.

At the commencement of the fourth day (the 26th) ultimate success appeared so certain, that

many agitators, who had refrained from taking part in the earlier proceedings from a fear of the scaffold, came forth from their hiding places; that numerous reinforcements arrived from the country; that something like a more regular army was formed; and that a new provisional government, with an accession of numbers, and an extension of power, was constituted. Indeed, the latter was then finally settled, under the fire of the royal army; and, with the addition of M. de Potter on the following day, remained, as to the extent of its powers and the composition of its members, on the same footing, till it was superseded by the appointment of the regent five months afterwards.* Before commencing the operations of this decisive day, the prince made an attempt to negotiate; but the provisional government, perceiving the advantage which the misconduct of his troops had given to the popular cause by setting fire to the city, and the unanimous resolution of the people to resist, which the prospect of victory inspired, declared that he must leave their walls or surrender, and that they could not "treat with incendiaries." Nothing, therefore, remained but to make a last desperate effort. The troops had been fatigued by the labours, and dispirited by the repulses, of the last three days. Their

* The names announced as the provisional government on the 26th of September were, baron Vanderlinden d'Hoogvorst, commander of the burgher guards; M. Charles Rogier, advocate of Liege; count Felix de Merode; M. Gendebien, advocate; M. Sylvain Van de Weyer, advocate; and M. Jolly, officer of engineers. The treasurer was M. J. Vanderlinden; and the two secretaries, baron de Chopin and M. J. Nicolay, advocate.

position was every day becoming more difficult to retain, and more dangerous to abandon, in the midst of a hostile population flocking from the neighbouring towns and villages. Their ranks were thinning as much by desertion as by fighting. Discipline had begun to relax, and provisions to fall short. They had not gained one inch of ground but what they occupied on their first entrance; and as the barricades were strengthening, and the citizens every hour learning the secret of the strength which discipline and subordination can add to personal intrepidity, their chance of making any impression on the civic intrenchments or the civic army was every hour diminishing. Their commanders, therefore, saw the necessity of a bold attack, to recover their character, if not to subdue their enemies. With this view, early in the morning, they united their artillery, and concentrated their forces. Having still possession of the park, they directed a column to attack the place Royale and the entrance to the lateral streets leading from the rue Royale, while the troops stationed in the palaces on both sides of the park should support the combined movement. The military men who had now got the direction of the civic forces perceived the intention of the royal army, and prepared to resist its attack, by strengthening their levies, or their bodies of best volunteers, and planting their cannon so as to carry destruction into the enemy's ranks, as he advanced from the park, or from the palaces by the passage into the place Royale. The royal troops were repulsed from all points after an obstinate struggle.

In this afternoon fire was set to several houses

near the gate of Shaerbeck, where the reserves of the royal army were posted; and though the conflagration was occasioned by the citizens, the odium of it was thrown upon the troops. General Mallinet, not to be behind the royal artillery, set fire by red-hot balls to the royal stables; and during the last night of the conflict, Brussels presented a picture of all the horrors of civil and foreign warfare united.

The night of Sunday was passed by the citizens in strengthening their barricades and preparing for the conflict of the following day; but before the morning arrived the royal troops had effected their retreat, and the cause of Belgic independence was finally gained. The volunteers immediately took possession of the park, the royal palaces, and all the positions formerly occupied by the troops — hoisting on all the public establishments the Brabant colours, which were henceforward to become those of the new state. The prince remained, with the greatest part of his army, several days in the neighbourhood of Brussels; but being harassed by the civic skirmishers, and seeing no chance of being able to return by continuing the contest, he finally retired upon Antwerp, where he arrived on the 2d of October, having stationed those troops which still adhered to his standard between Vilvorde, Malines, and Antwerp.*

* The best account which has been given of the Belgic revolution, on the Dutch side, is contained in a pamphlet of eighty-four pages (already referred to), published at the Hague towards the end of last year, entitled "La Révolution de la Belgique, et les Evénemens de Bruxelles en Septembre, 1830." This account states, that prince Frederick did not enter Brussels for the purpose of putting down the insurgents *by force*; that he knew too well, from the example of Paris, Saragossa, and

The number of killed and wounded in the four days' struggle has been variously stated*; with great exaggeration on the side of the Belgians, and with proportional anxiety at concealment on the part of the Dutch. Most of the Belgic authorities estimate the killed and wounded among the troops at about 2000, and the deserters at the same amount. The official despatch of prince Frederick allows only about 500 or 600 for his whole casualties in killed and wounded. The number killed and wounded among the volunteers and civic guard was much more considerable.

M. de Potter, who had been waiting on the French frontier till victory decided on his cause, entered Brussels the day after the retreat of the royal troops, was welcomed with great popular enthusiasm, and placed at the head of the provisional government. The government, thus completed, proceeded with

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Buenos Ayres, how little regular troops could do against multitudes firing from houses and in streets; and that he would not have attempted an entrance, if he had not been invited by the citizens to their support, and if he had not believed that he would be welcomed with satisfaction by all but the rabble, by whom the city was threatened with pillage. (See page 49.) The same author (page 51.) states, that the Belgic deputies urged the king to send the troops into Brussels. Why did they not announce their opinion in the states-general, where it would have been of use?

* The pamphlet mentioned in the last note makes the number of troops which marched on Brussels 9000 men; the number engaged 7000 or 8000; the killed only 120 or 130, and the wounded between 580 and 600. The number of killed on the part of the people he estimates at 600, and the wounded at 1400 or 1500. This last number is, probably, exaggerated.

the greatest promptitude and vigour to dispose of the immense interests which accident had placed in their hands,—to organise an army,—to effect the reduction of the fortresses,—to change the civil authorities,—to re-establish the courts of justice,—and to free from Dutch influence every part of the administration. In a few days (on the 4th of October) they issued a decree, declaring the independence of Belgium, and promising the convocation of a national congress, to settle its constitution and to fix its destinies. Their zeal and efforts were even outrun by the spirit and enthusiasm of the people. The victory over the king's troops at Brussels had acted on the public mind with electric rapidity and force. Though the troops who fired upon the citizens were Belgians as well as Dutch, the whole odium of the attack fell upon the latter; and detestation of Holland, with an entire separation from the government of the house of Nassau, became almost instantaneously essential ingredients in Belgic patriotism. The garrisons were either overpowered by the citizens, or deserted their colours, dismissed their Dutch officers, and joined their countrymen. In the course of a few days, Tournay and Mons on the French frontier, Ath, Namur, and Liege, had surrendered to the provisional government. The garrisons of Ostend, Ghent, and those of all Belgium, with the exception of Antwerp, Maestricht, and Venloo, followed the example; so that by the 10th of October the provisional government had entirely supplanted that of the king, and the southern provinces were ruled from Brussels instead of the Hague.

The king, having at last agreed to a separation, and having appointed a commission to draw up its conditions, when events had decided in favour of complete independence, sent the prince of Orange to Antwerp on the 4th of October, with a body of Belgic counsellors, to administer such of the southern provinces as still remained faithful, and to bring back to their allegiance those which had revolted. It was in vain that the prince, in compliance with this commission, invited the Belgians to accept of those propositions with which they would have been satisfied a month earlier; his conciliatory voice was not heard amid the loud cries of indignation which the people raised against the attack on Brussels. On the 16th of October, therefore, he made a bolder attempt; and acknowledging some of the rebellious acts of the government of Brussels, gave a formal permission to the inhabitants of the faithful Belgic provinces to send deputies to the national congress which had been convoked by the revolutionists, offering to place himself at the head of the "movement which should conduct the Belgians to a new state of things, of which nationality should constitute the force," and to allow them to complete their institutions, and only requiring to be their sovereign. This tender, which was advised by some of the Belgic members of the states-general with whom he was still surrounded, had at first the misfortune to be repulsed by the governing junta at Brussels, and afterwards to be disavowed by the government at the Hague*; and

* "The advisers of the prince of Orange at Antwerp," says M. Barthélemy (in a letter in answer to some remarks of lord

his royal highness, after anxious attempts to regain the authority which his family had forfeited, and to reconcile his duty to his father with the claims of his Belgic counsellors, was obliged to leave Antwerp ten days afterwards, a few hours before the Belgic volunteers entered, and on the morning before the day when the bombardment of the city terminated for ever all negotiations for the re-establishment of the Orange power in Belgium.

Palmerston), "of whom I was one, were convinced that it was not possible again to unite Belgium under the same crown as Holland. They therefore conceived the idea of proposing to the congress to confer the crown of the south on his royal highness. For this purpose the prince was to separate the army into two great divisions, and to take the command of the division of Belgium. By a distrust fatal to the public peace, he was refused all power over the army; and when he published his proclamation of the 16th of October, he was deprived of all the means of executing it."

CHAP. III.

INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN GERMANY.—NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING BELGIUM.—HOLY ALLIANCE.

THE revolutionary spirit excited by the political changes of France, after passing into Belgium, made its next successful display—happily, without civil war or bloodshed—in a part of the continent where it was least expected. No less than three of the smaller states of Germany took the opportunity of the general panic created among rulers, and the general confidence inspired into the people by the successful resistance to military force in Paris, to trim their political balance, to get rid of obnoxious sovereigns, and to open a new account between the governors and the governed.

For the last ten years, no quarter of Europe had been more free from political agitation than Germany: its secret societies, its *tugenbunds* and *burschenshafts*, which had been employed as a lever to raise the masses of patriotic youth against French domination, and which had subsequently been continued in activity against the native governments, because they had broken their engagements with their liberators and defenders, had ceased to be formidable, where they had not ceased to exist. These associations formed the only connecting link between reformers or revolutionists in the different states of the confederation; and their numbers were

too limited, their resources too contracted, their objects too visionary, and their proceedings too narrowly watched, to become dangerous to any of its numerous governments. The bond of a common language, a common literature, and a federal union of powers, represented by a body of diplomatists, or rather of national deputies, was an inadequate conductor of common sentiments of government through a mass of states differing from each other in interests, habits, religion, and civilisation, and embracing every condition and variety of political freedom and civil right, from absolute monarchy to republican establishments. Having no common centre of moral action or political opinion—no common capital where publicists or politicians could assemble, to give, by their combined efforts, an impulse to the whole nation—no common grievance, even, to provoke opposition—it was not to be expected that the revolution of July would affect them all in the same way. Projects which would have been generally adopted in a more united nation, beat in vain against the narrow barrier of particular states; and lines of custom-houses interrupted the freedom of opinion, as well as the freedom of trade, between the various sections of a divided territory. The periodical press, laid under censorship in all the states, and partaking of the degrees of freedom or liberality respectively belonging to each government, could express no common opinion, and unite in no common object. At Vienna, under the inspiration of prince Metternich, it spoke the doctrines of absolutism, and preached political quietude; at Berlin, it advocated gradual but cautious improvement;

and in Bavaria it was allowed some freedom of political discussion. The publicity of legislative and judicial debates was unknown as a source of popular instruction; the tribune and the tribunal were, therefore, alike lost to the great body of Germans, in producing uniformity of opinion, or leading to the demand of improved institutions. As the doors of the confederative council are shut against the public, the diet was only known by its acts or by the published memorials of its members, and therefore could have no tendency to spread general information among the people, or to break down the distinctions by which they are divided.

If the principles of the French revolution were to make any progress in Germany, it is plain, from this statement, that they must have acted in detail, and not by a general or simultaneous movement. Some of the states had already received the gift of constitutional freedom to the full extent demanded by the most enlightened portion of their people, and had no complaints to make against their rulers of oppression or rapacity,—of violations of their rights, or contempt for their understandings. Such was the case in Bavaria, Wirtemburg, and Baden. In Prussia a basis was cautiously laying for a general legislative assembly, by the establishment of provincial states, and the rapid improvement of an administration, in some respects as enlightened as any in Europe. In Austria the government, though absolute, is paternal, and seems to suit so well the genius of the people, that perhaps it may bid defiance to political innovation for the next fifty years. But in some other parts of the confederation

discontents prevailed to a great extent, and only waited a favourable moment for explosion. Oppression was most felt, and the people were best acquainted with their rights, in the north of Germany; and on them, therefore, the example of France produced its first effect.

The young duke of Brunswick, whose quarrel with his uncle and guardian, George IV., whose capricious tyranny towards his own subjects, and whose contempt for the authority of the confederation, have attracted more attention in Europe than the smallness of his dominions or the insignificance of his personal character would seem to warrant, was obliged, like Charles X., to take flight from the indignation of his people on the 7th of September, and was lighted on his way to exile by the flames of his palace. He had annulled, in 1829, the constitution given to his states during his minority; insulted his guardian, the king of England; maltreated and banished the counsellors who conducted the government before he came of age; libelled and calumniated the government of Hanover for protecting his exiled subjects from his vengeance; and performed a thousand acts of capricious violence, which seemed more like the freaks of insanity than the effects of unrestrained power on a weak capacity and furious passions. The diet, unwilling to try the first experiment of its powers against one of its refractory members, had shown a long forbearance, but was at last obliged to threaten him with an immediate invasion of his states, unless he conformed to decrees which ordered a reparation of the wrongs committed towards a member of the con-

federation; an observance of the constitution guaranteed to his subjects; and submission, in future, to its own sovereign authority. The troops of two of the neighbouring principalities were about to enter the duchy in execution of this sentence, when he left his estates, with all the money he could collect, together with some of the precious articles from the museum, and proceeded to Paris, where he had resided for some time before the events of July occurred. As cowardly as tyrannical, he fled from the French capital on seeing how the citizens treated the troops of Charles X., and got to Brussels almost in a state of destitution, leaving his arms in the hands of the Paris populace. Being more afraid of the French revolutionists than of the confederation, he directed his steps towards Brunswick, where he arrived on the 13th of August with a single attendant, and vainly endeavoured to make the people illuminate their houses in testimony of rejoicing at his deliverance. From that time till the 6th of September, he seemed to aim, amid the increasing disgust and disaffection of the inhabitants, at making himself as unpopular as possible, in order that he might provoke resistance, which would afford a pretext to the employment of force. He showed the greatest distrust of his subjects; he went to the theatre, which was his common amusement, by a circuitous way; and never rode out without being armed. The return of one of his counsellors whom he had banished, but who had been restored by the order of the diet, was expected to excite demonstrations of satisfaction which he himself could not command; and he gave orders to consider the public rejoicing as

seditious, and to punish its authors by firing grape-shot on the crowd. Meantime he seemed entirely given up to foreign favourites, and to frivolous amusements. He banished from his presence every person in whom the public had confidence; insulted the public authorities whom he could not dismiss; and while the public distress was every day increasing, refused to call the meeting of the states. When a deputation of the citizens waited upon him to represent their grievances, the only answer which they received was a distribution of ball cartridges to the soldiers, and the display of sixteen pieces of cannon, with the necessary ammunition, in front of the barracks. This insulting treatment of the petitions of the people, and menacing defiance of their displeasure, when as yet no riot or disturbance had occurred, produced the effect which it was intended to prevent. On the duke's return from the theatre on the 6th of September, his carriage was attacked by the populace, and he entered his palace amid a shower of stones and other displays of popular execration. On the following day he was waited upon by the magistrates, who again represented to him the strong excitement of the people—the necessity of doing something to appease their fury—and the expediency of immediately convoking the states. They recommended likewise that the cannon should be withdrawn into the arsenal, and that a dangerous struggle might not be provoked by a useless defiance. The duke still refused the satisfaction which the friends of order required; and calling general Von Hertberg, who commanded his small body of troops, gave orders to repress the apprehended commotion

by military force. Preparations were accordingly made,—notwithstanding the declarations of the general that he could not rely on the soldiers if ordered to fire on their fellow-citizens,—to defend the castle by all the artillery and troops at his disposal; when, towards the evening of the 7th, the attack commenced; and his serene highness, being convinced by his attendants that, even though he fired, his life might fall a sacrifice to popular indignation, thought it better to run away. Taking with him, therefore, two aids-du-camp and a body of troops, he fled from his capital, and did not stop till he got to Hamburg, whence he embarked for England. The populace, in their indignation, had set fire to his splendid palace, which they would not allow to be extinguished till the greatest part of it was consumed. A burgher guard was immediately organised; order was restored; the states were convoked; and prince William, the brother of the reigning duke, was invited to accept of the sovereignty,—which he now exercises according to the constitution which the late madman refused to ratify. Thus, after the example of the Parisians, the people of Brunswick got rid, by an insurrection, of their petty tyrant; and popular indignation executed the judgment of the diet more promptly and efficaciously than the troops of the confederation.

The old king of Saxony, a few days afterwards, was obliged to pay a similar homage to an insurrection of the inhabitants of Dresden, and to abdicate in favour of his nephew. He had not offended his people by the wantonness of a capricious disposition, like the duke of Brunswick; but he had attempted to interfere with their religious principles, and had

exhibited too strong a disposition to squander the resources of the state in the prodigal encouragement of jesuitical bigotry. In this cradle of the Reformation, it is singular enough that the court is Catholic, while the great majority of the people is Protestant. So decided was the disposition of his majesty in favour of priests and jesuits, that, next to the attraction of good hunting, it formed the main cause of the earnest desire which the ex-king of France evinced to fix his residence at Dresden, when expelled from France. Had he been allowed to proceed thither, he would only have arrived a few days before his Saxon majesty, relieved from his regal cares, would have been prepared to accompany him to exile or to a monastery. The change was effected by the terrors of a popular insurrection, and was followed, as elsewhere, by the establishment of civic guards, who restored and preserved order.

Nearly simultaneous with these events in Brunswick and Dresden, tumults occurred at Hamburg and Leipsic, in which some lives were lost, without any definite political object. In the latter cases religious prejudice was the motive of the popular excitement, which was in the one instance directed against the Jews, and in the other against the police.

In a short time afterwards, the elector of Hesse Cassel was obliged to appease his revolted subjects by the promise of a liberal constitution. No German prince had given more just grounds of complaint against his government than this sole remaining titular of the ancient empire. His avarice, rapacity, and oppression, felt both by his family and his people, rendered a constitutional guarantee

against their future exercise an object of pressing importance.

These were prompt and cheaply purchased revolutions, which altered no dynasty, and shocked no external interest; which did not change the relations of states to each other, or occasion any embarrassment to European diplomacy. The crown, though transferred from one head to another, remained in the family; and the rights of the people received new guarantees, without exciting a thought of foreign interference. But it was otherwise with the revolution in the Netherlands, which threatened more dangers to European tranquillity than the changes in France itself. The breaking down of that kingdom into two separate states — the overthrow of the Orange dynasty in one of them — and the establishment of a new power in Europe, affected the most important arrangements of the system which had been established at the general peace.

Ever since the Dutch or United Provinces had secured their independence by their heroic perseverance, and had become formidable by their naval enterprises and prodigious commercial wealth, the Catholic Netherlands had risen into importance as a dependent state. Interposed between France, Holland, and Germany; subject for two centuries to the houses of Spain or Austria; they were separated by great distances from the power which commanded their obedience, and enjoyed with little molestation their own laws, rights, and franchises, under delegated princes, who had learned by experience that they could not be attacked with impunity. Thus, though a dependency of a foreign

state, they enjoyed many of the advantages of an independent national existence; having taught the Philips of Spain a lesson which was not forgotten by the family of Austria. But their local situation, and their subjection to a more powerful state, had this disadvantage, that it perpetually exposed them to invasion or attack, in almost every extensive European war. Their territory was generally considered by France as so much space to be traversed before she could reach Holland, or by England as so much neutral ground to protect her trade and her coast from French aggression. In whatever country, therefore, or between whatever of the great powers of Europe, the war began, the scene was sure to shift to the Netherlands during some acts of the military drama. Hence Belgium was described by an old English writer*, with no less truth than quaintness, "as the cockpit of Christendome, the school of arms, and the rendezvous of all adventurous spirits and cadets." It continued thus for two centuries, till, after passing through scenes of revolt and anarchy (not unlike those which it has lately witnessed), occasioned by the unseasonable and ill-digested reforms of Joseph II., and suffering by the excesses of the French revolution, it was incorporated with France in 1794, and subsequently formed nine of the northern departments of the French empire.

In the new arrangement of Europe which followed conquests gained over Napoleon, chiefly by English arms, or the aid of English subsidies, the separation of the old Belgic provinces from their recent connection, which had always been a favourite object

* "Instructions for Foraine Travel," &c

of English policy, could not be overlooked. Holland had enthusiastically welcomed back, in the end of 1813, her former stadtholder, under the title of Sovereign Prince of the United Provinces, and constituted herself into an independent power. Here, therefore, was a part of the old system restored by the force of circumstances, and an incorporated portion of the French empire recovering its separate existence. It became a question what was to be done with Belgium, which was equally conquered by the allied armies, and occupied by the allied troops. The inconvenience of restoring it to the house of Austria was generally admitted, and England was not satisfied that it should remain united with France. How, then, was it to be disposed of, so as to give England and her Dutch ally security against French turbulence and ambition? It was not then the fashion to think of multiplying independent states, or of consulting national partialities. Belgium had never before been independent; and its provincial or federal institutions and connections never presented the unity of a national establishment. Without colonial establishments or maritime power, it was thought too insignificant in extent, and too critically situated in point of neighbourhood, to maintain its independence. "Flanders," says Sir W. Temple, "is not of a size to support a large army, nor of a figure to be defended by a small one." But whatever experience may establish on that subject in future, the policy of the time, and of the powers who then held in their hands the destinies of nations, was not to break down large united empires into small inde-

pendencies, in conformity with popular tastes or wishes, but to collect power into large masses, by annexing states, formerly independent, to the dominions of their more powerful neighbours. Hence the fate of Genoa, Venice, the Rhenish provinces, and Poland. As the object was to secure England and strengthen Holland, it naturally occurred, that the best mode of accomplishing it was to extend the Dutch frontier into Belgium, and, by the incorporation, to obtain the requisite line of fortresses, as a protection against the ambition or encroachments of France. The union was accordingly formed, like most other political unions of that period, without consulting the wishes of the parties; though the strongest professions were made of a desire to promote their joint prosperity, and to secure their mutual tranquillity. Nor did the project seem objectionable, had the minor arrangements been differently conducted.

The declaration of the union and its conditions were consigned to a protocol, subscribed by the ministers of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at London, in June 1814, which was accepted by the sovereign prince of the Netherlands, a month afterwards, at the Hague, and which, the following spring, received the sanction of the congress of Vienna, by being embodied in its final act. The terms of this union are contained in eight articles, which secure its anticipated benefits equally to both divisions of the new kingdom. Three of these articles, which bear upon the subsequent proceedings of the allies since the separation, deserve to be here quoted. The first enacts, "That the union of Bel-

gium with Holland shall be complete and entire, insomuch that the two countries shall form only one and the same state, governed by the constitution already established in Holland, which shall be modified by common consent, according to new circumstances." The sixth relates to the debts of the two divisions of provinces; and declares, that "the burdens of the two countries, as well as the advantages, shall be common. The debts contracted up to the time of the union shall be paid out of the general exchequer of the Netherlands." The seventh decides upon the mode of defraying the expenses of the fortresses, in the following terms:—"Conformably to the same principles, the expenditure necessary for the establishment and preservation of the fortifications on the frontiers of the new states shall be defrayed by the general exchequer, as it is the result of an object interesting to the safety and independence of all the provinces." Thus, by the way, the allies settled, in the original treaty of union, the extent of territory which they incorporated under the title of Holland and Belgium, and decided on the question of their separate debts and joint obligations—questions which have been litigated with so much hostility since the separation.

In order to show that the British government considered this notable union as British work, and brought about for British objects, it is only necessary to state, that a convention was formed, about two months afterwards, by which we agreed to a kind of outfit of fortifications, and a protection of the new kingdom. We stipulated to pay 1,000,000*l.* sterling, due by Holland to Sweden, and to ad-

vance 2,000,000*l.* more, to be added to 2,000,000*l.* from the exchequer of the Netherlands, to build a line of fortresses on the side of France; and, moreover, to contribute "3,000,000*l.* more, in conjunction with our allies, for the purpose of establishing and consolidating finally, in a satisfactory manner, the union of the Belgic Netherlands with Holland, under the dominion of the house of Orange." Thus, in a season of blind and prodigal expenditure, we agreed to advance 6,000,000*l.* of British money to build fortresses in a foreign country, for the protection against his neighbours of a foreign prince, whom we could not defend at any moment from his own subjects. But, besides these enormous advances agreed to in 1814, the line of fortresses still being considered incomplete, we stipulated, on the 12th of March, 1817, for a farther advance of 60,000,000 of francs, or about 2,400,000*l.* sterling, out of our portion of the French indemnity, to strengthen the line; contributing in all more than 8,000,000*l.* sterling, of pecuniary aid, to secure our new ally on the side of France.

The Belgic provinces, which had been occupied by Austrian troops as having belonged to Austria, were surrendered to the king of the Netherlands, according to the protocol of London and the treaty of Vienna, and were incorporated, in fulfilment of the terms of the same treaty, by the constitutional act or charter called a fundamental law, which had previously been submitted for their approbation to an assembly of Belgic *notables*.

This heterogeneous body of provinces, fused into one mass by the fire of conquest, has, as we have

seen, never attained consistency or solidity. Its elements, unaffected by the political arrangement of 1814, have been kept together rather by external pressure than internal affinities. To the preservation of the work, however, the allies had pledged themselves; the king of Holland, after the revolt at Brussels, claimed their interference; and it may be worth while to enquire how far his claim to their intervention is justified by the principles of their alliance.

We can easily admit, that, if the French revolution in July had not occurred, and if the French government had not objected to see an anti-revolutionary army on their frontier, the affairs of Belgium would soon have been settled by an army of Austrians and Prussians. The principles professed at St. Petersburg and Vienna; the principles explained in the negotiation, and declared in the manifesto, of Aix-la-Chapelle; the principles more broadly stated and systematically proclaimed in the acts and declarations of the congresses of Troppau and Verona; the principles embodied in the invasions of Piedmont, Naples, and Spain, would have warranted an immediate reduction of the Brussels insurgents by an allied force. The self-erected Amphictyonic council of Europe, whose ambassadors were a kind of anti-revolutionary commissioners, and whose troops were a political gendarmerie to execute the high police of turbulent states, would not have permitted such a successful resistance to any king whom, in their jargon, "God had intrusted with power."

But as these pretensions cannot now be enforced, though they have not yet been finally or formally

abandoned, we have only to enquire how far the treaty of Vienna binds the allies to preserve Belgium to Holland. This treaty, in guaranteeing the southern Netherlands to the family of Nassau, could only intend to secure it against foreign invasion. The danger was supposed to come from France; and hence the precautions taken, and the immense assistance given to protect Belgium against a French invasion. But England could not be a party to a treaty which would guarantee to sovereigns their own states against the states themselves. She could not contribute to build Belgic fortresses on condition that they should not fall into the hands of Belgians. These treaties do not stipulate that the allies shall interfere in the domestic quarrels of prince and people; but afford only the guarantee of the contracting parties against foreign ambition or hostile invasion. To keep the subjects of a foreign state under a prince whom they think oppressive, or a system of government which they pronounce vicious, however wrong they may be in both cases, cannot be an obligation arising from any treaty. It is an act of mere arbitrary force, of a force which, in the words of M. Bignon, "has decimated the most enlightened part of the population of states, covered Europe with exiles, and erected scaffolds at Turin, Naples, and Madrid." England never acceded to the principles of such a treaty, and has often protested against them.

What, then, does the intervention mean which the allies consented to exercise at the request of the king of Holland? Not an intervention by arms to put down the Belgic rebels; for Great Britain never

could join in such an enterprise, and France would never permit it. The decided declarations and attitude of the French government saved the Belgians from such a crusade. The principles of our own policy, though opposed to the undertaking as a British object, would not have objected to any interference on the part of the king of Holland's allies, by which he might have recovered his power; but it was a vital point with the new king and the government of France to prevent the entrance of a single foreign soldier in Belgium. The assurance of this determination has, on the one side, emboldened the Belgians to speak a language which they otherwise would not have dared to have used; and, on the other, has intimidated the members of the alliance, who feel convinced that the assistance of France to the insurgents would be equivalent to the conquest of the country.

Neither is it an intervention to dictate in any internal arrangement respecting government.

The whole of their interference, as we shall subsequently see, must be limited to questions purely external, depending on obligations which the parties to the former treaty contracted towards the king of Holland, in creating the union which is now dissolved. These relate to the limits of the territory to be included in the Belgic state, and to the portion which each division of the kingdom should bear of the joint debt. The former is purely an international object, as it has never been denied that foreign governments have a right to interfere to prevent conquests, or to regulate changes of territory which would alter the relative position of

states to each other. If they can insist that France shall not annex Belgium to her territory, they can likewise insist that Belgium shall not attempt conquests over Holland. On the subject of the debt their interference would be more doubtful, if they had not enforced obligations on Holland by their former interference, from which, as the power of fulfilling them is destroyed by the separation, it seems just that they should relieve her. As these points were not, however, settled till a later period in the history of the Belgic revolution, we must defer them till we arrive at subsequent events. The only point which was placed beyond a doubt by the decisive repulse at Brussels, and the establishment of a provisional government, was, that Belgium should no longer be incorporated with Holland.

On this decision, fears were immediately expressed, that Belgium cannot maintain its independence as a separate state; that its provinces are too different in character, and opposed in interests, to be kept together, except by the pressure of a stronger government than they themselves could maintain; that it will be too feeble to resist foreign aggression by any military force which it can keep on foot; that it wants ports for its trade, and markets for its manufactures and produce, which can only be found by a connection with a larger or a richer nation; and that its separation from Holland merely leaves it in a condition to be absorbed by France. In this reasoning it does not appear to us that there is much force. The population of Belgium is as great, its territory as compact, and its boundaries as well defined, as many respectable powers in Europe. It

has nearly 4,000,000 of inhabitants; it is richer and more populous than Portugal, which, with a short interval (of the domination of the Philips), has remained independent in the immediate neighbourhood of a larger power for centuries; it is larger and better defined than any of the smaller kingdoms of Germany; and it is twice or thrice the size of Denmark, which has a part of its dominions in Germany, and possesses less of unity in its population and territory than the Belgic provinces. The differences between the Flemish and the Walloon or Brabant portion of the new state would be no greater obstacle to the harmonious conduct of their joint government or administration now, than it was in the time of the Austrian viceroys. Belgium would require no line of fortresses, except on the south; nor does it seem that, under a system of balanced power in Europe, its independence would be threatened even on that side. The independence of states is not secured by their absolute or relative strength, but by the union of the great powers to maintain the order of which they form a part; to protect the weak against the aggressions of the strong, if they have conquest for their object; and to take care that, however they may conduct themselves in their separate spheres, at least the existence of the smaller shall not be merged in a more powerful orb: such an order of things, in fine, which gives Geneva the same security for its existence as France, and makes Hamburgh as independent of the German confederation as Prussia. Under an independent government the provincial spirit would subside, the pride of nationality would begin to be felt more strongly, patriotism

would grow into a passion, and the moral means of defence against conquest or incorporation would every year increase. The interests of trade and manufactures in the southern provinces furnished a strong motive with sensible men for a continued union with Holland; but as, from other causes, that union cannot subsist, they supply no reason for thinking that a union with France is indispensable. The new state has Antwerp, and the Scheldt is open; it has likewise Ostend, and an immense system of canal navigation communicating with these ports. In the first instance, it must look out for other markets than those of Holland for its grain, its iron, its coals, and its manufactures; and it will find none so profitable or convenient. But a union with France would not better its condition; and its independence will not preclude it from forming commercial arrangements for reciprocal advantage with both. The industrious classes of society at first must pay dear, indeed, for the luxury of a factious press, a turbulent bar, and a fanatic priesthood, whose machinations rendered the permanence of their Dutch connection almost impossible; they must pay dear for the nostrums of their political quacks, and the declamations of their selfish demagogues; they must pay dear for their barricades and their patriotic clubs, their De Potters and Brabant flags, their provisional governments and their national congress, their diplomatic missions and protested protocols, their republican institutions and their cheap monarchy. But the magnitude of the price at which they purchase the name of a nation is no reason why the bargain which is now struck should not be se-

cure; and affords at least no ground why, when separated from Holland, they should lose their name in that of Frenchmen. A French writer*, indeed, claims them as a species of French property, because in Cæsar's time Belgium constituted a part of Gaul, according to the first sentence of his Commentaries—"*Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgæ.*" But he should have recollected, that Cæsar is no authority in modern diplomacy; that the conferences of London are as indifferent to his award as the congress of Vienna; that, besides, his Gaul was not all subject to a "king of the French," whether a *citizen* or a feudal monarch; that the Belgians, according to the authority of the Commentaries, would have as good a right to extend their frontier to the Marne and the Seine, as the other Gauls to the Rhine; and that at any rate the Belgians, being, according to the same authority, the "bravest of all the Gauls," may well be supposed able to defend their own portion of territory.

If the Belgians were rejoiced to find themselves, by so many sacrifices, independent of Holland, the Dutch expressed equal satisfaction at the divorce, and probably with better reason. It is true, that more Dutchmen were advanced to posts of honour and emolument in the united kingdom than could have found employment or wealth in the narrower limits of Holland; that a few more of them obtained commissions in the army, and were nominated to be commanders of provinces or governors of fortresses; that, in the higher branches of the

* In a pamphlet entitled *La Belgique redeviendra-t-elle Française?*

administration, they had more than their share of power and patronage; that, by the union, Holland had the advantage of a barrier treaty, without its exclusive expense; that Dutchmen appeared at foreign courts in greater numbers, and with more *éclat*, than they could have done, had they only been required to represent Holland abroad; and that the domains of the crown in Belgium, added to those in Holland, gave an additional splendour to a Dutch stadtholder. The advantages enjoyed by Dutchmen, in respect to their greater share in the administration, which was one of the crying grievances of their southern neighbours, depended more on accident than partiality; the king having his administration formed before he obtained an extension of territory, and finding men more accustomed to business in a country which had long been an independent state, than in provinces incorporated with a larger empire. But still it cannot be denied, that to a certain class of persons in the higher departments of government the union was profitable. Nor can it be denied, that the interest of the public debt, and the expenses of the common establishments of the country, were less oppressive when borne by seventeen provinces than by seven. But these advantages, most of which were unfelt by the body of the people, were more than counterbalanced by hardships of which all were sensible. The losses which they suffered in their trade from a change in the commercial policy, by which they had become great and rich, were the subject of complaint for the whole term of the union. Their vital policy in trade and navigation was that of freedom. They had no

domestic manufactures to protect, no peculiar produce to encourage, by prohibiting the competition of foreigners in their own markets. They could take their grain from Dantzwic, their hardware from Birmingham, their coals from Newcastle, and their cottons from Manchester or Glasgow, without exciting a murmur or calling forth a remonstrance on the part of their domestic industry. They could thus always go to the best and cheapest markets, without restraint from internal regulation, and without reference to any other principle but the quality and price of commodities. But a change necessarily took place on their union with the Belgic provinces, whose system was one essentially of protection and prohibition. "The Belgians," says a Dutch writer*, "who pretend to all kinds of liberty, condemned trade to slavery. They never ceased to spur on the government to introduce a prohibitory system, by which they have brought about the ruin of Holland. The Dutch see every day their prosperity decline; and can calculate the day when, under the present system, their ruin will be complete. Holland has risen to the highest prosperity, without assistance from nature and in spite of nature, by her institutions in favour of free trade. Belgium, enriched with all the favours of nature, thinks that she can only thrive by restrictions." Thus the united government, in order to protect the agriculture, the mines, and the manufactures of Belgium, was obliged to adopt a policy ruinous and revolting to the provinces of the north.

But this was not all that the trading Dutchman

* See "La Séparation de la Hollande et de la Belgique," by count Hogendorp.

had to endure from a connection with Belgium. He found new competitors in his commerce, shipping, and colonies, as well as impolitic restrictions on his business, and galling limitations of his markets. He met his Belgic rival, set up with his capital, every where, at home and abroad, in places where he formerly enjoyed an exclusive traffic. He saw Antwerp, with a prosperity which was almost a creation of the union, rising on the decline of Amsterdam, and foreign merchants leaving Holland to settle on the banks of the Scheldt. If the material interests of Holland were thus, in the opinion of the trading portion of the community, sacrificed to a calamitous union with Belgium, the feelings, pride, and patriotism of the Dutch were no less wounded by the irritating and insulting treatment of their national character, language, and institutions by their southern rivals. Always restless, turbulent, and dissatisfied, vain of his country, bigoted in his religion, and violent in his opinions, the Belgian was a most hateful political associate of the phlegmatic, sober, and loyal Dutchman. The factious agitation in which the former seemed to delight, was to the latter a source of torture. The former beset the states-general with petitions for jury trial, for ministerial responsibility, for the freedom of the press, and other political improvements. The latter, if they could have bestirred themselves about such matters, would have petitioned against any change. Every Belgic journal teemed with abuse of the Hollanders, on account of the difference of their manners, tastes, habits, and dispositions. The necessity, therefore, of maintaining a perpetual intercourse with a

people so hateful to them — of meeting them in the courts of justice, in the marts of trade, and in the circles of fashionable life — of seeing their business transacted in Brussels every alternate year, and of being obliged to leave their country to find their king, — made the Dutch more eager for a separation, if possible, than the Belgians. The press, the universities, the people of the great towns, and the Dutch members of the states-general, all manifested this desire. In the address of the latter to the king, after the retirement of the Belgic members, they explicitly declared, that "the whole Dutch nation looked forward with some uneasiness, fearing that, for some supposed European interest, the powers who had undertaken to interfere respecting the future fate of Belgium might *think of renewing that disastrous union*, that, during fifteen years, has caused so *much mischief to the* provinces which, *even under this burden*, have remained faithful to his majesty and his family." Thus the parties mutually repudiated each other as nations, whatever was the interest or wishes of their sovereign, and threw back the ring by which they were joined in the face of the holy alliance which effected their union.

As the system of alliance of which the union of the Dutch and Belgic Netherlands formed so prominent a work was now for ever annihilated, it may not be improper to recapitulate, in a few words, its history and objects, and to allude to the only project in modern or ancient history to which it bore any resemblance.

This celebrated league was the natural result of the position in which the allied sovereigns were

placed, and the peculiar feelings with which they were animated, at the termination of the war of 1814 and 1815. They had all seen the most striking vicissitudes of fortune; they had all been conquered in their turn; they had all experienced the insolence of the victor; they had all seen their states more or less dismembered; they had all trembled on tottering thrones, and lowered their crowned heads under the *furcæ caudinæ* of military despotism. The tide of conquest had now changed, and floated them on its waves to the capital of their conqueror. A universal shout of deliverance and hope was raised from one end of Europe to the other. The great disturber, who was conceived to be the embodied spirit of Jacobinism, — the explosive matter of revolution, — had been banished to a rock in the midst of the sea; his magic wand was broken, and his assistants dispersed. The people every where expressed confidence in their restored rulers, and anticipated an era of prosperity and freedom. Without much previous piety, the sovereigns who rode out this storm, and profited by the infatuation of their great enemy, might easily ascribe their success to a supernatural interference in their favour. In seeing their hopes more than fulfilled, and their desires more than gratified, it was natural for them to wish to perpetuate so agreeable a state of things, in which the feelings of their people appeared to sympathise with their own; and to give it permanence by some solemn act, which should at once testify their gratitude for past blessings, and their resolution, by the observance of Christian philanthropy, to deserve future support, — in short, some system of social religion,

from which projects of conquest or ambition should be proscribed — some pious engagement, in which the maintenance of peace and the administration of international justice should be stipulated for, as necessary to the family of nations as well as to individual states — some deed, in fine, in which sovereigns should declare themselves responsible agents, and nations moral existences. Out of these vague dreams of satisfied ambition, and mystic notions of political obligation, sprung the holy alliance; their majesties of Russia, Austria, and Prussia exclaiming like the disciples in sacred history, "It is good for us to be here, in this scene of Christian triumph; let us make ourselves permanent tabernacles on the foundation of legitimacy and moral order." The superstitious character of the emperor Alexander, who thought that he was converted by the burning of Moscow, and the preaching of a German mystic, gave its form to the proceeding; which, probably, had nothing in its first conception either hypocritical, ambitious, or selfish. The people had not, at its publication, shown signs of discontent, or begun to doubt the fulfilment of those promises which had been made them in the hour of need. The league, therefore, might not originally contemplate the institution of a European police, or the necessity of the great powers watching the internal condition of every state. Had Bonaparte not returned from Elba, it might have been soon forgotten amid the quarrels which the division of the spoils of Poland and other countries was about to engender among the pious plunderers: but this event gave a new warning of the dangers of disunion, and a new in-

citement to the extension of the conservative alliance. Hence have sprung the various congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Laybach, Troppau, and Verona, in which the original members of the alliance met in person with their ministers, to settle the destiny of the world on their own principles of legitimacy and order.

These principles were, first, that no state should be allowed to change its institutions, or to new-model its form of government, unless the impulse of reform was given by the ruling power itself; or, in the language of the declaration of Troppau, "proceeded from those whom God had entrusted with authority:" and, secondly, that the holy alliance, either by a joint expedition, or by a separate armament, was called upon to interfere to put down changes springing from any other source, the result of military revolt or popular insurrection. On these principles Austria was employed as the instrument for overthrowing the constitution of Naples, and suppressing the revolution of Piedmont, in 1821; and France received a commission for invading Spain, and abolishing the government of the Cortes, in 1823. On the same principles, had the danger of a general conflagration been less menacing from attempted interference, the government which was established behind the barricades of Paris last autumn would have been outlawed, and the authority of Nassau would have been restored in Belgium. Already the immense military force of Russia had begun to move westward; and tribes of Cossacs, Calmucs, and Tartars were preparing for an expedition to the Rhine, when the Polish insurrection was thrown across their

line of march. On these principles, the ordinances of Charles X. would have been substituted for the new charter of France, and Louis Philip must have ceded his place to Henry V.

As the object of this happily extinct alliance was to overpower insurrectionary movements by arms, without any reference to the danger of vicinage or the vindication of their own rights, so all the means of police and prevention were thought allowable in the previous stages of the threatened disorder. Thus we have seen political reports made to the emperor Alexander on the state of Germany, and Russian agents paid to watch over the universities and secret societies of the south of Europe. Thus we know that the periodical press of Geneva has been controlled by orders from St. Petersburgh; and that a professor of law at Lausanne was sent away from that town, because he was too democratic for an absolute monarch in explaining the principles of the republic in which he resided. If this system had not been opposed by the spirit of the age, or annihilated by a great convulsion, the picture which Gibbon so powerfully draws of the stagnation of political improvement, and the impossibility of escape for political innovators or offenders, which rendered the universal authority of the Roman empire a frightful calamity, would have been realised in Europe by the coalition of despots, which for the last fifteen years have threatened it with their interference.

The grand design of Henry IV. of France, which was only a grand romance in politics, may have served in some measure as a model to this alliance. That monarch proposed, as a preliminary, to plun-

der the house of Austria of its rich inheritance, and to subdue all Europe by negotiations or by arms. The vanquished states, like the booty after a battle, were to be thrown into a common stock (as at the congress of Vienna), and parcelled out under his direction (as was done by that congress) among fifteen states, not one of which was to observe its ancient landmarks. The powers of kings, emperors, republics, dukes, and sovereign bishops were to be ground down to powder, that the plastic hand of the conqueror might fashion them more easily after his new model. Out of these discordant materials, a mighty edifice was to be raised to permanent peace and political security. It might, in the first instance, be cemented with blood; it might be hardened in the fire of persecution; but, when once established, it was to be as fixed and immoveable as the mountain ridges of our globe. The mighty were to be brought low, and the humble were to be exalted; but their place, when once determined in the system, was to be (like the arrangements of the holy alliance) unchangeable. Rival religions, rival schemes of government, rival feelings of patriotism, were all to be kept from impinging against each other, like the medals in a well-ordered cabinet. A new edition was to be given of society; but, to use a phrase which we have before employed, it was to be stereotyped. The pope was to be in partnership with the protestant; and Peter, Jack and Martin, though they might not agree about "their father's will," were not to quarrel about their "shoulderknots." In these fifteen states were to be six hereditary monarchies (like the five great

powers of the European alliance with the grand sultan), five elective monarchies, and four clusters of republics. The pope was to obtain Naples; and to make his head, already ornamented enough by the triple crown, still more gorgeous and grotesque, was to surmount the pontifical tiara with a royal diadem. His holiness showed no reluctance to accept the proffered honours. Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, and the empire, were to be rendered elective monarchies. It is needless to proceed farther in the description of a chimera; as it is not the arrangement itself, but the mode of forming and preserving it, which the holy alliance seems to have copied. It was, like the holy alliance, to be maintained by standing armies, by large garrisons, and a directing council, which would probably be ruled, like the late European congresses, by the greater powers. The royal projector does not state by what means he could make this council agree in all the measures to which its deliberations should extend; or how he could prevent an appeal to the strongest army or the most numerous garrisons by one of its members, should it cross his ambitious views, as happened in the proposed disposal of Poland at the congress of Vienna. He had before him the recent proceedings of the council of Trent, the members of which, though they professed to have only peace and harmony in view, had separated with a disposition to burn each other on a fitting occasion. Like the holy alliance, the grand system of states proposed by Henry IV. was to provide for eternal tranquillity, order, and security. How? by prohibiting dissent; by enchaining thought; by fixing opinion; by making

confessions, creeds, and dogmas hereditary; by forcing one generation to mount the treadmill of political ignorance after another, without the possibility of advancing a step towards improvement; and by giving to the brute force of a mass, like that of the Russian emipre, the direction or control of the most enlightened communities. Happily for the world, the scheme of Henry IV. was never realised, and that of the holy alliance has ceased to exist!

CHAP. IV.

MEETING OF PARLIAMENT. — STATE OF PARTIES ABROAD AND AT HOME. — KING'S SPEECH. — DISCUSSION ON THE CIVIL LIST. — CHANGE OF MINISTRY.

THE meeting of parliament in England is always an object of some interest; but the meeting of a new parliament — in a new reign — in a new and extraordinary state of Europe — with new projects to be proposed, and new characters to exhibit, could not fail to excite extraordinary interest and curiosity. Public opinion, it is true, in this country is not guided by the legislature (to which it is as often opposed as consenting); but the assemblage from all parts of the nation of a body of men who make the course of political events their study, — who come to the house invested with that local consequence which their wealth or rank gives them in their own districts, — who are conceived to be good advisers in public affairs, because they have a great stake in the public prosperity, — and who, whatever be their wisdom or inexperience, possess at least the faculty of embodying their joint opinions in authoritative acts, is generally sufficient to give a decided direction to the minds of the upper and ruling classes of society. Whatever meets with the general concurrence of such an assembly, or receives the sanction of its majority, is considered as adjudicated by a tribunal against which there is no effectual appeal. Their speeches save the indolent the trouble of ex-

amination, the diffident the perplexity of doubt, and the selfish the dangerous error of taking the wrong side; while their opinions hold up to all a flag or banner round which political parties may rally, or against which the weakest, by withdrawing their forces from a desultory warfare, may direct their combined attack. The opinions or sentiments of an individual, which would scarcely be listened to with patience in private company — which would attract no attention in a club or tavern, become of consequence when supported or echoed by a multitude, whose votes can give them validity. In the very concentration of opinion, independently of its justice, there is a power which almost changes its nature into conviction; as the rays of a wintry sun, which when scattered are scarcely felt, may be made, by passing through a burning glass, to consume a diamond. It does not matter so much what figure goes before; if there is any figure at all, the number of ciphers afterwards tell.

The state of Europe and of our foreign relations, about which disclosures were expected to be made; the state of parties at home, of which there had been no classification since the last appeal to the people at a general election; and the new propositions which government must necessarily make, as well as those which some of its friends expected, gave an uncommon degree of importance to the first sittings of an assembly met at such a period, and invested with such powers.

At no time, during the early stages of the first French revolution, did the state of affairs among the European community present an aspect more

alarming to the established order of things, or to the existing possessors of power. All the continental monarchs were "perplexed with the fear of change," if not with actual changes. The labouring classes of society seemed every where to feel dissatisfaction with their condition, and to look to the upper orders, or to the aristocracy of rank or of the purse, as their natural enemies. The changes introduced by machinery, in throwing bodies of them out of employment, — the consequent difficulty of finding profitable labour, or the necessary means of subsistence, exasperated them against their superiors, and threatened something like a servile war — a war of poverty against property — of unemployed labour against accumulated wealth — of starving manufacturers and artisans against prosperous citizens or well-paid public servants. Every where industry was suffering, trade languishing, and the pillars of private property and public order shaking, under the blind force of an irresistible populace, threatening to pull down the social edifice that it might not "be sport to its enemies," without considering that it would itself be the first victim.

All this discontent and exasperation had got a political direction by the events in France; and what at one time would only have been a corn riot, or an explosion of popular vengeance against some alleged monopolist, was regarded as the commencement of a revolt against the government. Such an alarm pervaded Germany, Italy, the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, and the Spanish peninsula. Switzerland, before tranquil and unmoved, surveyed from her mountain heights with impunity, though

not without fear, the flames of several political volcanoes opening around her. Revolution could desire no better instruments than a starving, unemployed population collected in manufacturing towns, and acquainted with the amount of their force, without knowing the causes of their misery. They compose, at all times, the elements of political danger—the stock in trade of mischievous demagogues—the *bande noire* of civil anarchy.

Though such was the general state of the Continent, the principles which fermented in the mass were more active in France and the Netherlands, where they had already effected a revolution, than any where else. In France, the authority of the government seemed for the time to have lost all its force, and the national councils to have been domineered over by the rabble of Paris. It had been the desire of the king, the ministry, the chambers, and the upper classes of society, to prevent the execution of the ex-ministers (whose trial was soon to commence) should they be found guilty; both because they wished the career of blood to stop, because they desired to exhibit to Europe a contrast between their present and their former revolution, and because they were anxious to preserve that character for generosity and humanity which the populace had gained by saving the lives of their enemies during the struggle of the last week of July. There might be, and there very likely was, much affectation of clemency in this proceeding. It was got up in a most theatrical manner. A project of law for abolishing capital punishment, which was scarcely listened to a year before, was hailed with

enthusiasm by the chambers, and was pressed forward as an occasion of appearing magnanimous towards the state prisoners. The chamber of deputies readily adopted the proposition; but as there was a chance of not being able to carry it through in time to answer its object, its partisans thought of a plan by which they might give it all the validity of law without having the king's regular sanction, and without compromising the judicial character of the peers. The thing was dexterously accomplished. After abundance of self-congratulation, after an enthusiasm of generosity, the chamber held, for the first time, a nightly meeting, and voted an address to the king, praying the exercise of his initiative in so glorious a work. His majesty, whose father had suffered on the scaffold during the reign of terror, and who was anxious that his own reign should be celebrated for clemency,— who, moreover, had lived in habits of intimacy with some of the ex-ministers, and could not contemplate without pain the prospect of their execution, while at the same time he saw that if they were condemned he could not exercise the prerogative of mercy without appearing to palliate their crimes—adopted the proposition with eager zeal, and with a strong expression of his own personal feelings. Thus was the chamber, the ministers, and the king committed beforehand to a project for saving the late servants of Charles X., whatever might be the result of their trial; and as long as these authorities existed, the expression of their sentiments, and the pledge of their suffrages, could be considered in no other light than as a law.

The popular agitators knew that the people de-

sired vengeance, and saw how easily they could turn to account this affected lenity of the constituted authorities, by directing against them the suspicions of the multitude. They therefore pointed out to the latter the trap which had been laid for their humanity; laid open the plot which had been arranged to cheat them, by an anticipated pardon, out of a sanguinary exhibition, to which they looked forward as the price of their sacrifices for liberty; and represented the proceedings of the government as a denial of justice, from the corrupt motive of saving the enemies of freedom for future assaults upon their rights — in short, as a return to the old *régime*, and as an act of treachery to the combatants of the "grand week." Their efforts succeeded to the full extent of their wishes among a turbulent and ferocious population, which had learned its own strength by overturning one dynasty, and thought that it could control another, the work of its own hands. The executive and legislative powers were thus placed in the dangerous dilemma of resisting a popular call, which seemed to have justice on its side, or of surrendering their ostentatious humanity to the dictation of a rabble. Mobs assembled round the palace on the 17th and 18th of October; the national guard was called out in great force; assistance was obtained from the troops of the line; and Paris was kept in a state of alarm for two days. The king and the government, whose power was in abeyance at this moment, could only appeal to the national guards, who were equally hostile as the rabble to the proposition of mercy. The king, therefore, was obliged to yield in a certain degree to the mob; for

the prefect of the Seine was allowed to assure the people that justice would be done, notwithstanding the "unseasonable" agitation of the question respecting capital punishment.

Thus the populace gained their point; and the king was obliged to address thanks to his "dear comrades" of the national guards, for having saved his palace and the capital from its fury. From that time to the end of the month, France may be said to have had no government.

A misunderstanding respecting the manner of quelling these riots widened the previous breaches in the cabinet, and brought on that contest about precedency, or that dispute about systems, which led to its dissolution. The proclamation of the prefect of the Seine, to which we have alluded, was at once an attack on the chamber of deputies which had voted the "unseasonable" address, and on the ministers who had answered it in the king's name. The minister of the interior, therefore, considered it as an act of revolt against his authority,—an encouragement, because a justification, of the tumults which this functionary was called upon to suppress, and an abandonment of the only ground on which the public peace could be maintained, namely, a cordial union between the authorities of the state. The dismissal of the prefect was naturally demanded; but the minister found abettors for his conduct among his own colleagues, backed with more powerful influence than he could bring against him. M. Dupont de l'Eure, the keeper of the seals, supported the prefect, and offered to resign if he were dismissed. The ground of contest

was therefore shifted; and it became a question whether the king would support the minister of justice, who was the friend of the obnoxious functionary, or the minister of the interior, who demanded his dismissal. The popular influence of the former, reinforced by that of M. de la Fayette, and in case of need by the bayonets of the national guard, whose command the old general threatened to resign unless his friend Dupont remained in office, rendered the choice scarcely a matter of doubt for a moment. The resignation of M. Guizot was accepted; and the duke de Broglie, as he shared his sentiments, insisted upon sharing his exclusion. A practicable breach being thus made in the cabinet by the influence of popular clamour, the enemy was admitted, and the contest about the ultimate possession of power, or the ultimate trial of principles, began.

When the first ministry of the new king was formed, it was necessary to represent in its composition different parties, who had all combined to expel the dynasty of the Bourbons, and were therefore entitled to be consulted on the disposal of the power which had been wrested from them, but who were greatly at variance on the system of government which would best secure the new order of things, and satisfy the just expectations of the people. The one, as we have formerly remarked, was for adhering as closely as possible to the old charter — for arresting the violence of revolutionary changes — for hanging a drag on the wheels of innovation — for preserving the power of the monarchy, and maintaining a check on the press — for an here-

ditary peerage — for an election law giving property its due weight — for the present judges, and a system of departmental administration similar to that proposed by M. de Martignac. In short, their object was to reap the fruits of the revolution immediately, in so far as they could be gathered from a change of dynasty, and to wait for more till they were ripe. Their opponents acted upon more violent principles, and made more insatiable demands. With them all things were to be new. The principle of the sovereignty of the people appeared to them to be the sovereignty of the same class which had gained the victory of July: they desired institutions of a more popular cast; a more extensive basis for the electoral colleges; a peerage only for life; a more democratic municipal law — in short, a republic with an hereditary president. When the former party retired from power and the latter succeeded, it was evident that the cabinet must adopt more popular courses. The change, though long expected and often threatened, was brought about by the menaces of the mob, who demanded the dismissal of the ministers, as well as the execution of the state prisoners; but the difficulty consisted in settling the exact shade of colour for the future administration, and in fixing upon persons who, by their weight and character, would give it stability. Two of the ministers had retired; but a sufficient number remained, had they been unanimous, to reconstruct the cabinet. It was determined to have a president of the council, or prime minister; and the choice lay between the two bankers, M. Lafitte and M. Casimir Perrier; the latter, though sufficiently liberal, being less of the

movement party than the former. Under the banners of each was arrayed a number of influential friends, representing systems of government or sections of opinion in the nation and the chambers. The struggle between those parties, having on the one side M. Lafitte, M. Dupont de l'Eure, marshal Gerard, and M. Sebastiani, and on the other M. Casimir Perrier, baron Louis, M. Molé, and M. Dupin, lasted from the 20th of October to the 2d of November; councils being held and new projects discussed every day, amid a complete paralysis of all the powers of government. At last, after striking the balance, the *movement* party obtained the superiority, and the ministry was constituted as follows: M. Lafitte, prime minister and minister of finance; marsha Maison, of foreign affairs; M. Montalivet, of the interior; marshal Gerard, of war; M. Dupont de l'Eure, of justice; and M. Merilhou, of public instruction. The members of the former cabinet, who occupied a place in the council without any specific office, retired.

This was justly regarded as the most important step that had been taken since the revolution; as, in in fact, a decision given in favour of continuing the politics of the movement party. The whole of the Paris press, with a few exceptions, who looked upon the revolution as their own work, gave it their concurrence and applause. The king seemed to have no choice, but only regulated the play of his council like the marker of a billiard-table, without interfering in the game. It was impossible to disguise the fact, that a ministry thus composed presented few guarantees for the tranquillity of France, or of Europe; that it was the result of the riots which

disgraced Paris on the 17th and 18th of October; and that it was engaged to the revolutionists to support their extreme principles. It could at least inspire very little confidence into the English government, who now were called upon to explain to parliament the state of their foreign relations.

In the Netherlands there had been, during the month of October, three governments, each claiming the obedience of Belgium — that of the king at the Hague, that of the prince of Orange at Antwerp, and that of M. de Potter and Co. at Brussels. The commission of the prince from his father, which continued in force from the 4th to the 20th, had no other effect than to embroil him with both parties. He had tried to negotiate with the provisional government, and was repulsed: he had claimed the command of the Belgic troops from the king, and was refused. A considerable number of his Belgic counsellors remained with him till his commission was recalled. They had advised his proclamation of the 16th, by which he gave his sanction to the revolt, declared the countries separated, offered to place himself at the head of the Belgians, and authorised the districts under his command to send deputies to the national convention. In that proclamation he had said, "I recognise you as an independent nation. In the provinces in which I exercise power, I will not, in any thing, oppose your rights as citizens. Choose freely, and by the same mode as your countrymen in the other provinces, deputies for the national congress. I place myself at the head of the movement which brings you *towards a new and stable condition of things, of which*

nationality will be the force." This act having been disavowed by the king's government, the Belgic counsellors of the prince left him to join their countrymen; and his royal highness himself took farewell of Antwerp in an address to the inhabitants, dated the 25th of October, in which he expresses his regret at being unable to effect the pacification of the country, and his hope that he would be enabled to promote their happiness in more tranquil times. In the king's ordinance of the 20th of October, recalling the full powers granted to the crown prince, his majesty had declared that he henceforward limited the cares of his government to the northern provinces and to the province of Luxembourg; that he declared the fortresses of Antwerp, Maestricht, and Venloo (the only Belgic towns in which his authority was acknowledged), in a state of siege, and subjected their inhabitants and civil authorities to their military governors. Thus the *separation* was made as complete by the royal ordinance as in the proclamation of the prince; though his majesty refrained from using the words "independence" or "nationality," and limited the separation by the condition of continuing only till "he should come to decision on the settlement of the southern provinces in *concert with his allies.*". On opening the states-general of the northern provinces, two days before the publication of this ordinance, his majesty, in his speech from the throne, while he expressed his "affliction that a handful of rebels should be able to detach such a favoured and interesting population from the government," declared the separation complete, and added, that by

this means he would be enabled "to devote his attention more exclusively to them, and to employ their strength and resources solely for their own interests." One member of the southern provinces appeared in the assembly, but was told that his mission had ended. His majesty again alluded to the decision of his allies on this point; adding, "that he waited with patience, with calmness, the result of those measures and the issue of those deliberations to which the events which are taking place in the southern provinces give rise, at this moment, on *the part of the allies who guarantee the existence of this kingdom.*"

Such was the state of things up to the 27th of October. The separation of the northern and southern provinces had been declared at the Hague; and the independence of Belgium had been proclaimed at Brussels. The king had been deposed in the southern provinces; but there was still a strong prospect that the difficulties with which the Belgians were surrounded, and the hope of being able the more speedily to reconcile their new order of things with Europe, would induce them to offer the sovereignty of their state to the prince of Orange. That prospect vanished at the bombardment of Antwerp.

Having no longer any mission in Belgium, his royal highness left that city on the morning of the 26th, not knowing whither to shape his course; being considered a Dutchman in Belgium, and afraid of being insulted as a Belgian in Holland. Meanwhile the fighting, which he could not restrain, without recalling all the Dutch troops behind the

Moerdyk, — a proposition to which his father would not listen, and which, in the circumstances, would have been the height of imprudence,—continued on the road between Malines and Antwerp, beneath the walls of which the Dutch portion of the troops were driven, after three weeks of skirmishing and successive changes of position.

The towns-people took courage at the approach of their friends, and rising on the Dutch compelled them, in order to avoid a fate similar to that of the troops in Brussels, to retire within the citadel. The arrival of the Brussels volunteers, and their admission into the town, hastened this step. A convention was accordingly drawn up between general Chassé, the commander of the garrison, and the authorities of the city, by which it was agreed that the troops should not molest the inhabitants, provided they were left in undisturbed possession of the citadel and the arsenal. In breach of this agreement, an attack was made by the volunteers on the arsenal in the forenoon of the 27th; and the general replied by a destructive bombardment, both from the fortifications and the ships of war in the river, which lasted from four o'clock in the afternoon till eleven at night. Red-hot balls and shells were showered upon the quarter of the town nearest to the arsenal. Houses were set on fire in several places. The entrepôt was destroyed; sixteen houses were burned down. The cannonading was heard within a circumference of thirty miles; the conflagration was seen as far as Brussels. The destruction of property was immense, though the loss of life was not great. The people fled in all directions out of the town; foreign shipping was endangered; the town, on the fol-

lowing morning, presented the appearance of a great ruin; and the trade of the port was considered as irretrievably injured. The cry of indignation and horror which this catastrophe excited, drowned, among the Belgians, every remaining feeling of loyalty or respect for the house of Orange. The provocation which general Chassé received, and which probably, considering the nature of the irregular troops who had broken the convention, was not sufficient to justify an attack upon the town, was forgotten amidst the greatness of the disaster which he had occasioned; and, the treachery of the Belgic volunteers being kept out of sight, the whole proceeding was ascribed to Dutch jealousy—to the desire of vengeance on the part of the king, and to his wish to annihilate the trade of Antwerp for the benefit of Amsterdam.

To this fourth stage of their insurrection the Belgians had arrived at the meeting of parliament; a stage in which the southern provinces had been declared independent—in which the dynasty was not only deposed, but in which the claims of the prince of Orange had been buried beneath the ruins of the arsenal and warehouses of Antwerp.

The state of our own internal affairs was not a little alarming. Since the success of the Belgic and French revolutions, demagogues and incendiaries had been taking every method, and employing every art, to mislead the public mind on the causes of the general distress, and particularly on that which afflicted the country labourers. In the county of Kent, great bodies of the latter had assembled, to

break agricultural machinery, to compel farmers, proprietors, and magistrates to raise the rate of wages, while incendiaries had set fire to stack-yards and farm-houses. The labourers in most of the southern counties had been ground down by the operation of the poor laws, and by the harshness of overseers, to the lowest state of misery and degradation. Thrown upon the parish from their increasing numbers and a deficiency of employment, they were treated more like slaves than free-born Englishmen. Being inspired with the idea that their situation could not be worse, the law had lost its terrors; imprisonment was no longer formidable; and every obstacle to the commission of crime or violence was removed. They saw collected into great masses that wealth which they were told had been plundered from their own labour; and therefore they regarded the rich as their plunderers. They found their wages reduced by their masters, who appeared to live in affluence, and their claims for subsistence denied by the parish authorities, who were bound to support them from the land; and therefore they looked upon the property of the former as that of an enemy, and the conduct of the latter as that of an unfeeling tyrant. Hence they destroyed without remorse the thrashing machines, which enabled their employers to dispense with a part of their labour, without reflecting on the losses which they occasioned; and hence, if they did not kindle the fires of the incendiaries, they stood by and refused to extinguish them. Being idle, and having no motive to stay at home, — being in want, and requiring relief, they wandered about the country in

large bodies, intimidating the inhabitants, destroying property, levying contributions, and threatening whole districts with confusion and pillage. This evil, which first began in Kent, extended to the neighbouring counties, and, as will be seen hereafter, embraced the greater part of the south of England. In the manufacturing districts trade had somewhat revived, and, though wages were still low, the workmen obtained steady and constant employment.

Ireland was in one of her periodical fits of agitation—not on account of the oppression of the Catholics—not on account of a scarcity, of famine, or a new tax—not on account of the burthen of tithes or the exertions of captain Rock, but on account of that union with Great Britain which is so essential for the security of the empire, and which constitutes the greatest blessing to its least fortunate division. The "sister island," resolved never to let us forget either our near relationship or our separate identity, had found out, after the example of Belgium, that she would be better off with a separate administration and a domestic legislature; and therefore held meetings, and attempted to found societies, to promote a dissolution of the union. The directing spirit of this new movement was Mr. O'Connell. The chief parties on whom his delusions acted were the priests and the inhabitants of Dublin: the former conceiving that, by a separation, the revenues of the established church would fall into their hands; and the latter, that they would profit by the necessary residence of the gentry, whom a separate parliament and government would attract to the capital. The opponents of the leaders and their

adherents consisted of nearly all the wealth, property, and respectability of the empire.

The state of political parties at the opening of the new parliament, it is difficult to describe or to classify. The settlement of the Catholic question by the ministry, with the assistance of the Whigs, and against the views and remonstrances of a great portion of the Tories, who had usually supported them, had broken to pieces the former cast of parties, and no definite arrangement of the scattered fragments had yet been formed. The latter could not be immediately brought back to the government and rallied round it, as on any slight or temporary estrangement. The pride of some had been too deeply wounded by the desertion of their leaders—by the betrayal of their confidence—and the preservation of the secret of the intended change, till the minister brought the enemy into the camp. The habitual associations of others had been too rudely torn asunder by striking the flag of intolerance, which had so long waved over their heads in parliamentary majorities and party festivities. And, perhaps, the better feelings and more solemn convictions of a large body of them had been alarmed at dangerous concessions—which they ascribed to fear, or at an apparent surrender of principles, which they attributed to interested apostacy. It was therefore known that this party would still maintain that hostility to the ministers which had been produced by their former differences. Some of them had approached nearer the popular cause, and others had actually declared themselves reformers, in consequence of their treatment by the adminis-

tration, and the adoption of measures by parliament which they deemed so pernicious.

In finding an additional argument for reform in the conduct of the house of commons on this occasion, they agreed with a great body of the public; for it cannot be denied, that if the measure had been less unequivocally good, or had been less illustrated by repeated discussion, the bold stratagems and profound secrecy, so inconsistent with the open course of a representative government, which had been employed, and the rapid change of a minority into a majority at the dictation of a minister, would have rendered it one of the most dangerous and discreditable projects ever carried through the legislature, and consequently have furnished the strongest arguments for a change in the representation.

On the other hand, the party who had supported the government in passing the Catholic bill had subsequently been treated with too much coldness and suspicion by the ministers to remain their firm allies. The Whigs had allowed them to go on by sufferance; they had expected a call to aid them, but had been disappointed; they hoped during the lifetime of the late king for some attempt at amalgamation, but without much confidence that it would succeed, owing to the prejudices which his majesty was known to entertain against their leaders. The new reign, under which these prejudices did not exist, presented another opportunity of effecting a coalition of parties; but still no *desire* of sharing office with their rivals was manifested by the noble duke at the head of the administration and his

colleagues. Seeing, then, that his grace meant to remain in power, and to rule alone under the new sovereign as under the last, without any change of system or any mixture of party, they began to declare loudly their dissatisfaction. Indications of more active hostility were displayed in the pamphlets and other publications of the Whigs, from the hustings during the elections, at public meetings, at festive celebrations, and on all occasions where politics or party discussions could be introduced.

The questions of reform, of retrenchment, of economy, of legal improvement, and of colonial amelioration, had been every where agitated during the general election, and the members for populous districts had been pledged to support them. Parliamentary reform had gained such an accession of strength by the late events on the continent, and by the loud demands of the people at home, that it was supposed even to have made converts of the ministry; and a scheme for an improvement in the representation was expected by some to be announced in the king's speech, while others were afraid that the government would take advantage of the alarm felt by the timid friends of our establishments in church and state to refuse all concession.

Such was the state of affairs, abroad and at home, at the opening of the first parliament of William IV., which met for business on the 2d of November. The king delivered the speech from the throne in person. The chief topics which it embraced were the change of the dynasty in France, the state of Belgium, and a proposed interference in the affairs of the Netherlands; a proposed recognition of don Miguel as king

of Portugal; the proposed settlement of the civil list and of a regency; and, lastly, the disturbances in some of the counties in England, and apprehended disturbances in Ireland. In noticing the French revolution, the speech was as formal and laconic as possible, making use of a reserve which was perhaps commanded by commiseration to fallen greatness on the one hand, and by respect for the triumphant cause, to which compliment was unnecessary, on the other. "The elder branch of the house of Bourbon," said the king, "no longer reigns in France, and the duke of Orleans has been called to the throne by the title of the king of the French. Having received from the new sovereign a declaration of his earnest desire to cultivate the good understanding, and to maintain inviolate all the engagements subsisting with this country, I did not hesitate to continue my diplomatic relations and friendly intercourse with the French court." The ministry would have saved themselves much angry discussion, and some reasonable suspicion, had they been equally reserved in speaking of the affairs of the Netherlands. Upon that topic they entered with a minuteness of detail entirely uncalled for, and announced principles of which they ought to have foreseen the danger. "I have witnessed," said his majesty, "with much regret the state of affairs in the Low Countries. I lament that the enlightened administration of the king should not have preserved his dominions from revolt, and that the wise and prudent measure of submitting the desires and complaints of the people to the deliberations of an extraordinary meeting of the states-general should

have led to no satisfactory result. I am endeavouring, in concert with my allies, to devise such means of restoring tranquillity as may be compatible with the good government of the Netherlands, and with the future security of other states."

In this declaration the government of England assumed the right of criticising the conduct of other governments; and while it calls the administration of the king of the Netherlands (perhaps with justice) *enlightened*, it speaks of its opponents as rebels. The broad announcement of being engaged in devising means of restoring tranquillity "compatible with the good government of the Netherlands," admits of the supposition of any extent of interference in the internal affairs of that country, and, coupled with the declaration to the states-general at the Hague, could not fail to be alarming to all the opponents of Holy Alliance principles.

The proposed recognition of don Miguel was made dependent on the "performance of a great act of justice and humanity on his part, by the grant of a general amnesty." Considering the relation in which the British government stood to the constitutional party during the Canning and Goderich administrations, — considering the extent of our former intermeddling with the affairs of Portugal, which unintentionally had brought about such disastrous results to that party, — considering that, by the efforts of our diplomacy and the accidental presence of our troops, the present ruler of Portugal was restored, without resistance, to the country which he has so misgoverned, and acquired the power of inflicting vengeance on those who had

been brought to rely on our protection, the grant of an amnesty seemed a necessary condition of British recognition. Nor could the demand of such a condition be reckoned (as was represented in the debate which ensued) any intermeddling with the internal affairs of an independent state. We did not require the usurper to pardon his enemies, to open his prisons, to reverse his confiscations, or to recal the excited victims of his despotism, with any threat of hostilities in case of refusal, or upon any alternative of encouraging or promoting the continuance of revolt; we merely declared that we could not recognise him, by renewing diplomatic relations with his government, till he performed such an act of justice and humanity. He had insulted the British government, by wantonly violating treaties to which the British government was a witness, if not a guarantee; the British government had in consequence recalled its ambassador from his court, and discontinued all diplomatic intercourse with him for upwards of two years; he solicits a renewal of that intercourse, and, without at all dictating in the management of his affairs, the party from whom the favour is asked can say that it can only be granted after certain acts are performed by him to which we attach importance. Whether the amnesty would have been faithfully executed by such a perfidious prince; whether the individuals who now personate a hostile government in one of the dependencies of his crown could have relied upon its stipulations and laid down their arms; and whether, had it been violated on his part, the British government had reserved any power of punishing the violation, are

questions of detail, independent of the principle of the transaction itself. If imprudently managed, our conditional recognition might have led to interference, but it was not necessarily connected with it.

In announcing the necessity of settling the civil list, his majesty's ministers put words into the king's speech respecting the extent of his renunciation of his hereditary revenues, which, though technically correct, gave occasion to some misapprehension and much criticism. By saying that he placed, *without reserve*, at the disposal of parliament his interest in the hereditary revenues of the crown, he was found, to the real or affected surprise of the opposition, not to include the revenues of the duchy of Cornwall; because, by a quibble, these belong to the duke of Cornwall, who in the present instance, and in every case where there is not a prince of Wales, must necessarily be the king himself.

The solemn manner in which his majesty's government, in the speech from the throne, alluded to the threatened disturbances in Ireland, showed the importance which they attached to the seditious efforts of Mr. O'Connell, the sense that they entertained of the increased danger to the union of the empire from the successes of the Belgic revolution, and their determination to check at their commencement those disorganising and treasonable machinations, which, under pretext of a legislative separation between the two countries, aimed at a dismemberment of the kingdom. "I cannot," said his majesty, "view without grief and indignation the efforts which are industriously made to excite among the people a spirit of discontent and disaffection, and to disturb

the concord which happily prevails between those parts of my dominions, the union of which is essential to their common strength and common happiness." The "agitator," at whom this withering denunciation was directed, was himself in the house, to invite its application, and to witness its effect.

The debate which ensued in both houses was extremely interesting and animated, displaying on the part of the opposition an earnest application of important principles at a most momentous crisis, — an uncompromising hostility to the administration of the duke of Wellington, — and no very equivocal hopes of being able to overturn it. Mr. Brougham in particular, whose recent return for Yorkshire was both the triumph of his overwhelming popularity and a great accession to his parliamentary consideration, assaulted the policy of the speech and the composition of the cabinet with the tiger-spring of his excited energy. He had thrown down the gauntlet to the ministers on the hustings at York; he had preached a Whig crusade against them at public meetings and political dinners during the recess; he had displayed his desperate hostility in vigorous manifestoes through that portion of the press which he could command; and he now appeared in the house of commons to lead on the war, with the great seal in his view, and followed by a trusty band of reformers, resolved to storm official power, or to conquer constitutional changes. The honourable and learned gentleman, in a speech of great brilliancy and vigour, deprecated the intended interference in the affairs of the Netherlands, and happily exposed

the imprudent ministerial criticism on the conduct of the parties in the Belgic contest.* He regarded it as the duty of the throne of England to preserve for the people the blessings of peace; and he knew of no other way in which peace could be secured to them than by laying down a clear resolution, never under any circumstances to be deviated from, against all and every act or word of interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. "I know," said he, "no danger which can render hostilities more certain, and none more liable to bring them home to us, nothing more liable to make wide-spread war abroad crush and overwhelm us,

* Both Mr. Brougham and other members who spoke against interference in Belgic affairs, and censured the language of the speech in branding the Belgians as rebels, thought it a part of their duty to deny the correctness of the epithet "enlightened," applied to the government of the king of the Netherlands. It probably would have been more consistent with diplomatic decorum to have used no epithet at all on the occasion; but if any were allowable, the one selected was not unwarranted. If they should resist British authority on this subject, they may perhaps take Belgic, especially when that Belgic authority is of the kind that we can cite. The present regent of Belgium, *M. Surlet de Chokier*, who has been in the states-general during the last fifteen years, and generally in opposition to the court, spoke in 1818 of the king as "one of those philosophic princes who reign for the happiness of humanity;" and on the 8th of March, 1830, four months before the revolt, he thus expressed himself: "Nobody is more penetrated with gratitude than I towards his august person. I can say, without flattery or compliment — a king like ours, a man of talent and constitutional principles, faithful to his oaths — who listens to all his subjects, and even to foreigners, who go to boast over Europe of the reception with which they are honoured," &c.

than for us to adopt those principles of the holy alliance which are contained and embodied in the king's speech. Let it not be said that ministers, the most *feeble of any ministers into whose hands, by a strange combination of accidents, the government of this country ever fell*—let it not be said that they who are hardly sufficient to manage the routine of official business in the calmest times — who are not able to manage the business of this house in ordinary times, will never deem themselves sufficient to manage the business of a great and complicated war; and that they who are unable to steer the bark in the fairest weather, will never court the tempest and defy the storm. I am aware that headstrong men are very apt to under-rate their weakness and over-rate their power, and that no men are more apt to deem failure impossible than those who cannot calculate the danger."

We have quoted this passage, both to show the soundness of the principles laid down by Mr. Brougham respecting interference in foreign states, and to afford a specimen of his changed tone in speaking of the cabinet.

The objection made to the part of the speech relating to Portugal was answered in a very satisfactory manner by sir Robert Peel in the one house, and the duke of Wellington in the other. The observations of earl Grey in the latter, both on the foreign and domestic policy of the country, though not so pointed with hostility to the character of the administration as those of Mr. Brougham, were no less condemnatory of their system. The noble earl contended that the words of the speech,

by pronouncing an opinion on the conduct of the king of the Netherlands, and his "revolted" subjects, had announced an interference and shown a partiality which was impolitic. Mediation might at first only be intended; but if the parties despised the counsels of the mediators, was it not likely that the existing tranquillity would be disturbed? If the independence of Belgium should be established, in what a situation would the English government be placed, who had pronounced the Belgians rebels? He therefore "protested against this language, as impolitic and ill-judged — unjust to Belgium, and injurious to the interests of England." The duke of Wellington contended, that in speaking of so close an ally as the king of the Netherlands, they could not characterise what had occurred in his dominions but as a revolt against an enlightened government. The revolters had made no complaints against the king personally, or even against his administration, that could warrant their insurrection. His grace assured their lordships that the alarm expressed of a war resulting from British interference was chimerical. There was not the slightest intention on the part of any power whatever to interfere by means of arms in the arrangement of Belgic affairs. In making this declaration, the duke of Wellington no doubt spoke his own conviction on the state of things at the moment, because the conferences of London had begun, at which the French government had declared against all armed intervention; but he did not describe correctly the first intentions of the king of Holland's allies, or the probable results of their interference, had disturb-

ances in the north not prevented the Russians from marching to the Rhine.

In speaking of the affairs of Portugal and the conditions of the amnesty, the duke of Wellington declared that Great Britain would *not* be bound to enforce the observation of the latter by a war, though we should be bound to interfere in every way to prevent its violation short of absolute hostilities. We may therefore conclude that it could never have been carried into execution, and that the lists of the amnesty would only have been renewed lists of proscription.

But the discussion in the upper house was more remarkable for the declaration of the chief minister of the crown on a topic omitted in the king's speech than for his explanations on points which the speech embraced — we mean his declaration on parliamentary reform. My lord Grey, true to the principles of a long life, took occasion, from the proposal of arming for our security made by lord Farnham, to remark, that our security would consist more in removing grievances from the people, in granting them redress, in gaining their affections, and particularly in satisfying their desires, by the adoption of some measures of temperate reform, than in increasing our military establishments. He had hoisted this flag in his youth, at a time of threatened revolution, and now called upon the friends of order to rally round it. The noble earl stated that, in his conviction, if the government did not yield to measures of temperate reform, they must make up their minds to witness the destruction of the constitution, and that ministers might now pursue with

safety measures for improving the representation, which would be ultimately forced upon them at a season of greater difficulty and danger. In reply to these observations, the duke of Wellington, to the astonishment of parliament and of the country, declared that, so far from being provided with any measure of reform, he was convinced that no reform was necessary; that in his opinion the representation of the country was perfect, and that any attempt at reforming it would be an impolitic interference with the best legislative system that ever existed. "For my own part," said his grace, "I will say, that I never heard that any country ever had a more improved or more satisfactory representation than this country enjoys at this moment. I do say, that this country has now a legislature more calculated to answer all the purposes of a good legislature than any other that can well be devised; that it possesses, and deservedly possesses, the confidence of the country; and that its discussions have a powerful influence in the country. And I will say further, that if I had to form a legislature, I would create one—not equal in excellence to the present, for that I could not expect to be able to do, but something as nearly of the same description as possible. I should form it of men possessed of a very large portion of the property of the country, in which the landlords should have a great preponderance. I therefore am not prepared with any measure of parliamentary reform, nor shall any measure of the kind be proposed by the government as long as I hold my present position."

A declaration like this, so decidedly opposed to the general opinion of those who think or those who do not think on politics, seemed an attack on the common sense of the nation; a sentence of political incapacity on the great body of the people; a libel on the patriotism or abilities of two or three generations of great statesmen who had been zealous for reform; an arrogant display of contempt for eminent existing authorities on the subject; and a total ignorance of the increased strength of those convictions which the events of the continent had arrayed against the continuance of the present system. It taught persons of all classes that no sympathy could longer exist between the nation and a chief minister who poured such unsparing and uncalled for insult on their prayers and opinions. The king was still popular; but the interposition of a military chieftain, with notions so hostile to popular rights, between the throne and the people, was deemed calculated to throw an ominous shadow upon both. Up to this time the public indulged a strong hope that some moderate plan of reform would be brought forward by the government, under its auspices, or at least without its opposition. The duke of Wellington and the chief minister of the crown in the other house had in the course of the autumn visited Manchester and Birmingham, where they had been received with great enthusiasm, and feasted, as the future patrons of a measure for giving representatives to these important towns. It is true that, at the festive board, the authorities could draw no response from the oracle either for or against their darling project; but they fully anticipated a favourable answer when he should be placed on the

parliamentary tripod. His colleagues during the summer, and especially after the general election, had represented to him the necessity of some concessions to the popular claims; but they found him as inflexible as his marshal's batoon, and the camp discipline which he had established in the cabinet put an end to further solicitations. His resolution, therefore, had been deliberately taken, though at first studiously concealed, and at last probably announced in a more decided manner than his prudence would have permitted, had he been fully aware of the increased influence of reform principles in the country. The political opponents of the duke immediately perceived the immense purchase which they had gained in employing reform as a lever for shaking the cabinet; and his colleagues in the other house, on the following evening, in vain endeavoured to recover their hold, by a qualified assent to the principle of a measure against which their chief had pronounced his hostility both as to principle and details.

No division took place on the address in either house; and some of the practical measures announced by the government, such as the settlement of the civil list, or some motion introduced by the opposition, such as the reform question (of which Mr. Brougham had given notice), was waited for with impatience, as a trial of party strength or a decision on national policy.

That trial was not long delayed; and the question of the civil list, though not the real cause of the change, led to a total alteration in the composition of the ministry, and a revolution in the spirit of our public councils. But, before the occurrence of the

vote on which the cabinet of the duke of Wellington was wrecked, a circumstance had taken place, which, though trifling in itself, added greatly to the unpopularity with which the duke's anti-reform declaration had enveloped him.

The king had been invited, about a month before the meeting of parliament, to honour the city of London by dining with the corporation, and had chosen Lord Mayor's day, when a banquet would be otherwise provided, for the occasion of his gracious visit. The greatest preparations were made, accordingly, for this splendid festival. Precedents of royal city feasts were hunted out and examined; a committee had been appointed to superintend the arrangements; and all classes of the citizens looked forward to the occasion, both for testifying their feelings of loyalty, and gratifying their curiosity with a brilliant pageant. The streets were to have been illuminated along the whole line of the procession; the coloured lamps had actually been hung up, and the tasteful devices arranged for the coming exhibition. Many of the poorer inhabitants, or more economical shopkeepers, had let their windows for sums so large as would nearly pay their rents for the year; and considerable numbers of strangers had arrived from different parts of the country to witness the show. All the guests had been invited, and large sums had been offered and refused for tickets of admission. In anticipation of immense assemblages of people, extensive precautions had been taken to prevent tumult or to preserve order. The livery had been invited to line the streets, to the number of six thousand; and nearly two thou-

sand special constables had been sworn in to assist the police.

But all these preparations for preserving order had been thought insufficient by certain civic authorities; and the public were surprised on Monday morning, the 8th of November, to find that the king's visit for the following day had not only been postponed, but that neither lord mayor's procession nor dinner was to take place; that the home office had been in communication with some of the civic authorities the whole of the previous day; that two cabinet councils had been held, one of which lasted till midnight; and that, in consequence of these prolonged deliberations, the resolution of his majesty had been formed, though not without "the greatest reluctance and regret," to forego the satisfaction of his visit.

Never, probably, was so ill advised a measure taken by any set of ministers, as to consent that the king should accept of the invitation, and then advise him to decline it from a fear of popular tumult. If positive evidence could have been obtained of the formation of a seditious plot, its authors ought to have been arrested and punished. If no decisive evidence could be procured, its existence should have been disbelieved. Fear should not have been shown at any rate, where courage and resolution were the most necessary. If bodies of disaffected persons really existed, it was evident that they would be emboldened in their designs by this homage paid to their power, by this concession made to their menaces. The opinion of foreign nations respecting our internal condition must have been humilitating to our pride and boasted security, when they learned

that our sovereign could not ride through the streets of his capital, and dine with his subjects, from alarm for his personal safety. To the people of the country the disposition of the inhabitants of London must have appeared equally dangerous, when they learned that the common civic festivities, celebrated without interruption for centuries, could not now be indulged in for fear of the mob. The first effect of this announcement was a panic among the monied interests in the city, and a sudden depression in the public securities, which fell nearly four per cent in one day. The second was a general dissatisfaction at the conduct of the ministry for postponing the visit, and for alleging apprehended tumult as the cause. It was easy to have foreseen that great crowds would assemble on so rare an occasion as the combination of civic pageantry with a court procession—the union of majesty with municipal splendour; and therefore, if the danger arose from the pressure of numbers, an earlier opportunity ought to have been taken to announce the change. At all events, it could not but be inferred that the government could afterwards satisfy the country that they acted upon the most irresistible information of treason or sedition in giving occasion to such a panic. What, then, was the surprise of the public to learn, the same day, that the alarm was merely delusive, that their fears had been excited by the most ridiculous reports, and that the two civic bodies, the common council and the court of aldermen, upon the strictest examination, had found no ground for public apprehension. Suspicion and alarm turned into ridicule, when it was admitted that the whole originated in an officious communi-

cation from the lord mayor elect to the duke of Wellington, warning his grace that his own person might not be safe, and advising him to come protected; that the alderman who wrote the letter was surprised that it had become so portentous; that he had no information on the subject beyond vague rumour; that he believed the people loyal, and was surprised that the administration, on the strength of what he said, should have advised the king to stay away!

In both houses of parliament the subject was discussed with a freedom which showed that a great name could not cover an impolitic act, and the result covered the ministry with ridicule. The precious correspondence between the parties was read; and every body was surprised at the duke's want of firmness or reflection, to be frightened by an alderman, and at the alderman's want of dexterity, to have given occasion to postpone his expected baronetcy and his dinner. His grace could pretend to nothing more than the inference arising from his own unpopularity, to warrant the belief that an attack would have been made upon the king. It could be no discovery that the nights in November were long, that the crowds which the royal pageant would collect would be great, and that in this, as in all great crowds collected at night, there would be some danger of disturbances from the thieves and pickpockets who assemble to ply their trade in such an inviting field. There was no other discovery made, for no other was revealed; and every body laughed at the idea of being frightened with the bugbear of a revolution, and an assassination of the king, merely because the mob had threatened to pelt a minister with mud, or

because a foolish alderman had requested him to come to a dinner with a troop of horse.

The dissatisfaction of the citizens at their disappointment was extreme. Some were enraged at their losses, others at the imputation on their loyalty, and all of them, from motives of vanity, of interest, or ambition, joined in expressing a strong disapprobation of such an uncalled for interference with their gains, their pleasures, or amusements. Some riots took place in consequence on the evening of Lord Mayor's day, but seemed to have no political object; they were chiefly formed by idle youths between the ages of sixteen and twenty, who had imbibed an antipathy to the new police, from its active exertions to restrain their excesses. Bodies of these young men paraded the streets, attacked the civil officers, and broke windows out of mere wantonness, or for the purpose of aiding pickpockets in the exercise of their trade. Mobs collected round the *Rotunda*, a kind of hall or theatre, in Surrey-street, near Blackfriars bridge, opened for public meetings, and for the lectures of demagogues; but they produced only a little annoyance to passengers, and committed scarcely any breaches of the peace.

The parliament having recovered from this fictitious panic, received the first communication of ministers, in the presentation of a plan for the settlement of the civil list.

Before the revolution in 1688 there was no classification of the revenues or expenditure of the state into those of the crown and those of the nation. Without going farther back than the 12th of

Charles II. chap. 4., which granted the subsidy of tonnage and poundage to that sovereign for life, we may remark, that all the income of the crown was granted in the manner of the civil list at present. Tonnage and poundage was granted to Charles II. for life, and to James II. for life. After the revolution it was continued to William for four years; and by the 7th of queen Anne it was settled on the queen and her heirs for ever. This source of revenue, which was the origin of our duties of cust ms, produced then about 600,000*l.* a year. The hereditary excise was granted to Charles II. and his successors for ever, as an indemnity for the profits of the court of wards, &c., and produced about 666,383*l.* a year. Besides these, a tax upon every fire hearth was granted to Charles II. and his successors for ever, which produced, according to Davenant, 245,000*l.* a year. The revenue of the post office, which was likewise granted to Charles II., produced 45,000*l.* To James II. was given an impost upon wines and vinegar, from 1685 to 1693, towards repairing the navy, producing 172,000*l.*, and duties on French brandies and linens, from 1685 to 1690, producing less than 100,000*l.* These, together with some small items, not worth mentioning, composed the whole taxation of the kingdom before the revolution; and at the highest computation they did not exceed 2,061,856*l.* With this revenue James II. supported his civil list, kept a formidable navy at sea, and paid his army. No distinction was drawn between the civil and other expenses of the government. If these revenues were declared hereditary, at least they were liable to the hereditary

obligation of defraying out of them all the expenses of the state. When the sovereign had any war on hand, or had incurred any extraordinary charge for military or naval services, an aid or subsidy was imposed for the special object, before the system of contracting debts began. At the revolution we had no national debt. The wars of William and Anne made greater additional supplies necessary than could be raised within the year, and gave us the system of burdening posterity. The demesne lands of the crown, which anciently supported all the expenses of the king, had been reduced by alienations so early as the reign of Edward III., so that the revenue arising from this source was only 154,139*l.* In the time of Henry IV. they were reduced to 48,000*l.* When Henry V. undertook the conquest of France, his revenue was only 56,966*l.* In the time of Henry VI. the parliament resumed the crown lands. Temporary subsidies for specific objects was the only other resource of the crown in these early periods of our history.

The first establishment of a civil list, distinct from the other charges of the state, was created by the 1st of queen Anne, chap. 7. March 1701. By this statute it was enacted—1st, That the excises subsisting at the revolution should be continued to her majesty for life. 2. That the tonnage and poundage granted by 9 William III. should be continued for her majesty's life. 3. That these branches, together with the hereditary excise, post-office, first-fruits, fines of the alienation office, wine licenses, compositions in the exchequer, revenue of the duchy of Cornwall, and any other revenue arising out of the rents of crown

lands in England and Wales, should be granted, for raising 700,000*l.* for the support of her majesty's household, and the honour and dignity of the crown. Before this time, however, the distinct charges incurred on account of the crown, particularly in the preceding reign, were generally known. The civil list of expenses of William III. were, from November 1688 to Michaelmas 1689, 428,918*l.*; from 1689 to 1690, 644,145*l.*; from 1690 to 1691, 657,092*l.*; from 1691 to 1692, 631,988*l.*; from 1692 to 1693, 696,968*l.*; from 1693 to 1694, 682,436*l.*; from 1694 to 1795, 761,739*l.* In this year died the queen, whose expenses had been before included in the civil list. The allowance to the prince and princess of Denmark were likewise included, amounting from 40,000*l.* to 53,000*l.* a year; as likewise a pension of 15,000*l.* to the duke of Gloucester. The privy purse of both king and queen never exceeded 40,000*l.* a year, and fell as low as 22,000*l.* The civil list of William III. from the death of the queen was as follows: — From 1695 to 1696, 699,485*l.*; for 1697, 745,496*l.*; for 1698, 374,777*l.*; for 1699, 892,669*l.*; for 1700, 683,947*l.*; for 1701, 704,412*l.* for 1702, 293,949*l.*, from Michaelmas to Lady-day. The king's privy purse was sometimes only 10,000*l.* or 15,000*l.* The whole expenses of the civil list during the thirteen or fourteen years of his reign was only 8,876,095*l.*, which included 638,921*l.* to the prince and princess of Denmark, 75,000*l.* to French protestants, and 175,000*l.* to the queen-dowager of Charles II. Out of this likewise was a sum of 534,000*l.* for contingencies now excluded

from the civil list, such as 10,000*l.* a year of his majesty's subscription to the Bank of England, and 42,000*l* for the queen's funeral.

The principle introduced in the reign of queen Anne respecting the expenses for the support and splendour of the crown, has ever since been acted upon at the commencement of every new reign; and has been found so convenient in practice, that it has been introduced in the administration of other constitutional governments. As the king, in such governments, is one of the legislative powers, it has been very properly concluded, that to secure the independent exercise of his functions, he ought to be relieved from the necessity of applying to the liberality of parliament for his personal support, and ought therefore to have the necessary expenses of his establishment settled, once for all, at the beginning of his reign.

As the measure now introduced for this object was the last act in the official life of the Wellington administration, and the last legacy left to parliament by the chancellor of the exchequer, it may be interesting to give a short outline of his speech, and the debate to which it gave rise. He began by stating his confidence that in any measure to promote the comfort of the monarch, and to support the splendour and dignity of the crown, he was sure of the concurrence of the whole house. The people had at all times been attached to monarchy, and the popularity of his present majesty showed that that attachment had not diminished. He did not, however, rely on this feeling of attachment to procure a blind acquiescence in his present measure,

or exempt it from the most rigorous examination.

In proposing a new settlement of the civil list, he stood in a situation different from any of his predecessors in introducing such an arrangement. At the commencement of former reigns, a debt was to be provided for, as well as an allowance made. At the death of queen Anne, this debt amounted to 500,000*l.*; at the death of George I., to 1,000,000*l.*; at the death of George II., to 5,000,000*l.*; and during the life and at the death of George III., debts had been incurred in the civil list to the amount of between three and four millions. The late reign had closed without any debt, and therefore only the future was to be consulted. Another circumstance now in his present situation, was the entire surrender of all the hereditary and casual revenues of the crown to parliament, including the droits of the admiralty and the West Indian 4½ per cent. duties. In this state of facts, and with this surrender of royal rights, the chancellor of the exchequer looked to parliament for such a provision as would, in future, prevent the accumulation of debt on the civil list—which always brought a certain degree of discredit along with it—and at the same time secure a reasonable support for the crown, to be expended under such regulations as would secure that object. A permanent settlement would be stripped of all its advantages if the funds were so inadequate, or the regulations so imperfect, that on every emergency some new application must be made to parliament for aid, or for getting rid of accumulated charges. In fixing the amount, he proposed rather to be guided by ex-

perience of the past, than to determine it on calculations altogether new. At the commencement of the late reign, his majesty's hereditary revenues were fixed at 850,000*l.* for England, and 207,000*l.* for Ireland; while in the last year the hereditary revenues of Scotland, which were left untouched, amounted to 109,000*l.* With this income and casual revenues, he estimated the amount of the civil list of his late majesty on an average at 1,221,600*l.* In fixing the future civil list, he proposed to remove from that head of expenditure charges to the amount of 166,000*l.*, which should be paid out of other funds. This deduction would leave the civil list of the late reign at 1,056,000*l.* In stating the estimate for the future civil list, he would take one sum for the whole kingdom, and he proposed to fix that at 970,000*l.*, making a difference between it and the civil list of the late king of 85,000*l.* But this would not be the only saving. The income of his majesty as Duke of Clarence would cease, effecting a saving of 88,000*l.*, which, together with another saving on the civil contingencies, would make the total reduction 138,000*l.* (We may remark, by the way, that these are not savings on the civil list, as both these last items were paid out of the consolidated fund, and the country has now no Duke of Clarence.) With reductions on the pension list, and the lopping off of other charges to the amount of 23,000*l.*, the whole saving he calculated at 160,000*l.* Estimating the expenses resulting from the married life of the sovereign at 100,000*l.*, the comparison of the present arrangement with that for George IV.

would be to that amount the more favourable. About 40,000*l.* had likewise been saved by his majesty taking the servants of the late king, and thus rendering it unnecessary to pension the household, as at the end of George the Third's reign.

A proposal had been made to separate the charges incurred for the support of the crown from all others, and to transfer them from the civil list to some other fund. To this proposal he objected; but he had introduced an arrangement by which, when a salary was paid out of two funds, the civil list being one, it should be entirely transferred to that from which it had derived the larger portion of its amount. Those of the officers who received the smaller portion from the civil list should be transferred to the consolidated fund. This was the case with the salaries of the judges, amounting to 26,130*l.*; of the speaker of the house of commons, of the consuls, and other officers, which amounted to 64,521*l.* All the reductions thus made by the deduction of fees, and by transfer from the civil list to the consolidated fund, would amount to his former statement of 166,000*l.*

After such deductions, he still maintained some of the former classification, and divided the civil list into ten classes:—1st, The privy purse for king and queen, 110,000*l.*; 2d, The salaries of the great officers of the household, 140,000*l.*, with the deductions of fees and charges, which amounted in the late reign to 8,803*l.*; 3d, The tradesmen's bills in the different departments of the lord steward, lord chamberlain, master of the horse, master of the robes, and office of the board of

works, 210,500*l.*; 4th, Royal bounties, charities, and secret service money, 23,196*l.*; 5th, Pensions under the sign manual, 74,200*l.*; 6th, Salaries and pensions to foreign ministers, 186,800*l.*, to be issued clear of fees, being 140,000*l.* for the former, and 46,800*l.* for the latter, including the expense of the South American missions, amounting last year to 22,300*l.*, and showing a saving of 27,250*l.* We had only eighteen foreign ministers in 1820; now we have twenty-five to maintain out of this fund. Class 7th, 13,751*l.*, or allowances to the chairman of Westminster session and the lord mayor and aldermen of London. The 8th class includes salaries of the lord chancellor, of the privy seal, of the first commissioner of the treasury, of the chancellor of the exchequer, &c. amounting to 24,318*l.* The Irish civil list, forming the 9th class, was fixed at 125,000*l.*, and the Scotch at 21,005*l.* The whole of the charges thus enumerated amounted to 960,000*l.*; and he took 10,000*l.* to cover contingencies. The right honourable gentleman concluded by expressing a hope that the reductions would be thought to have been carried far enough; that the calls of economy had been consulted as far as compatible with the proper splendour of the crown, and that the house would find the estimates which he had detailed satisfactory. He never once alluded to the revenues of the duchy of Cornwall, which in a former reign were proposed to be sold to pay the debts of the prince of Wales, and which may average between 12,000*l.* and 20,000*l.* a year; nor those of the duchy of Lancaster, worth, as Mr. Burke stated, 4000*l.* in money, and 40,000*l.* in patronage; though both these

were understood to be included in the surrender of the hereditary revenues announced in his majesty's speech.

Lord Althorpe, Sir H. Parnell, Mr. Hume, Mr. Brougham, and Lord Palmerston expressed their dissatisfaction at the statement of the chancellor of the exchequer, as involved and unintelligible; and opposed his arrangement on the ground, 1st, of its extravagance; 2d, its want of classification; 3d, of the necessity of an enquiry, before a bargain was made with the crown to last a whole reign; and 4th, on account of the omission of the revenues of the duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster in the royal surrender. After an inefficient and unsatisfactory answer from Sir R. Peel and the attorney-general on several or all of these points, the committee adjourned the debate till Monday the 15th of November, some of the opposition demanding a separation of the expenses incurred for the crown from that of all other services; all complaining that the estimates had not been reduced in proportion to the fall of prices, and all demanding an examination by a select committee to ascertain the necessity of such charges.

It was proved by Mr. Hume that the parade of surrendering the casual revenues amounted to nothing, and was a mockery on the public. The droits of admiralty now amounted to 1229*l.*, other droits to 284*l.*, and the West India 4½ per cents were *nil*, having been already given to support the West India church, by an act which stated that if they produced more than 21,000*l.*, the surplus should revert, not to the crown, but to the public. The revenues of Gibraltar did not exceed 10,000*l.* a year.

The whole of the casual revenues amounted to about 24,000*l.* a year, which was all that William IV. surrendered. Mr. Brougham, on the other hand, remarked with great severity on the deception attempted to be practised on the house and the country by the words of the king's speech, which implied, in his opinion, more than the surrender of the paltry sum of the casual revenues, and included, in common sense, those of the duchies among the hereditary revenues.

On Monday the debate was resumed. After traversing similar ground, Sir H. Parnell moved for a special committee of enquiry. An able reply was made by the chancellor of the exchequer, which brought forward no new point. The debate was continued by other members, Mr. Banks, Mr. Calcraft, and Mr. H. Sumner. Sir H. Parnell complained that he could not understand the accounts, which were complicated and puzzling; that there was no saving which he could make out, but 27,000*l.*; and that all the apparent saving consisted in the abolition of fees, and the transfer of expense from one fund to another. He complained likewise, that though only three classes or heads of expense belonged to the civil list, amounting to 460,000*l.*, yet that the crown was considered to expend the whole 970,000*l.* by the proposed plan. The present arrangement was founded on the report of 1815, which was a year of great extravagance. The honourable baronet concluded by moving for the appointment of a committee, not to examine witnesses, or to call for persons, papers, and documents, but to verify statements. He was supported by Mr. Banks; and the vote being

called for, there appeared for the motion 233, against it, 204; majority, 29. The ministers were thus defeated, in a full house, by 29.

It was quite evident, at first sight, that this vote must be the death-blow of the ministry. The proposal on which they were defeated was the first measure of a new reign; it had been long promised, and had been maturely considered; it was connected with the comfort of the sovereign and the splendour of the throne; and it deeply concerned the feelings of the people, at a time when the calls of economy were enforced by the pressure of want. The point on which the defeat was given, though apparently one of form, was, in fact, one of trust and confidence. The ministers came forward with estimates for the king's civil list, which they declared they had deeply considered. They demanded the acquiescence of parliament in their proposal, on its belief of their statements. They staked their responsibility as an equivalent for parliamentary examination. The majority refused to rely on their professions, and insisted on an enquiry by a committee. They thus declared that the ministry did not enjoy their confidence, as openly as if the character of the government had been the question directly at issue. The leader of the house of commons immediately felt that he had no power over his troops; that many of his friends had gone over to the enemy; and that he could not carry on the business of government in the face of so powerful an opposition. He had lost the enchanter's wand at the last election which could allay these little storms of faction; and the marshal's batoon in the upper house had likewise lost its power of

command. The discordant elements of which the majority was composed might be separated by the next vote, and some of his former adherents might again be attached to his standard; but they were always liable to desert, and to join his enemies, when he was most in need of their support. It was evident that otherwise the ministry had become unpopular. They were weak in talents, while they aimed at a monopoly of power. They could not form good measures, or defend them. Their announcement, in the king's speech, of an interference with respect to Belgium had alarmed the friends of peace and national independence. The hostility of the duke of Wellington to every kind of reform was looked upon with alarm, at the time that revolution was threatened in other countries because reform had been refused. And their refusal to let the king visit the city had covered them with a degree of ridicule, which was totally inconsistent with continued respect.

The defeat on the civil list was not the cause of their discredit, but the consequence; they therefore took the honourable and wise course of resigning. Their fall was entirely the result of their own conduct; it was the fruit of no intrigue; it was the consequence of no caprice on the part of the monarch; it was no stratagem of the court; it was not occasioned by the loss of the cordial confidence of their master. But when they had lost the confidence of parliament, and could no longer carry on the government, his majesty willingly accepted of their resignations. He asked both the chief ministers apart to whom he should apply, and they mentioned Earl Grey. His lordship was accordingly sent for at

five o'clock on the 16th, and received his majesty's command to form a cabinet; his majesty declaring that the duke of Wellington had his undivided confidence when minister, which he now transferred to his lordship to the same unreserved extent.

Though the late ministry, as an enumeration of their names would indicate, were weak in talents, in knowledge, or in family influence, they were yet enabled to carry the Catholic question, the Dissenters' relief bill, and the abolition of the beer monopoly.

Sir R. Peel, its leader in the house of commons, should form part of any administration which conducts on broad and liberal principles the affairs of this country. He has done more for the reform of law, and for the maintenance of order without violence in difficult times, than any home secretary who has occupied the office for a century. He was always a liberal and candid lover of reforms. He never asked for power beyond the law; and his attention to business was unwearied and assiduous, while his services in parliament are valuable as a good debater and an excellent stater of facts. Of the Duke of Wellington it would be difficult to speak in language of too high admiration when we refer to his transcendent military services: with but the exception of his noble and successful exertions in carrying the Catholic question, there seemed nothing in his foreign or domestic policy which showed an equal aptitude for conducting the civil and political affairs of a great and free nation.

CHAP. V.

THE NEW MINISTRY. — DISTURBED STATE OF THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION. — SETTLEMENT OF BELGIUM.

In the course of a week from the resignation of the ministry of the Duke of Wellington, the new ministerial arrangement, entrusted to Earl Grey, was completed; and the noble lord was enabled, as first minister of the crown, to lay before parliament on the 22d of November the outline of the system on which he and his colleagues intended to conduct the government. The following is the list of the new cabinet:—Earl Grey, first lord of the treasury; Lord Brougham and Vaux, lord chancellor of England; Viscount Palmerston, foreign secretary; Viscount Melbourne, home secretary; Viscount Goderich, colonial secretary; Marquis of Lansdowne, president of the council; Baron Durham, lord privy seal; Mr. Charles Grant, president of the board of control; Lord Althorpe, chancellor of the exchequer; Sir James Graham, first lord of the admiralty; Lord Holland, chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster; and the Duke of Richmond, postmaster-general. The other chief appointments were, Mr. W. Wynne to be secretary at war; Mr. Agar Ellis, chief commissioner of woods and forests; the Marquis of Anglesey to the lord-lieutenancy of Ireland; Sir Thomas Denman to be attorney-general; and Sir W. Horne, of the chancery bar, to be solicitor-general;

Mr. Poulet Thomson to be vice-president of the board of trade, and Lord John Russell, paymaster of the forces.

Of the persons who compose the cabinet, and occupy the inferior places in the government, we are not called upon here to speak. Most of them are well known to the public by their parliamentary conduct or their social position. It may, however, be remarked, that the number of titled persons in it gives it too much of an aristocratic complexion; that it is more exclusively filled with members of noble houses than any ministry which we have had for some time past; and that, including those who fill several inferior appointments, which we have not enumerated, the premier has reserved too large a share of its power and emoluments to his own family and relatives. But a more serious objection to the majority of the new cabinet was their want of official experience, and their necessary unacquaintance with official business. Their capacity and talents had chiefly been shown in opposition,—in discussing the policy of administrations which they were not invited to share,—in suggesting measures, the execution and details of which were left to their antagonists,—and in enlightening the people on their true interests, when they failed in compelling the government to attend to them. Lord Grey, whose acknowledged abilities and enlightened principles entitled him to a high place in any administration, had never been in office but for a few months during a long life. Mr. Brougham was in the same predicament, though now promoted to a place where experience of general affairs was less requisite. Lord

Althorpe, though a man of sound sense and considerable knowledge of parliamentary business, had suffered equally from continued exclusion; while Sir James Graham, and some of his other colleagues, had never opened their mouths but on the benches of opposition. The cabinet could, however, boast of three respectable exceptions to this rule, in Lord Palmerston, Lord Goderich, and Mr. Charles Grant, who added a long experience of affairs to the acknowledged possession of talents, and active habits of business to the power of parliamentary speaking.

The formation of the ministry, expeditious as it was, was said to have been embarrassed and delayed by the conduct of the chief opposition leader in the house of commons, who had overturned the previous cabinet. Desirous of place, but equally desirous of the reputation of despising it; devoured with the flames of ambition, but covering his ambition with the veil of self-denial; resolved to have the highest prize in his profession or none, and yet allowing it to be supposed that he would decline it if offered; formidable to his friends by his reputed indiscretion, and more formidable to his enemies by the activity of his talents; almost equally dangerous to be obliged or to be neglected; indulging in the wanton caprice of a power which he knew was now necessary to any ministerial arrangement, and yet shrinking from a declaration of his own claims to preferment, he rendered doubtful for some days the success of Lord Grey's ministerial negotiations. His friends admitted his importance to the extent of doing nothing without his concurrence, because his opposition might be dangerous to the stability of

their structure; but they could not at first consent to place him on its highest pinnacle, because he would present too broad a mark for their enemies to fire at. In pretending to weigh the representation of Yorkshire against the great seal, he only resolved to retain the former because he was not pressed to take the latter; and employed the menace of a reform in the house of commons, to stimulate the premier to call him out of it. His irresistible energy in exposing the last ministry, in parliament, at public meetings, and through the press, had, combined with events, been one of the chief causes of their overthrow; and it was concluded that no other ministry could withstand his opposition. The alleged defects of his character, as regarded judgment, steadiness, or profound knowledge of his profession, were properly appreciated by every body: but the energy and capacity of his mind were traced in such a wide range of action;—he had done so much in diffusing education, encouraging science, pressing legal reform, and defending the rights and liberties of his fellow-citizens;—his name was so often seen in connexion with literature, politics, forensic and parliamentary eloquence;—he was so universally feared or admired for the withering power of his sarcasm, and the overwhelming force of his declamation;—and by all these means he had acquired so great a popularity, that no set of ministers, coming in on popular principles, could dispense with his aid or encounter his hostility. As soon as he was offered and had accepted the seals, the cabinet was formed.

In three hours after Lord Grey and his colleagues

had had their nominations formally sanctioned by his majesty, his lordship made a speech in the house of peers, in which he declared that the principles of his *government* should be economy and retrenchment at home; non-intervention with the internal affairs of other states; and a reform in the commons' house of parliament. The announcement of principles so opposite to those hitherto acted upon produced the happiest effect on the temper of the nation. Satisfaction and confidence every where succeeded to suspicion, discontent, and alarm. All parties seemed disposed to give the new cabinet credit for their good intentions, and waited with impatience—but without distrust, for the development of their plans. They easily obtained the necessary time to mature them; and after a short session, in which little business of importance was transacted except the passing of the regency bill, on account of the necessary absence of some of the ministers, for the interval between the time of their accession to office and their re-election, parliament adjourned from the 23d of December to the 3d of January.

The task which the new ministry had undertaken seemed to be surrounded with more perplexity and embarrassment, from the state of affairs both at home and abroad, than had been witnessed for many years. The distress among the agricultural labourers still continued; the circle of riot and disturbance was every day enlarging, and outrages on property were becoming more numerous and more destructive.

These excesses had commenced, as we have

already stated, towards the middle of autumn. On the 29th of August, four hundred agricultural labourers at Hardres, in Kent, destroyed all the thrashing machines in that neighhourhood. About the middle of September, the outrages on property being still continued, a meeting of the magistrates of the eastern division of Kent was held, when resolutions were entered into, and a reward of five hundred pounds offered for the conviction of the ringleaders in these offences. The following week a second meeting was held, at which the high sheriff presided, nearly forty justices being present. The resolutions of the first meeting were adopted; special constables were ordered to be sworn in; and a copy of the resolutions to be forwarded to the secretary for the home department, requesting his co-operation. The farmers assembled the same day: a committee was appointed by them to confer with a similar body appointed by the magistrates, for the purpose of putting a stop to these illegal and alarming proceedings. In spite of the active exertions of both, the work of destruction was carried on in an open and undisguised manner. The rioters having destroyed all the machinery within their reach, or compelled the farmer to execute their purpose himself, proceeded to burn the barns and wheat stacks of such as still retained their machines. Letters signed *Swing* were received by post by two individuals in Dover, threatening the destruction of their premises by fire; and on the dead walls all through the town, and for some miles on the road to Canterbury, the same significant word was written in chalk. The barns and corn-stacks of the Rev. Mr. Price of

Lyminge having been burned on the night of the 5th October, the lords of the treasury offered a reward of 100*l.* for the apprehension of the offenders; and his majesty's pardon was offered to any but the person who set fire to the property, who shall discover and convict his accomplices. Nine of the machine-breakers having been tried, and six convicted at the East Kent sessions, and sentenced to three days' confinement and hard labour, it was hoped that a stop would be put to their proceedings; but, emboldened by the lenity of the sentence, their companions proceeded to greater outrages, not only burning the corn, hay, and straw, together with the dwelling and outhouses of Mr. Knight of Barden, near Sittingbourne, but a few evenings after, the stables, outhouses, and stacks of corn belonging to Mr. Castle of the Salutation, near Sandwich; and also those of Mr. Haine of Solling Court, and others of less importance in other parts of the county. In some instances the fires were arrested by the arrival of fire engines; but in several cases the labourers looked on the conflagration coolly, without offering any assistance. As every day brought accounts of fresh acts of the incendiaries, the greatest alarm prevailed throughout the county. The military were constantly on the alert, patrolling the roads and villages nightly. A troop was stationed at Sittingbourne for the protection of property in that neighbourhood, and another at Lenham. At the latter place, the Earl of Winchelsea met and addressed two hundred labourers, who had assembled for the purpose of destroying thrashing machines and agricultural property. They heard him

patiently, and declared that want of work was the sole cause of their straying from their homes, and that they had not the means of procuring food for themselves or their starving families. Indeed, the general complaint amongst these poor deluded men was want of a reasonable allowance for their daily labour.

Resolutions calling for a horse and foot patrol, together with the embodying of the yeomanry, were unanimously adopted at a meeting of the magistrates and farmers.

At Guestling, near Hastings, the paupers held a meeting, and gave notice to the heads of the parish to attend. About a hundred and twenty labourers were assembled: their demand was a rise of wages to 2*s.* 3*d.* in winter, and 2*s.* 6*d.* in summer. The clergyman, whose demand upon the parish had been raised to 800*l.* a year, was required immediately to give up 500*l.* a year to their employers, in order to enable them to comply with their demands. To this he very readily agreed.

While the magistrates in Kent were doing all in their power to quell the disturbances and discover the authors of the fires, the work of destruction was going on, though not so alarmingly, in the adjoining counties. Fires were nightly seen in Sussex, Surrey, Hampshire, Wiltshire, Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Buckingham, Hertford, Bedford, Northampton, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Suffolk, Norfolk, Lincoln, and even in some of the northern counties. Notwithstanding the exertions of the magistrates, their efforts for the discovery of the actual incendiaries proved unavailing. Several persons were taken into custody under

suspicious circumstances, but nothing transpired in their examinations to fix the guilt upon them. That the fires were kindled by means of some chemical preparation thrown into the stacks and houses, and by persons connected with the labourers, does not admit of a doubt, as in some cases an explosion as loud as the report of a gun was heard immediately before the stacks or barns burst into flames. The fires were generally preceded by threatening letters, as in Kent, signed "Swing;" and such was the terror produced by this formidable name, seconded by the appearance of two or three hundred labourers, clamorous for an increase of wages, that few farmers had courage to resist the demands that were made upon them by the rioters. With a few exceptions, where the labourers extorted money or food, their object does not appear to have been plunder. Their demand was limited to an increase of wages; and in no case do they appear to have required more than 2*s.* 6*d.* a day during summer, and 2*s.* 3*d.* in winter. Their usual mode of proceeding was either to call a meeting of farmers, at which they assembled in numbers of from 200 to 600, and in a few cases considerably more, when they formally presented a list of their grievances, to the redress of which they compelled the farmers. Wherever they were boldly and firmly resisted, they showed little courage. The inhabitants of the villages of Swington, Easton, and Itchen Abbas, chiefly the property of the Duke of Buckingham, not only refused to join the disturbers who had perambulated the neighbourhood, but came in a body of 150 men to Avington House, the seat of the duke, and having been sworn in special constables, bivou-

acked for three days and nights round the house, which they thought might be in danger from the rioters. The same thing happened near Winchester. In the neighbourhood of Hanbury, about 150 ruffians assembled, and after extorting money, breaking machinery, and threatening to burn or destroy the property of all who opposed them, proceeded to the farm of Wasing Place, where they destroyed the thrashing machines, converting the iron knobs from the spindles into formidable weapons, by fixing them on the ends of their sticks. The clergyman of Brompton, being apprised of their approach, swore in special constables as many of his parishioners as he could muster; and, accompanied by them, went and met the rioters. Finding that remonstrance was vain, he read the riot act; the rioters rushed upon him, but did not strike him; a general fight took place, which terminated in the capture of the ringleader and ten of his companions.

Though the assistance of the military has in several cases been called in, in only one instance, at the seat of Mr. Bennet, of Wiltshire, were sanguinary measures necessary. Mr. Bennet having learned that a mob of above 500 men were advancing against the mansion, went out to meet them, to induce them to disperse. He was received with a shower of stones. The Hindon troop of cavalry accidentally coming up, and the mob persisting in throwing stones, the cavalry were ordered to fire blank cartridges over their heads; but the mob only laughed, and rushed into the plantations around the house, where they continued pelting the soldiers, who at

last effected a charge, when several were wounded and one man killed.

The rioters, however, did not always meet with proper resistance. At a meeting at Ringmer the labourers presented a petition, asking for married men 2*s.* 3*d.* per day to the 1st of March, and from that period to the 1st of October, 2*s.* 6*d.* a day; for single men, 1*s.* 9*d.* a day to the 1st of March, and 2*s.* from that time to the 1st of October. Lord Gage, who was present, after consulting with the vestry and farmers, told them that their wishes should be complied with. At Chichester also, where about 1000 labourers assembled, the farmers agreed, for the safety of their property and their families, to give 14*s.* a week in place of 10*s.* At Eastbourne, Lamberhurst, and numerous other places, a similar scale of wages was asked and agreed upon.

Of the loss of property occasioned by the acts of these deluded men, no correct estimate can be made; but when it is stated that there have been above one hundred and twenty fires, and supposing no more than a stack or two and the premises to have been burned at each place, the loss of property must be very great. In some places, however, the loss has been estimated. At Mr. Baker's saw mills, near Southampton, the loss is estimated at 7000*l.*; the property burned in farms at Preston, Shottisbrook, and North Cove, at 1000*l.*; those of Southern Aylesford, and Riston from 600*l.* to 800*l.* each; and that at Willingham above 4000*l.* But the loss in machinery must have been immense. In the neighbourhood of Norfolk alone, in the course of a few days, it was calculated to be 5000*l.*; and at the paper

mills at Kitcham, 1000*l*. Wherever the rioters appeared, not a machine was left unbroken.

It will be evident upon the slightest reflection that such riotous assemblages, however formidable in the immediate neighbourhood of the rioters, could never be considered as dangerous to the institutions of the country. The distress which excited to acts of outrage was confined to a particular class, who possessed no influence but from physical strength, and inspired no alarm but by an acknowledged breach of the laws. From the very nature of their employment, they are scattered over a great surface, and could not be brought together in formidable masses. From the same circumstance, they could have no general concert, and no leaders capable of combining their efforts for a joint object. In no case did they hoist any political banner, or declare for principles which could attract supporters. Their object was that of destruction and plunder, in order to induce their employers to better their condition; and every man possessed of property, or accustomed to employ labourers, was of course the adversary of their pretensions. The days have gone by for the success of a Jack Cade insurrection; and those must have been either deceivers or dupes who tended or felt any revolutionary alarms from the "rural war," as it has been called, which was kindled in England towards the end of the year.

The greatest danger arose from the ignorance and fears of the magistrates, who, misunderstanding their powers, and miscalculating the effect of their interference, fixed the rate of wages, and advised the discontinuance of machinery, at the dictation of

the mob. The noble secretary for the home department, seeing the spread of this impolitic and pernicious system, issued, on the 8th of December, a circular, explaining to the justices of the peace their legal incapacity to make such arrangements; and pointing out the pernicious tendency of acts grounded on such erroneous principles of political economy. "The magistrates," he very properly remarked, "had no power to settle the amount of wages; and any interference in such a matter could only have the effect of exciting expectations which must be disappointed, and of ultimately producing, in an aggravated degree, a renewed spirit of discontent and insubordination."

The distinction between such remedies for public distress as come within legislative enactment or magisterial interference, and such as depend for their general adoption on individual recommendation, is nearly always forgotten or neglected by the ignorant and unreflecting depositaries of authority; yet, without alluding to such a distinction at seasons like that through which we have passed, irreparable injury may be done with the intention of effecting a cure. As legislative acts must be the same for all—as they admit of no exceptions but what they themselves specifically create—and as they take away all freedom of action in the cases to which they extend, they cannot of course be introduced to regulate those relations of life, or direct that use of property, which, in a society not totally enslaved, must be left to be settled by the judgment or interest of individuals. Thus with most men it is a subject of regret, that in the present state of English

society property should be so unequally distributed; but, without fixing the amount of fortunes by statute, and thus destroying all motive for human exertion beyond a certain point, or by an act of spoliation and levelling after wealth has been acquired, it would be impossible to prevent such a result. In the same manner, many ascribe the degradation of the agricultural class as a body to the practice of throwing large tracts of country into one farm, managed by a gentleman farmer, with a large capital to improve it, and thus occupying by a hundred slaves and a driver the land formerly held by five or ten substantial and independent yeomen. Their theory may be right, as their taste for independence is certainly respectable; but how could the law interfere to dictate to a proprietor on what terms he shall let his estate, without interfering in every other employment of his property? He must *find* it or he must *think* it for his interest to let his land to one rich speculator, instead of five or ten less wealthy tenants, otherwise he would not do it; and the statute would therefore step in to dictate to him his own interest. With as much propriety might it direct the size of his house, or the magnitude of his pleasure grounds. But how could the law, with any regard to general policy, fix the size of farms proper for all parts of the country, and for all kinds of tenants? If even it went this length, could it deprive a proprietor of the right of cultivating his own estate, in order to extinguish the obnoxious race of gentlemen-farmers, and thus again uniting grounds which had before been separated? As a third and more important illustration of the distinction to which we are now

calling attention, we may allude to the policy of a law for regulating the rate of wages, on which some country magistrates have lately assumed the initiative of legislating. It is desirable that the distressed labourers should enjoy permanently that rate of wages which they have lately extorted by intimidation from reluctant farmers and terrified landowners; but can the rate of wages in agriculture be regulated by statute, without destroying entirely the freedom of the working classes, and annulling all contracts between the servant and his master—reducing the former to the condition of a slave, and making the latter a trustee for his benefit? If the farmer is bound to give a high price for labour when he could get it cheaper, he is *taxed* to the amount of the difference, whatever it is, for persons with whom he has no more connexion than any other part of the community. If he is obliged to pay high wages when he could get labour for less, he must be allowed to dispense with the services of those whose assistance he does not require; otherwise, he is doubly taxed in maintaining those whom he employs, and those whom he does not employ.

While the magistrates did all in their power to render temporary distress a perpetual calamity, by interfering to annul all contracts between master and servant, another set of political economists, under the direction of a part of the daily press, kept up the unceasing clamour that the landlord and the parson—that rents and tithes were the great cause of the evil. "Compel the landlord," said they, "to reduce his rents, and the clergy to demand less than their tithes, and all will be well."

Probably the reduction of these demands, so as to enable the farmer to relieve his labourers, may be the only remedy attainable where an *immediate* remedy is required. But there is no more reason, in law or equity, why the landlord and the parson should supply the fund of relief to the labourer, than the lawyer or the merchant; except that the former are in the more immediate vicinity of the distress, and within the more immediate range of the danger. By this accidental circumstance, they are more appropriately called upon in the first instance to give relief, as the inhabitant of a house before which an accident has happened has to incur the expense of that shelter and aid which humanity requires from all. The deduction which the landlord and parson thus make from their incomes, is *a tax* which they pay over to the farmer to enable him to assist the labourer. It is a new assessment on their property—it is an addition to their poor rate;—it ought therefore to be broadly stated in that way, and not to be called a rise in the scale of wages. The farmer may pay it as wages, but it is levied as a tax.

This, however, is not the only or the chief objection to the interference of the magistrate in fixing the wages of labour. The labourers must either be all employed and paid at this advanced rate, or some of them must be employed at the advanced rate and others thrown out of employment. If all are employed at a higher rate of wages than the fund out of which they are supported has hitherto been required to contribute, or than it would supply except for the decree of the

magistrate, it is evident that the remaining dependents on the fund must have less. If the landlord gives up a portion of his rent, and the parson of his tithes, to the compulsory support of parish labourers, it is self-evident that neither of them has so much to hand over to his shoemaker, tailor, coachmaker, or jeweller; that he cannot retain so many servants, or employ so many tradesmen. The fund not being increased in amount, and only altered in distribution, the latter must suffer as the former are relieved. Suppose that this is not the case for some time; that savings are resorted to, and that no reduction takes place in the expenditure for the latter, while that for the former is increased; it cannot be denied that the fund must every year diminish, and will be at last exhausted.

If, on the other hand, the farmer is only to hire at an advanced rate those labourers whom he would naturally employ independently of any interference on the part of the magistrate, then nothing is gained by the measure but the introduction of a bad rule into rural economy. The farmer must naturally employ as many labourers as will do his work, and if the competition for employment were removed he must pay them adequate wages. The removal of a quantity of labour out of the market would have the effect of rendering it dear, like the scarcity of every other commodity, and the labourer would be able to fix his own terms. But what would be gained by the mass of labourers who could not find employment? Would not they be thrown upon the parish? —and then of what benefit would be the order of a magistrate that they should receive so much wages

a day, when they could not obtain a day's work? Thus then, on either supposition, the interference of the magistrate with the rate of wages must be dangerous and mischievous. If he orders the farmer to employ labourers for whom he has no employment, he might as well order a gentleman to take into his house a supernumerary cook or footman; if he orders these supernumeraries to be employed at higher wages than those for which he would naturally obtain them, he commits the double injustice, of forcing the farmer to employ more labour than he wants, and to pay it higher than he could get it for; and if by ordering him to pay higher wages only for such labourers as he would otherwise employ, he commits a needless violation of contracts, and obtains an accession of unemployed paupers to the parish rate, or the parish workhouse.

All enlightened friends of the independence, comforts, and moral habits of the poor have raised their voices against the abuse of the poor-law system, which consists in paying the wages of labour *partly* out of the farmer's purse and partly out of the parish rate. But what was the policy adopted or recommended by the magistrates during the late distress, but that of paying the *whole* wages of the parish out of the rates? It, in fact, made the whole labouring population slaves, dependent on the parish. The magistrates, actuated no doubt by humane motives, attempted to relieve the physical wants of the lower orders at the expense of their free agency and moral liberty. They destroyed all possibility of contracts, and left the farmer and labourer in the relation to each other of master and

slave: for it is quite evident, that if the farmer is ordered to pay so much wages a day to his labourer, without the power of reducing or changing the remuneration according to the deserts of the party, or the price of labour in the market, he must likewise have the power of compelling them to labour, and all the other authority which a master has over his slave. There can be no medium. Compulsory maintenance infers compulsory labour. If the social relations formed by voluntary contract are to be superseded, they must be replaced by those resulting from the fixed rules and settled penalties of slavery. The yoke once enforced on the necks of the parties on both sides, will never fall off. If their wages are raised and their comforts augmented, their numbers must likewise increase. They will be under no restraints from prudence, or from apprehension of future events, when they are insured of high wages in all circumstances. The magistrates take upon themselves all the cares of their families, and leave them to live and to work like the other animals whom their master feeds. On the other hand, the fund of the farmer would be always answerable for the additional expense, in proportion to the increasing numbers of his establishment. He would of course demand a further reduction of rent and tithes. The rent and tithes, for the distribution of which he becomes a kind of trustee or overseer, would every year diminish by the increasing call, till they would be entirely absorbed. Double the wages of every labourer in England at the expense of the proprietors of the soil, and in twenty years

not a vestige of their beneficial interest in their estates would remain.

The recommendation to discontinue machinery, coupled with an order to raise wages, was a monstrous practical contradiction. Machinery, by the very terms of its employment, is of use in increasing the fund out of which labour must ultimately be paid. To order, therefore, the labourer's share of that fund to be increased, while you diminish the means of keeping it up, is a practical absurdity.

The government not only employed the most reasonable means to check outrage, by assisting the local force, and to prevent permanent mischief, by warning the magistrates of the limits of their authority in the matter of wages, but it adopted a step of great importance and utility, in appointing two special commissions, one on the western and another on the midland circuit, to try the numerous prisoners who had been apprehended in the commission of outrage. These commissions were opened at Winchester on the 20th, and at Reading on the 27th of December respectively. At the former town, three hundred prisoners awaited their trial; six of whom were sentenced to death, and eighty-eight to transportation for life, or for terms of years. This commission proceeded to Salisbury, where a great number of prisoners likewise awaited their fate. At Reading, one hundred and thirty-eight of the rioters in that district were tried; two of whom were sentenced to death, and the rest to transportation. This commission afterwards proceeded to Aylesbury, to try the rioters in the county of Bucks.

These commissions, whose proceedings almost entirely engrossed the attention of the public towards the end of the year, answered many valuable purposes. In the first place, their obvious effect as well as their expressed intention was to shorten the imprisonment of the numerous rioters, or machine-breakers in custody, who must otherwise have awaited their trial to the spring assizes; thus keeping our gaols full, inflicting a long torture on the prisoners, and continuing all the miseries of suspense among their families and relatives, or, in fact, in all the parishes and villages to which they belonged. In the second place, they afforded the judges an opportunity to expound the law with more imposing solemnity and more striking effect, while the outrages, which the justice of the country had come to punish, were still fresh in public recollection, or were threatened to be renewed. And, in the third place, they collected and spread through the country a body of evidence on the moral condition and physical sufferings of the agricultural labourers and working classes connected with agricultural industry, which could not have produced so powerful an impression at any other season, than when their tumultuous proceedings, the result of distress operating on brutal ignorance and mischievous delusions, were spreading dismay throughout the kingdom.

In this last respect, the reports of these trials form the most valuable addition to the general stock of our knowledge, on the state of the working classes in the agricultural districts, which it has received for years. The result of parliamentary enquiries into the operation of the poor laws, and

the information collected by committees of the houses on the condition of the farm labourers, are read only by a few, and contain nothing so striking as the sworn testimony given on these trials. The extreme and even brutish ignorance of the peasantry, which it was no object with parliament to prove, is displayed here in the evidence of every witness. In most cases the culprits were entirely unacquainted with the penalties of the law which they were trampling under foot, or of the protection which it extended to that property which they had leagued to destroy. In attacking machinery, they imagined that they were conferring a benefit on their class; and that justice would not punish so useful a crime. Easily duped by the more cunning instigators, they however showed the native goodness of their disposition by generally abstaining from acts of cruelty or ferocity; and their proceedings, dangerous and alarming as they were, seemed more like the wanton pranks of children, than the serious and unprincipled displays of criminal design.

On such a mass of prisoners and their associates, the majesty of a court of justice, the solemn voice of the judge, and the exposed terrors of the law, could not fail to produce a salutary effect. This effect extended to all the districts with which they were connected. The peasantry every where became convinced that the laws and the justice of the country could not be trampled upon with impunity; —that the destruction of property, of whatever kind, was a crime of which they must bear the penalty; and that outrage was not the best way of

bettering their condition, or relieving their wants. The universal diffusion of this conviction, joined with a more merciful attention to the state of the poor by overseers and magistrates, ended the riots, and restored tranquillity in a few weeks.

While the state of the country, and the necessity of preparing the promised measures of retrenchment and reform, chained the attention of the king's government to domestic affairs, they had, at the same time, to conduct those difficult negotiations respecting Belgium, which were necessary to reconcile the observance of treaties with the sanction of Belgic independence, and to preserve the peace of Europe without violating the principles of national sovereignty.

Before they came into office the conferences of the five powers had begun in London, and they had agreed to a protocol, dated the 4th of November, which, as a preliminary, required a cessation of hostilities between Holland and Belgium. The subsequent details of these negotiations, so far as they occurred within the year, will be found in the narrative of the proceedings which completed the Belgic revolution, and which now demand attention, from the great interests which at the time they affected or endangered.

The national congress, which was convoked by the provisional government of Belgium, met at Brussels on the 10th of November. The elections over the whole country had been conducted with considerable regularity, and had terminated in perfect peace, though the forms of direct election had never before been followed, and the people had thus been as-

sembled to employ an instrument entirely new. The deputies to the states-general had hitherto been returned by the members of the provincial states; and the influence of popular opinion, thus strained through two sets of voters, was more frequently tarnished than purified by the circuitous process. The electors, whose qualification was made very low, having now a real power in their hands, were directly addressed by those who solicited admission into the national council; and the political influences under which they acted were as various as their local situations. In the country, and in towns of the second or third order, the nobility, the landed proprietors, and the priesthood directed or obtained their suffrages. Hence they returned counts, barons, and members of the provincial *noblesse* in abundance, together with abbés, curés, canons, and vicars-general. In the towns and cities of the first order, on the contrary, such as Ghent, Brussels, Antwerp, and Liege, the influence of the privileged classes was counteracted, or their patronage shared, by wealthy manufacturers, rich capitalists, or respectable professional men. Among the deputies of such places were observed no ecclesiastics, but many advocates, judges, merchants, and persons of family. One class of men were not represented in congress, as might have been expected from their former influence; we mean the friends of the fallen government. All those who had served under the house of Orange, or who were supposed to be favourable to the Dutch cause, were carefully set aside. A considerable number of the most eminent members of the late states-general, such as M. de Gerlache,

M. de Brouckere, M. de Stassart, and M. Surlet de Chokier, were re-elected; but the choice was confined to such as had been in factious opposition to the Orange government. The most violent demagogues, too, were generally deprived of the fruit of their exertions, or obstructed in the realisation of their hopes. Most of them became candidates; but more than one instance occurred of presumption reproved, or ambition mortified, by a position on the poll greatly at variance with the estimate which the parties themselves had formed of their patriotic merits. Even though at the head of the provisional government, M. de Potter and M. Ducpetieaux, who had suffered in the cause, were rejected from the electoral college of Brussels, though it had twenty-eight nominations at its disposal, or, in other words, twenty-eight palms of civic glory to bestow. This political ostracism pronounced on the most violent of the republican or infidel party, shows the power and influence of the priests, about fifteen or twenty of whom occupied places in the new convention. Few of the higher nobility were elected, for the double reason, that some of them had lost their popularity by their attachment to the royal family, and others were anxious to keep aloof from a movement which they could not guide, and were afraid to resist.

Most of the members of this assembly had been before little experienced in business, and were now but little prepared to discuss the great questions submitted to their deliberation. At the same time its grotesque physiognomy gave no very high idea of its dignity. Composed of ecclesiastics, nobles,

judges, advocates, attorneys, notaries, and manufacturers, in the smock-frocks of the national guard, in professional habits or clerical costumes, and decorated with orders of nobility, crosses, and other honorary distinctions, it suggested little idea of senatorial gravity or deliberative wisdom. Its installation was attended with considerable pomp. All the troops of the garrison were under arms; the civic guard was called to receive the deputies; and the members of the provisional government proceeded to the hall of its sittings in the ancient palace of the states-general amid the ringing of bells and the firing of artillery. The number, when complete, was two hundred; and one hundred and fifty-two attended the opening sitting. When the assembly was provisionally constituted, M. de Potter, who was the oldest member of the governing junta, opened their deliberations by a speech of considerable length, and marked by a violent abuse of the late government; containing a bill of grievances against the dynasty, a justification of the revolt and final separation of Belgium, and a history of what the provisional government had done up to the time of the meeting of congress to establish internal order and to guarantee external security. The most important fact which the government speech announced was the interference of the allies by the conferences of London, and the receipt of the protocol of the 4th of November, which required the belligerents to establish an armistice preparatory to an ultimate settlement of their differences under the mediation of the great powers. The deposition of this protocol on the table of the congress ought to

have been gratifying to the assembly, as a virtual recognition of their independence, and a declaration at their first meeting that they had no external enemy to dread, provided they could establish order and wise institutions at home.

The congress, placed in a very equivocal situation in respect to the provisional government, which had been self-created, was doubting what answer it should return to the address of M. de Potter and Co., when the members of the government sent in a tender of their resignations to the representatives of the people, into whose hands they surrendered the trust, which they had only exercised till the national will could be consulted through the medium of organs chosen by the nation. M. de Potter refused to join in this act of resignation. The congress thanked the government for their past services, and requested them to continue them till a definitive arrangement. The members who had resigned accepted again of the trust, and M. de Potter then resigned. The motive for this apparent contradiction is to be found in the idea which this demagogue formed of the origin of his own power, and the limits of that of the congress. The provisional government existed by the acquiescence, and, of course, by the consent of the nation, before the congress was called. This government had called the congress together, and limited its duty to the special object of establishing a constitution. It had therefore nothing to do with the executive, and could not take power from one set of provisional governors and give it to another. It could determine on the form of government, and elect a chief

of the state; and there its mission ended, along with that of the provisional government, which would cease as soon as a permanent government should be settled. Entertaining these ideas, so different from the notions of his colleagues, he opposed the proposal of a resignation when they resigned; and entertaining them still, he could not continue in office with men who had formed an opinion of their duties and their powers so different from his own. From this period his influence ceased; he had declared himself a republican. His reputation with the multitude was made use of to oppose the Orange government. Those who employed him at last turned the mob against him; and, in the course of two months, the man who had been carried to the Hôtel de Ville on the shoulders of the multitude in returning from exile, was obliged to exile himself, from a fear of assassination by a popular commotion.

Having settled their regulations and forms of proceeding, the congress entered, on the 16th of November (their fifth sitting), on the great business of their mission, which was to organise a government, and to establish institutions for their country. The subject was introduced by count de Celles, who had been employed by the Dutch government in negotiating the *concordat* with the see of Rome, who was acquainted personally with the diplomatic transactions which took place at the union, in 1815, and who, being a nobleman of fortune and abilities, enjoyed a considerable reputation among his countrymen. The count proposed two resolutions to the assembly; namely, that it should declare the inde-

pendence of Belgium; and, second, that it should engage not to separate till it had settled the definitive constitution of the new state. Another member (M. Rodenbach) proposed that the declaration of independence should be immediately followed up with a manifesto, that the family of Orange was for ever excluded from the exercise of power in Belgium. A third deputy objected to the immediate consideration of the latter proposition, and proposed that the congress should first settle the form of government before it declared any family admissible or inadmissible to power. The priority of this proposition seemed reasonable, as a decision on the latter question might render any discussion of the former unnecessary. On the supposition that the congress should decide in favour of a republic, with a president, elected at short intervals, the exclusion of the Orange family, as sovereign princes, would be decided by that vote; or if they chose to be candidates for temporary power, the vote of exclusion would narrow unnecessarily the list of future competitors. Another reason for postponing the decision respecting the family of Orange, till the form of government and other preliminary questions had been settled, was addressed to the fears of some of the members, and the humanity of others. The citadel of Antwerp had not yet been evacuated; the fortress of Maestricht was still in the hands of the Dutch; and might not a resolution to exclude the family of the king of Holland for ever from power in Belgium, either delay the surrender of these places, or provoke to acts of vengeance? Besides, a precipitate resolution on a point so important, and

in circumstances so little pressing, might appear to the world rather a display of hatred and passion than the calm result of deliberate reflection or mature wisdom. The assembly had received diplomatic communications of a proposed armistice. This armistice, if it took place, might lead to an evacuation of the whole Belgic territory. Then would be the time of coming to a decision on the claims or merits of the Orange family, without being liable to the imputation of fear or the charge of precipitation, and without exposing the lives and properties of their fellow-citizens in Antwerp and Maestricht to danger. After this question of priority had been discussed, with more heat than argument, it was decided against the precipitate judges of the dynasty, by a majority of ninety-seven to seventy-seven.

On the following day (Nov. 17th) the congress proceeded to deliberate on the proposition for declaring the independence of the country, which had been referred to the sections or committees for their consideration, and on which a favourable report had been made by the central section.

The independence of Belgium was a fact which, in the eyes of some, scarcely required to be announced in a solemn declaration. The expulsion of the Dutch troops and Dutch functionaries, the organisation of an independent government, the convocation of the congress itself to decide on the internal organisation and external relations of the state, and the total abstinence of foreign powers from any claim of interference, sufficiently established a truth to which no form of declaration could otherwise have given the least validity. The domi-

nation of Holland had ceased to exist; the bonds imposed by force had been broken by force; the rights of conquest had been reversed by conquest; the inhabitants of Belgium were now masters in their own land; they had now a country of their own, in which the commands of a foreigner could not be heard; they could dispose of themselves, their fortunes, and their industry, as they pleased; they could erect any social edifice that suited their interests, their reason, or their taste, without consulting any foreign political architect; in short, they felt themselves surrounded with all the attributes of independence, and exercised in its utmost plenitude every power of self-government.

But though these sentiments were generally admitted, and even ostentatiously proclaimed, it did not appear to the majority that a solemn declaration of independence could be altogether useless or superfluous. At present the fact and the right were the same, and the fact protected the right; but a time might come in which this order might be reversed, and the declaration of the latter might aid in preserving or recovering the former. Such a document, subscribed by the representatives of a whole people, would not only remain a solemn appeal to Europe in behalf of rights hitherto disregarded, but would exist as a flag round which to rally the friends of the country in times of menaced conquest or temporary subjugation. This sacred emblem of national right might be pulled down by the hand of military violence, but it would never cease to be associated in the hearts of the people with their noblest privileges, and would be again elevated in their patriotic en-

thusiasm with the first relaxation of superior force. Had Belgium, like Holland, declared its independence at an earlier period of its history, its fortunes would not have been tied to the chariot wheels of every ambitious conqueror; it would not have been transferred from sovereign to sovereign, and family to family, like the spoils of a battle or the trophies of a victory; it would not have been for two hundred and fifty years the victim of Spanish bigotry, of Austrian rapacity, or of French ambition. The generals of the allied troops, on entering Brussels in February, 1814, declared its independence, and called upon it to form its government. Had it before made a declaration of its independence, and been habituated to the idea of its rights, would the allies so soon afterwards have transferred it to Holland? The policy of Europe had been always hostile to Belgium. Its territory, its commerce, and its rights had been always attacked by foreigners, who allowed it to make no direct appeal to the justice of independent governments in its own name. The time had now arrived for a change of system; and it was not only useful but becoming, that the change should not take place silently, but should be announced in an appeal to the good faith and public justice of Europe.

The object of this resolution was not, of course, opposed; and only furnished an occasion for the display of patriotic oratory. We need not therefore allude to the views which different members took of the question. The circumstances which gave the chief interest to the debate had nothing to do with the declaration of independence, so far as Holland

was concerned. They related to the existing connection between one of the Belgic provinces and the German confederation, and to the future union contemplated with France by some of the deputies. One of the sections to which the project of the manifesto was referred proposed as an amendment, that "the national congress proclaims the independence of the Belgic provinces, *without prejudice to the relations of Luxembourg with the Germanic confederation;*" and two of the sections objected to the declaration of independence, if intended to exclude the possibility of an union with France. As the first of these amendments introduces considerable perplexity into the Belgic question, and might furnish a very reasonable pretext for a war, if the powers of Europe were so inclined, it may be proper to state the facts at greater length than their intrinsic importance would seem to deserve.

Before the actual union of Holland with the Belgic provinces, the sovereign prince of the former had acquired the sovereignty of the grand duchy of Luxembourg in exchange for the dominions of the house of Nassau in Germany, which he had renounced at the congress of Vienna. This province was to descend to the second son of the king, prince Frederick, when the eldest son, the prince of Orange, should succeed to the throne of the Netherlands. As it was exchanged for the German possessions of the Orange family, and bordered on Germany, it was made a component member of the Germanic confederation; and the king, as grand duke of Luxembourg, was entitled to have his representative at the German diet. Nay, more; the fortress of

Luxembourg was declared a fortress of the confederation, and is still garrisoned by Prussian troops. Thus the grand duchy came into the family of the king at a different time and on different conditions from the other Belgic provinces. Its rule of succession was different, and it was placed under a different protection. It was made the appanage of the king's second son, and was only to remain united to the crown so long as the present king continued to wear it. Thus far Belgium and the province of Luxembourg appeared perfectly separable, and the forfeiture of the one did not necessarily imply a surrender of the other.

But this is only a part of the case. By the second article of the fundamental law, the province of Luxembourg, is solemnly united under the sovereignty of the Netherlands. The commission appointed to examine the terms of this fundamental law, and to suggest the improvements which were afterwards adopted, allude to the union of the grand duchy with the other provinces as an incorporation, or as an indissoluble increase of territory. "The province of Luxembourg, which takes the title of grand duchy, and which is a substitute in the house of your majesty for your German states, becomes *to the kingdom an increase* of the highest importance." The report afterwards proceeds in the following terms: "We have been informed of the rights which family compacts had given to your youngest son over the estates of Nassau, and we acknowledge the just title which this prince has to an indemnity; *but we have thought that it belongs to the states-general to propose, either by a cession of*

domains, or in some other way, the measure which will best satisfy what equity demands, and what the gratitude of the nation prescribes. We presume, sire, to express our desire that arrangements may be made, in concert with your allies, *that in no case the grand duchy of Luxembourg be separated from the kingdom.* This wish, which is in the interest of the state, appears likewise to us in the interest of Europe." This suggestion of the commission was carried into effect by a law passed on the 25th of May, 1816 (the year after the union), which, after reciting in its preamble the terms on which the grand duchy was ceded to the family of Nassau, and the rights acquired over it by the king's youngest son, states, that as it was thought conducive to the general interest of the kingdom to unite the said grand duchy to the other provinces, and to place it under the same constitutional laws, the second son of his majesty should be indemnified for his eventual right of succession by the cession of royal domains in the district of Breda, the revenue of which amounted to about 180,000 florins a year, to be possessed by him and his heirs male, without, however, the power of alienating or mortgaging them. The fact is thus established, that the province of Luxembourg was incorporated with the united kingdom of the Netherlands; that had that kingdom continued to exist, it could not have been separated from it; and that prince Frederick or his representatives had lost all right to its possession, by the award of an indemnity.

But this only established the point, that it was to belong to the united kingdom; and not that it was

considered a province of that division of it which is called Belgium. The latter fact is proved by other circumstances. The province of Luxembourg has always gone along with the Belgic provinces in all their fortunes, under the dominion of Spain, Austria, and France. It never was united with Holland since the establishment of Dutch independence, till 1815. At the time of the discussion of the fundamental law by the Belgic commission which sat at the Hague in 1815, there was at first no representative from Luxembourg. When the king proposed to unite this principality to the other provinces, a representative of its interests was added; and the constitution was submitted to the *notables* of Luxembourg, as well as to those of the rest of Belgium.

Before it had been decided to annex it to the other provinces of the Netherlands, and while it was yet occupied by the allied troops, the number of deputies had been settled for the whole kingdom at 110, — being 55 for Holland, and 55 for Belgium. When this province was to be incorporated, it was proposed that it should send *four more representatives* to the states-general, which would have raised the number of the chamber to 114. But to this arrangement the Dutch members of the commission objected, on the ground that it would give *Belgium a preponderance of four members over Holland.* The original number was therefore adhered to, and Luxembourg was considered as a Belgic province, and came in for its share of the Belgic representation.

Such is the state of undisputed facts, on which the different parties rest the validity of their rights, or lay the basis of their reasonings. No sooner had

the majority of the Belgic provinces shaken off the dominion of the Orange family, than the people of Luxembourg hastened to join them. The Dutch authorities were deposed, and Belgic authorities appointed. The provisional government sent its commissioners to this province, as well as into the rest. The taxes were collected, and justice administered, in the name of the same government. And when an order was issued to elect deputies to the national congress, Luxembourg sent its representatives as well as Brabant or Flanders. These deputies continued to sit in the congress, to defend the rights of their province, and to enjoy their share of the national independence. The royal governor prohibited the elections in the town of Luxembourg; but the inhabitants proceeded beyond the range of his cannon, and elected their deputies.

On the other hand, the king of Holland, while he abandons the Belgic provinces, insists on retaining the grand duchy. He is supported by the Germanic confederation, under whose protection the province is placed, and is countenanced in his claim by some publicists and diplomatists. M. Bignon, the liberal minister of the French chamber of deputies, in a celebrated speech which he made in that assembly on the 13th of November, points out the "ill-founded pretension of the Belgians to the province of Luxembourg, as an excess of imprudence and passion." He afterwards calls it "an usurpation," which may lead to a combat between the new state and the Germanic confederation. The house of Orange, he insists, holds this province on a different tenure from that of the other Belgic provinces, having received

it as an indemnity in exchange for the principalities of Nassau, Dillemberg, Liegen, and Datz, ceded to Prussia. Hence he expresses an apprehension that the Germanic confederation will assert its rights, and employ Prussian troops to execute its decrees. The king has applied for assistance to the Germanic confederation, and has obtained the offer of the necessary detachment of confederative troops to assert his right, according to the mutual guarantees given to each member of the diet. This fact was announced to the grand duchy by a proclamation of the governor, on the 17th of November; and the resolution of the diet was subsequently acted upon, in the appointment of the particular contingent of troops to carry the award into execution.

The question, we allow, is surrounded with great difficulties; and no two powers, looking out for a quarrel, could desire a better pretext for drawing their swords. The speeches in the Belgic congress on the subject were, of course, all on one side, and therefore ought to have no more weight than the intrinsic force of their reasoning; though it must be owned, that if all the other Belgic provinces are allowed to dispose of themselves by shaking off the yoke imposed by treaties, it would be hard to refuse the same privilege to the inhabitants of Luxembourg, whose transference to the family of Nassau had no higher sanction than theirs. These conventions were all made at the same congress; they all stipulated for the submission of the parties, without consulting their wishes. Belgium itself, which was held by the same allied forces, was considered as an indemnity to the house of Orange as much as Luxembourg for ces-

sions in Germany; and the mere allotment of the latter as a patrimonial principality to a younger son, which was a domestic arrangement — afterwards altered by a positive law, exchanging that principality for an indemnity on the royal domains — ought not to alter the tenure on which they are both held. By shifting the indemnity of the second son from Luxembourg to the domains of Breda, and by incorporating the former with the united kingdom under the same constitutional act, and subject to the same rules of succession as the other provinces, the king did all in his power to render them inseparable, and cannot therefore complain of the defection of one more than the other. Had the grand duchy *adhered* to the crown of Holland when the other provinces declared against it, some doubts might have been raised on the justice of uniting it to Belgium, and the provisional government of Brussels might have been justly chargeable with an act of hostility, or an invasion of right, in sending its commissioners to arrange its civil and military condition in conformity with the general system of the Belgic provinces. But the contrary is the fact. The grand duchy stretched out its hand to the general union, and insisted on its right of a common independence. As regards the king of Holland, therefore, Luxembourg is precisely in the same predicament as the other nine provinces. It was united with them in all their fortunes, before their incorporation with France; it was detached from France along with them; it was joined to Holland along with them; it revolted along with them; it is now ruled by the same provisional government, and has

its deputies in the same national congress. The treaty which specially appropriated its territory as an indemnity for German cessions, and fixed its succession in a younger branch of the family (though it had not been altered by the fundamental law, or the family compact of 1816), is not more sacred or more binding than the treaty which transferred the other provinces to the crown of the Netherlands, and which is now abandoned by the contracting parties in favour of Belgic independence.

But a new difficulty occurs as respects the rights of the Germanic confederation. The grand duchy was declared a member of the Germanic body, and as such has still a garrison of Prussians in its capital. The political object of that arrangement was, no doubt, the same as that contemplated on the erection of the provinces of the Netherlands into a kingdom. It was not to gratify the ambition of a particular family, however respectable, by making them German as well as Belgic princes, but to strengthen the new state against the ambition of France, by hanging it as a confederate on Germany. While, therefore, the allies voted subsidies to build fortresses as a barrier against French aggressions on the south, they linked the new kingdom to the German empire, and gave it the army of the confederation as a barrier towards the east. The province of Luxembourg, detached from the kingdom of the Netherlands, and viewed apart from the design of the allies in its cession, would be a standing anomaly. Its separate existence would only afford an evidence that the influence of a family arrangement prevailed over considerations of national

security and popular rights. But if the treaties are binding which enchain Luxembourg to Germany, let the sovereign of the new state of Belgium become a member of the diet like the late king. The congress have wisely avoided any dispute on this point, by decreeing the independence without prejudice to the relations of Luxembourg with the Germanic confederation. If such an arrangement as would allow the Belgic state to retain possession of Luxembourg could be agreed upon, Prussia might be induced to withdraw her garrison from the grand duchy, and obtain an indemnity for her Rhenish provinces in Germany.

In this dispute about the right to Luxembourg, to which the Belgians appear at first sight to possess a reasonable claim, it ought not, however, to be forgotten, that before November last Belgium had never been an independent state; that having no recognised existence, except as a conglomeration of provinces subject to another power, it could not, after its late separation from Holland, have a *jus postliminii* to any separate district; that, never having been organised as a distinct political identity, it cannot be considered as dismembered by the separation of one of the provinces *accidentally* connected with it; that if it were to proceed on any strict rule, it might as well claim French Flanders as the grand duchy; and that if it really had any independent rights before the declaration of independence, it ought to consider Liege as a compensation for Luxembourg, or to declare that foreign powers have no right to interfere in any changes of the relations and powers of neighbouring states.

Such, at the end of the year, was the state of the question with respect to Luxembourg, and such are the principles on which all the other claims of the Belgians on particular portions of territory were to be decided. The government of Belgium is quite right in desiring the incorporation of this with the other provinces opposed to the Dutch, but does not seem entitled to its possession on the principles of a previous separate existence, which it asserts out of compliment to diplomacy.

The party inclined to a French connection objected to the general declaration of independence, as prejudging their cause. The author of the original proposition declared his intention to exclude the pretensions of France, as well as to destroy the usurpations of Holland. This gave an opportunity to those who desired an union with France to declare their opinions, and to exhibit their strength. The point was less intricate and more intelligible than that relative to Luxembourg; but it was satisfactory to be observed that both argument and numbers were against the proposed union. It was seen and acknowledged by the sensible part of the assembly, that the question of Belgic independence, and of an incorporation with a great neighbouring power, would be viewed with a very different eye, and lead to very different conduct, on the part of foreign nations. If the Belgians kept themselves separate from France, whatever government they adopted, or in whatever way they might conduct their internal affairs, they would be sure to have the people of Europe with them, though kings and conventions might be against them; but a proposed

union with France, to aggrandise that power, would unite people and governments in a general war to prevent such a result.

On the other hand, some members of the congress contended that Belgium could not exist as a separate commonwealth; that the interests of its trade and industry connected it with France; that neither its agriculture nor its manufactures could flourish if confined to its own limited markets; that, making part of a great kingdom, it would enjoy more extended commercial intercourse, and a less expensive protection against foreign aggression. These arguments were, however, overbalanced by the pride of a separate national identity, and the apprehension that a union with France would provoke a general war, of which Belgium would be the theatre and the victim. Foreign intervention in Belgic affairs was considered impossible on the supposition of their separate existence, but absolutely unavoidable on the supposition of their fusion with France. With intervention would come all its train of war, and all the oppressions of military occupation. On the other hand, Belgium might enjoy the markets of France by an improved system of trade without any political incorporation; Belgic corn might be exchanged for French wine; Belgic hardware for French woollens; and a perfect adjustment might take place in all other branches of trade for the mutual benefit of both parties, though the sceptre of France did not extend beyond its present limits, though Brussels were to remain the capital of an independent state, and the Belgic provinces were not again merged in French departments. Such

reasoning as this happily prevailed, supported as it was by M. de Brouckere, count de Celles, M. Leohn, and some of the other most respectable members of the assembly. The declaration of independence, with the modification respecting Luxembourg, was therefore unanimously adopted by an assembly consisting of one hundred and eighty-seven members, only thirteen of the whole congress being absent. A manifesto to Europe was ordered to be drawn up, to proclaim this independence, and to justify the means by which it was established.

Having decided this point in the sittings of the 17th and 18th of November, the congress proceeded, on the 19th, to discuss the question of the form of government suited to the independent state which they had just proclaimed. Our limits will not permit us to give even a brief outline of the debates which took place on the litigated advantages and disadvantages of the republican or monarchical form. Nothing new, of course, could be said on such topics. The only novelty of the occasion consisted in the sight of a grave assembly, delegated from every district of the nation, with a mission to discuss such vital questions, unfettered by any previous pledges, uncontrolled by any existing authority, conscious of a power to reconstruct the social fabric on any given model,—building, as in some countries, from the top downwards,—enabled to bring their Utopian theories to practical application; capable, by their fraction of popular sovereignty, of realising for a time the political day-dreams of their closet on the great stage of public affairs—of giving themselves and their fellow-citizens an hereditary sovereign, or a temporary

chief—of erecting a throne or a president's chair at their pleasure; and, with "the world of political perfectibility all before them," deliberating whether to choose "the fierce democracy" of the French regicides, or the constitutional monarchy of England, with as much calmness as if they had only to decide on the order of a procession.

The chief advantages of a republic are, the boasted cheapness of its establishments (particularly those connected with the head of the state); its constant dependence on public opinion; and its liability at short intervals to public control. It votes no civil list; it pays no chamberlains or lords of the bedchamber; it has no troops of body guards and masters of the horse; it pays neither courtiers nor confessors. The chief, rising from the body of the people and again descending among his fellow-citizens, is never above their censure or their praise; and if he neglects the wishes of his countrymen, the next election removes him from the office in which he annoyed them. This representation may be true in certain cases, but it is not true in all. Experience has proved that republics are more expensive sometimes than monarchies. There never was a more expensive government than that of Holland under its self-denying grand pensioners, and never a people more heavily taxed than the Dutch, before they had the misfortune of being the subjects of a monarchy. It is no doubt true, that in a republic, such as that of North America, public offices more frequently change hands; but we very much doubt whether public opinion has more weight than in less democratic states. At any rate, we cannot consider the fac-

tious violence which prevails between contending parties, and the constant business of electioneering which a change of president encourages, as unequivocal blessings. The healthy exercise of the body politic is not, more than in the natural body, perpetual motion or constant excitement. To prevent civil stagnation, it is not necessary that the surface of society should be agitated by a continued storm. A salutary jealousy of power does not inculcate incessant distrust. There is a medium between a fever and a lethargy; and, to enjoy liberty, it is not more necessary to be constantly reflecting on its possession than, to enjoy health, it is necessary to be constantly feeling one's pulse. The turmoil of perpetually recurring elections for the chief magistrate of the state; the irritation of party antipathies, which every election occasions; the appeals to popular passions, and the abuse of antagonist candidates, may, in our opinion, be happily changed for a calmer, though perhaps less ecstatic, enjoyment of freedom.

But though a republican government could be proved to be the least expensive in the world, and might be purified from every alleged defect, it is not an established maxim that it is fitted for every people and for every state of social order. The Belgians have been always accustomed to monarchical institutions, though combined with a great infusion of popular principles. They are fond of titles, and have a numerous nobility, proud of their ancestry. These titles could scarcely exist under a republic, except by a division of society into nobles and plebeians, as in ancient Rome or modern Venice. The forms of

law and society would all be required to be altered; for a temporary president could scarcely be entrusted with the distribution of hereditary honours. Besides, the Catholic hierarchy, which is very powerful in Belgium, is as much opposed to republican institutions as the nobility who derive their titles from Charles the Bold or Philip the Good. In this state of public opinion, it is not surprising that, out of an assembly of one hundred and eighty-seven, only thirteen deputies were found to vote for a republic.

The majority, however, agreed in nearly all the objects which a republican could contemplate as the advantages of his scheme; while they avoided the dangers of internal anarchy, and the contingency of external aggression, by adopting the project of a constitutional hereditary monarchy for their country. Every advocate for a monarchy insisted on cheap government, and an efficient control of the people over the measures of the executive. They insisted likewise on the limitation of the supreme power within the narrowest limits possible; on the most unsparing correction of abuses; on the greatest extension of liberty; in short, on a republican government administered by an hereditary chief. Hereditary title was recommended, to prevent the confusion of contested elections for the chief magistracy, rather than to screen tyranny or to warrant extravagance. The ancients had only two forms of government, despotism and a republic; a despotism which sacrificed every thing to stability, and a republic which abandoned every thing to political movement. Modern Europe has combined the two; and has thus extracted from the mixture a power

which continues, and a power which changes, in *republican monarchy*. To show how incompatible a levelling principle of democracy would be with the public peace, it was stated by a member, that in every one of the provinces Belgic families of nobility had been planted from time immemorial, and had there taken root: that they deserved the popularity which they enjoyed: that they had a kind of right to the influence which they exercised; for that they were distinguished over all Christendom for their purity; that they were not only affable, kind, and popular, but faithful to their religious duties, and chivalrous in the observance of their honour; that they had never sold themselves to power; and that in camps, in palaces, and in the haunts of trade, they had defended the rights of the people, and resisted the counsels of oppression.

The next subject which engaged the attention of the Belgic congress was the formal deposition of their king, and the eternal exclusion of his family from the exercise of power in Belgium. This differed from the abstract topic of their previous deliberations "about forms of government," in being warm with recent injuries, and pregnant with national and personal antipathies. The very agitation of the question for excluding one prince and his descendants from the throne before another was selected to fill it, showed the precipitancy of passion more than the providence of reason. It is self-evident, that if the throne was to be hereditary, and if a person or prince unconnected with the house of Nassau was to occupy it, there was nothing gained by declaring against the pretensions of the

prince of Orange. Unless it was proposed to follow the Spartan example of having two kings for Belgium, the very act of transfer was a sentence of exclusion. In commencing a new building, it is necessary sometimes to pull down the old, and to remove the rubbish; but in this case the ground was already cleared, and nothing remained but to found and complete the edifice.

After the unsuccessful attack on Brussels, and the bombardment of Antwerp, it was the general opinion of the Orange party that the friends of the prince had lost all their influence, and his pretensions all their validity. Though those who knew him most intimately acquitted him of all connivance with his father's agents in these aggressions, yet the great body of the people entertained strong suspicions of his conduct; and some went the length of thinking that he was more guilty than his father, in that he added duplicity and perfidy to cruelty. His contenting himself with proclamations when he was required to act; his departure from Antwerp only a day before the attack; his debarkation at one of the first Dutch villages, where he might almost hear the roaring of the artillery which was levelling the second city of his future inheritance, and where he received visits from some of the allied ambassadors; his return to the Hague, where he represented himself as in danger; and his cordial reception by his father, whom it was said his Belgic predilections had enraged, were all cited as proofs of his insincerity in the Belgic cause. His unpopularity from these causes was considered as so great, that, in the idea of some, a civil war would

have been the consequence of his accession to power. The blood that had been shed by his father's troops, and the violent appeals which had been made to popular passions against his family, had rendered it odious to support his pretensions, and even dangerous to speak in his favour. Accordingly, during the whole discussion, no member of congress had the boldness to declare him the fittest sovereign for Belgium; while every harangue uttered against him, even down to the maledictions of a republican priest, who exclaimed as on the inspired tripod, "Down with the Orange family!" was addressed to an applauding audience.

But it was not passion alone, or the antipathies of the multitude, acting on the timidity of the interested, that were arrayed against the prince. Some of the more enlightened members of the assembly advanced plausible reasons of state, and reasonable grounds of expediency, for his exclusion. In the case of any other prince whom they might call to power, the principle of election would be notorious to himself and all the world. Having no previous claim, he would owe his crown only to the free choice of the nation. The sovereignty of the people would thus be proclaimed in giving themselves a ruler. No antiquated pretensions, no anterior rights or understandings, could be pleaded in extenuation of a breach of contract with his subjects. It was otherwise with the prince of Orange. His royal highness might look beyond the election of 1830 to the treaties of 1815, and might consider himself as much entitled to reign by the latter as the former. He never could be able to

divest himself of old recollections, or to adopt frankly the new conditions of his tenure. His elevation, in fact, would be a sort of restoration, and liable to all the objections which usually apply to a restored dynasty. The civil list provision which would suit a stranger might appear to him insufficient; and the control to which others would submit might appear to him intolerable. Besides, the interests of Belgium would still be liable to be sacrificed to those of Holland, so long as the father occupied one throne, and the son another; and it would be difficult to prevent the union of the crowns on the same head after the father's decease.

Such are some of the objections to the title of the prince, advanced by the more moderate members of congress; but the great majority were satisfied with less refined reasoning. The latter found it easier to draw up articles of impeachment against not only a whole family, but a whole nation; embracing, in the comprehensive range of their animosity, the history of their ancestors, and the character of their posterity. Here they found a large field for abusive personalities; a glorious opportunity of trampling on fallen greatness; and a tempting facility of exposing kings and courts, at the small expense of violating the respect due to truth and misfortune. One of the members even, who was most eloquent on the debate, having denounced all the Orange family for some generations past, as ambitious, selfish, treacherous, cruel, and sanguinary, had the temerity to lay his sacrilegious hand on the character of William the *Taciturne* (as he affected to call him), the great founder of the

Dutch republic, who, according to this lover of freedom and advocate for the rights of conscience, had introduced distractions into the Netherlands by becoming the supporter of the Protestants! This retrospective injustice was indulged in by several zealous anti-Orangeists; and the character of the present family was not to be trusted by the patriots of Belgium, because prince Maurice had treated Barnevelt with cruelty and injustice.

But the chief topics of declamation were the alleged oppressions of the royal government during the last fifteen years, and the recent military aggressions on Brussels and Antwerp. The mover of the proposition for exclusion (M. Rodenbach) asked, with emphatic hostility, "How can the prince of Orange present himself in a capital, in the midst of a too confiding people, to whom he has falsified all his promises? How will he make his public entry? Will it be by the gate which saw the shameful flight of his brother, and of his cowardly and barbarous soldiers? Will he take up his abode in the palace, where grape-shot has traced the fatal decree of the fall of his house? Will he raise up the mutilated statues of his father, trampled upon by an indignant people? Will he pick up a crown and put it on his head, soiled with blood and dirt?" To such appeals the friends of the dynasty, in the exasperated temper of their audience and their constituents, could make no reply. Others (among whom were several of the members of the old states-general) were themselves more measured in their language, and dignified in their forbearance, but

could not check the torrent which ran so furiously against their unfortunate prince.

In the second day of the debate an incident occurred which it was expected would be beneficial to the Orange cause, or at least would adjourn its decision, but which really precipitated the decree of exclusion, and increased the ranks of its partisans. One of the deputies from Antwerp (M. Le Grelle), who, with the other members for that city, had urged the postponement of the decision till the arrangement of an armistice, which would secure their property from the vengeance of the Dutch garrison, having heard that a Russian envoy had arrived, moved that the government should be invited to declare whether any diplomatic agents had reached Brussels besides the English and the French; and in case there had, to lay before congress a copy of the diplomatic notes and documents brought by them from one or more powers relative to the affairs of Belgium, and particularly to the question now under discussion. This proposition, after some resistance from the enemies of the prince of Orange, was complied with; the chamber formed itself into a secret committee, and the diplomatic commission of the government submitted to it the diplomatic communications which the government had received on the preceding night or that morning. The unfavourable effect of these communications was immediately seen at the resumption of the public sitting. Some members declared that their views and their votes would now be altered; that, if left free from foreign interference, they would have opposed the proposition for the perpetual ex-

clusion of the Nassaus; but that, as the independence of their country was their main object in all their exertions, they would never adopt a resolution which might have the appearance of sacrificing that independence to a foreign menace. This avowal was made by a member (M. Jotrand) who on the previous day had spoken in favour of the prince of Orange. The communications alluded to were Russian. The Russian government informed the provisional government at Brussels, through a French agent, that it could not view with indifference any attempt to resist the title of the prince of Orange; and that the separation of Belgium from Holland, and the breach of the treaties which founded the existing system of Europe, could only be overlooked or sanctioned on the condition of the Belgic dynasty commencing in the prince of Orange. This threat, which probably at any period of the revolution would have been disregarded, was communicated at a most unfortunate stage of its progress, when the minds of the people were exasperated by their injuries and exalted by their success—when two of the great powers of Europe had declared against the principle of internal interference, and had envoys at Brussels, as if to protest against the other members of the alliance—when the provisional government, by the convocation of the national congress, had lost all power of forwarding the object aimed at—and when the congress itself had gone so far that it could not retreat without the sacrifice of national honour to the fear of arms. The discussion continued some hours after this communication, and ended in a vote of exclusion, by one hundred and

sixty-one to twenty-eight. Even the minority could not be considered as supporters of the Orange family, though they objected to the introduction of the exclusion bill as premature, and to its terms of perpetuity as unnecessary, revengeful, and impolitic.

As the discussion which decided the fate of the late dynasty in Belgium, and has perhaps sown the seeds of future war in Europe, is of more interest than any other part of the deliberations of congress, we shall make no apology for collecting into a brief statement the main arguments employed in the two days' debate by the speakers on both sides. The party who supported the exclusion argued, 1st, That the people would not be satisfied without an *immediate* declaration on the subject; that distrust would exist in the public mind of the intentions of congress so long as they left any door open for the return of the Nassaus; that there was no chance of their ever ascending the throne but by a civil war; and that the sooner intrigues in their favour could be terminated by a solemn decision, the better. They contended, in the second place, that so long as the fate of the dynasty was left in doubt, no definitive arrangement could be formed between Belgium and Holland; that the two states could not treat as power with power, while the son of the sovereign with whom they were at war was supposed to have any claim on their obedience, or any influence in their affairs. 3. They argued, that, in order to be consistent, Belgium should follow up its declaration of independence by a sentence of exclusion against that family which was made the instrument, by the allies, of their subjugation. The

treaties of 1815 had created the condition of dependence from which their country had just escaped, by imposing upon them at once the Dutch domination and an Orange dynasty. They had thrown off the former by their act of independence, and they were now bound to renounce for ever the other. The exclusion of the Nassaus was only a corollary to the declaration of independence. When men desire freedom, they do not keep their chains on one hand while they throw them off the other. To drive away the Dutch and to retain the Nassaus, would be attempting the inconsistent absurdity of at once destroying and maintaining the treaties of 1815, imposed upon them by foreign dictation. If they had any faith, therefore, in the principles of their revolution, they should carry them to all their consequences. After what had passed, the return of the Prince of Orange would be a restoration; and restorations were always accompanied with old pretensions, with distrusts, jealousies, and vengeance. How could the prince, as sovereign of Belgium, pardon the attacks made upon his family while an exile in London, or a resident at the Hague? Besides, he could not frankly adopt the new institutions, or renounce in favour of the revolution the alleged rights acquired by previous treaties. It was argued in the fourth place, that the act of exclusion would exercise a great influence on the allied powers in their future negotiations, and enable congress to outmanœuvre holy alliance diplomacy. Hitherto Belgium had been so happy as to avoid a collision with Europe by two circumstances; the fear of driving it to form a republic, or compelling

it to embrace a French connexion. This alarm was now removed by the declaration of a constitutional monarchy, and the manifesto of national independence. The allies might now, while relieved from this alarm, and so long as the question of the Orange dynasty remained unsettled, refuse their friendship, unless it was purchased by a crown for the prince. The sentence of exclusion would put an end to these hopes and artifices, and enable the country to come to some definitive arrangement. The new state had been exposed to three kinds of war: a war with Europe, which was prevented by the course which congress had pursued in renouncing a republic and an union with France; a civil war, which will be avoided by the exclusion of the Nassaus; and a war with Holland, in consequence of their exclusion, which, if inevitable, Belgium need dread as the least of all the apprehended evils. In the fifth place, while there remained any chance for any member of the deposed family, foreign intrigues would be busy in fomenting discord among their opponents, the nation would be distracted from the duty of looking out for a sovereign suitable to its wishes, and candidates would be prevented from making their claims available, out of regard for the competitor already in the field. In the sixth place, though it might have been proper not to have made the proposition of exclusion till a prince had been found to fill the vacant throne, the decision could not now be adjourned without danger. Its adjournment would be ascribed to fear, and would be regarded as a negative election of the prince.

Such were the arguments from expediency advanced for the immediate exclusion of the family of Orange. The right and justice of the measure were grounded on the alleged oppressions of the late king—on the breach of his engagements towards his Belgic subjects—on the recent calamities which the Dutch government had brought on the country. The treaties by which their union with Holland was formed were made without their consent; and they acknowledged no power in the allies to dictate in their affairs.

Those who opposed the proposition could not, unfortunately, rely on any claim of right in favour of the king, or any striking pretensions to merit, services, or popularity on the part of the prince. Their chief objections were directed against the unseasonable time of bringing it forward, and the unnecessary as well as unmeaning cruelty of pronouncing an eternal sentence of attainder or disqualification against a whole race of princes. Their speeches were merely defensive or apologetic, and produced little effect on an assembly heated with glowing descriptions of Orange massacres, and enthusiastic protestations of exclusive patriotism.

After thus proclaiming that the basis of their institutions was to be a constitutional monarchy, and voting the exclusion of their old family of princes for their monarch, the congress proceeded, in their subsequent sitting of the 24th, to discuss the project of a constitution. A project drawn up by a commission appointed by the provisional government, and published before the convocation of the congress, was submitted to that assembly. It was of

course declared to have no authority, except as the work of individuals. One of its authors, who was both a member of the commission and a member of congress, introduced it as his own, and called for its consideration, as embracing the best parts of the French charter adapted to the institutions of Belgium. But other members had likewise their projects, and objected to selections or preferences. They were all accordingly referred to a committee, to extract from their variegated pages a perfect constitutional act.

But these discussions sunk into insignificance amid the vast interests which the late decision of the congress had put in motion, and amid the din of hostile preparation which was immediately heard from the north, the east, and the south. The provisional government and the national congress had been apprised by a friendly voice, that if they decreed the exclusion of the Nassaus, their friends could not answer for the peace of Europe; and this intimation, instead of *delaying their decision or altering their purpose*, only confirmed the one and precipitated the other. Their vote of exclusion was therefore understood by themselves to be a declaration of war. They had violated the treaties to which the great powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria were parties, and had "torn the seal from the bond" by which they held their new acquisitions of territory. This might have been forgiven, had they made the gift of their crown a peace-offering to the exasperated alliance, and thus preserved a relic of that virtue which successive congresses had infused into the barren settlement; but it was not to

be tolerated when they added an insulting rejection of accommodation to previous breaches of treaty. This was felt by the world to be the test of war or peace; the olive and the Orange title, the sword and the exclusion, were folded in the cloak of the envoy who brought the message; and the Belgians chose the latter. King William had repeatedly announced that he was in deliberation with his allies about the means of supporting the faith of treaties (the King of England's speeches alluded to these treaties); and the Emperor of Russia, in his letter to the King of France, made their friendship depend upon their faithful observance. Great exertions had been made to retain Antwerp and Maestricht, not only as hostages of Belgic good behaviour, but as the means of more easy aggression. This being the understanding both in Belgium and on all parts of the continent, the parties began to take their ground, and to announce their preparations. The French government had shown no open disposition to support the Belgians in their obstinacy, and would have been glad to find that the Belgians had given no pretext for interference; but it found that it could not permit that interference even on the pretext of enforcing the stipulations of treaties, without bringing to its frontiers a military force which might be directed against its own institutions. The two revolutions, though perfectly distinct in origin and character, had been confounded in popular estimation; and if the shield of France was not extended over the work of the Brussels barricades, the blow would fall upon her own.

The parallel between the expulsion of the Orange

and the Bourbon dynasty, both placed on the throne by the same alliance, and in furtherance of the same anti-revolutionary principles, was too close; the coincidence between the circumstances of the new institutions of Belgium and France was too striking; the sympathy of two people previously united for more than twenty years was too great; and the territory too contiguous, to allow an invasion of the one without resistance from the other. Though the government of France should oppose such a union, the government could not stand against the collapse of the two people, attracted by such powerful affinities, and operating at such short distances. It would be vain to pretend that the question was one of territorial limits, and not of political opinions; and that if Luxembourg were not invaded, Belgium might have been safe. Such reasoning could scarcely persuade a diplomatist, and could have no influence on the armed masses of the national guard, or rather on the nation in arms, prepared to defend its own work in the ranks of their imitators on their own frontier. Accordingly, the French people and the French government chose to consider the military preparations of the holy alliance as directed against themselves, if Belgium should furnish a pretext for the movement; and as soon as the Belgic question was decided, they began to arm. On the eastern and southern frontiers, the inhabitants, who had seen the evils of two former invasions, anticipated the government in their preparations for resistance. They formed themselves into associations of insurance against the calamities of war, employed their municipal funds in buying arms for their

volunteers and organising themselves into corps. These preparations were justified by the language held and the preparations making in Russia and Prussia. It was stated on authority which is now found to be authentic, that Russia was placing several corps of her army on the war footing; that great bodies of troops were marching to the Polish frontier; that an army of 200,000 men, with 400 pieces of artillery, was there collected. It was added, that General Diebitsch had left Berlin, where he was on a special mission to distribute this force and make arrangements for cantoning and provisioning it. Prussia brought forward her northern ally, and, in alarm about her own interests, was early busy in repairing her frontier fortresses, increasing their garrisons, and providing them against immediate hostilities. The Rhenish provinces and the frontiers of Holland were the quarters to which her force was directed. Austria, in the course of the autumn, had called out an extraordinary levy from Hungary, and had been pouring troops into Italy. It was said that she had been negotiating with the court of Turin for the possession of Alexandria and some other fortresses in Piedmont.

All these preparations were ordered, and these operations were going forward, before the northern courts had heard of the changes in the British ministry; a circumstance which had great weight on their subsequent proceedings, as the doctrine of non-intervention had *now* been broadly proclaimed, instead of being mysteriously hinted at, or half-abandoned. The Polish insurrection was a better security for the inactivity of Russia in the north.

Meanwhile, the armistice was pressed upon the acceptance of the Dutch and Belgians by the conferences at London, and agreed to by both states. The latter had thus leisure to proceed with the examination of their proposed constitutional act, which was nearly completed by the end of the year. Among other articles, the constitution enacts an hereditary monarchy and two legislative chambers — a chamber of deputies, and a senate or second chamber. The latter is to be elected for eight years, and to consist of representatives from the provinces, likewise elected by the people, to the amount of half the number of their deputies.

When the congress had decided for an hereditary monarchy, and the exclusion of the Orange dynasty, the next question was, Who should be invited to fill the throne of Belgium? Of internal competitors, with any decided pretensions, there were none. Some of the oldest nobility, of great fortune and high character, had disqualified themselves for a revolutionary crown, by keeping aloof from the revolution, or by supporting the late family. Among this number was the Duke d'Aremberg and the Prince de Ligne. The only other name which could be mentioned as combining popularity with rank, — as having added services to the revolution, with fortune and consideration among the upper classes of society, — was Count de Merode. He had the advantage of having risked his fortune for the cause; of having lost a brother in defending it; and having himself been a member of the government which established its independence. But he had not raised himself beyond the level of hundreds of his country-

men by the brilliancy of his military success, or the importance of his civil services, — by the splendour of his fortune, or the renown of his family. The public voice would never have pointed him out for the office, but in the absolute dearth of any great social eminence. To have proposed such a mediocrity to the president's chair for a year, would have appeared ridiculous; but to exalt him to the throne, without personal or hereditary claims, would have appeared a burlesque upon elective royalty.

The organs of public opinion, therefore, looked beyond the Belgic frontier for a better representative of royalty; and the European public was for two months amused with the numbers and qualifications of the candidates who appeared for the new throne. At one time there were no less than seventeen put on the list, by different petitions to congress; among whom we need only mention that we find the names of General Lafayette, Viscount Chateaubriand, and his holiness the pope! The nature of the subsequent contest, when the list was reduced to two, a son of Prince Eugene and of Louis Philip, does not fall within the scope of our *Retrospect*. We may say the same respecting the result of the London conferences, in settling the terms of separation between Holland and Belgium. Their final award was not pronounced till the 20th and 27th of January, though the principle on which they intended to act, and consequently the end at which they would arrive, had been previously known. Laying it down as a maxim, that treaties do not lose their force, whatever changes may take place in the internal organisation of nations, they have assigned to

Belgium and Holland the limits which they possessed before the French revolutionary war, while Holland was independent and Belgium subject to the house of Austria, with the exception of Luxembourg, which is reserved for Holland, though claimed by Belgium on the grounds which we previously stated. Holland is thus left in possession of Limbourg, Luxembourg, and the left bank of the Scheldt, the island of Cadsand, or the part of West Flanders opposite Antwerp. The debt has been apportioned on principles which leave *sixteen* parts out of thirty-one to the charge of Belgium, and the remaining *fifteen* to the charge of Holland. Against this decision the Belgians have protested, and have appealed from the conferences of London to the sword; renouncing all the proffered benefits of an immediate recognition of their independence, and a guarantee of their neutrality, in subsequent European contests.

CHAP. VI.

ATTEMPT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PATRIOTS ON SPAIN. — STATE OF PORTUGAL. — REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN SWITZERLAND.

We have seen the influence of the French revolution on the people nearest the French frontier,—on the Netherlands,—on some of the German states,—and on England itself, the land of freedom. We are now to devote the little space which is left us to trace its effects, so far as developed within the year, on the bordering confederation of the Swiss cantons, and on one of the most southern and one of the most northern nations of Europe, both suffering under the greatest oppression, the former of domestic, the latter of foreign despotism.

The history of Spain during the early part of 1830, as during the last six or seven years, was little else than a record of the intrigues of the *camarilla*, and the quarrels of servile factions.

Ferdinand was, and is still, "King of the Indies," though he has not a single subject or foot of ground on the American continent. He has hitherto resisted all attempts at an accommodation with the new republics; and whenever he can obtain a moment's security from disturbance, or reserve a few dollars from an inadequate revenue, he thinks of an expedition to recover possession of states, which, though still a prey to anarchy, are as likely to conquer

Spain as to be re-subjected to her colonial sway. In the early part of the year, the events of his own life were of some consequence to his court and family. He has been married a third time,—has repealed the Salic law, introduced into Spain by the Bourbons,—and, as if to show his prophetic anticipation, has had a daughter. The long-promised amnesty, which was to restore so many exiles to the country, did not appear on any of these joyful occasions; and the refusal of this act of humanity and justice left the patriots, unbound by any tie of gratitude, to pursue the course which the extraordinary events of the period suggested.

The French revolution of July produced the greatest joy among the exiles, and the greatest alarm at the court of Madrid. His catholic majesty felt beneath his feet the shock of the convulsion which had overthrown the throne of Charles X.; and his banished subjects, instead of looking for a tardy pardon, expected almost immediately a political triumph. Several weeks even before the great events of Paris, a party of the exiles in England had been preparing themselves for an expedition to recover their rights, and to depose their tyrant. They had kept up a close correspondence with their disaffected countrymen at home, who, mistaking their own wishes and feelings for the sentiments of those around them, held out the most encouraging prospects of domestic support to any revolutionary attempt made from without. The assurances of co-operation thus received were so flattering and encouraging, that those who doubted of the success of the cause, or who testified any

hesitation in engaging in it, were looked upon as little better than traitors. General Mina was pressed by these sanguine patriots to place himself at their head in their intended enterprise; but having, with his characteristic sagacity, seen the inadequacy of the means to be employed, he, with that caution which is no less an ingredient of his character, temporised and postponed the undertaking on so many pretences as to excite a suspicion of his patriotic views, and to cause a schism among his friends. The head of the expedition then selected was General Torrijos, who, besides his difference with Mina on the proper time to strike the blow, was likewise opposed to him on the government to be established in Spain after the blow had succeeded.

The means provided for this enterprise were extremely slender, evincing that its leader depended more on its moral effect than its physical force; and of these slender means its chief was deprived by the vigilance of the Spanish ambassador, and the interference of the British ministry. A ship loaded with arms, belonging to or rather constituting the expedition, was captured in the Thames, and the general escaped from Brighton to Dieppe in a fishing-boat. Relying on the accounts which he had received, that the Spanish nation was ripe for revolt, that the train was laid for blowing up the strong hold of absolute power, and that it only required the hand of a constitutionalist to apply the match, and the head of a liberal politician to direct the subsequent movements, General Torrijos did not hesitate to throw himself on the southern coast of Spain, with only two or three attendants,

and a bale of proclamations, immediately after the events of July.

This part of the insurrectionary scheme, together with the confident leader who was committed to its success, was hid for some months from the view of Europe, while the force of the patriots, directed towards the Pyrenees, attracted more attention than its numerical importance deserved. General Mina, averse at first to rash enterprises, was either borne along by the imprudent enthusiasm of his countrymen, or believed that the French revolution would have so much altered the disposition of the northern Spanish provinces, that he might hope for support in his undertaking from domestic disaffection. He therefore placed himself at the head of as many of the exiles as had not sworn to raise another standard, and gave the rallying word, "The Pyrenees!" If this party could not rely upon the French government for succours in that quarter, they at least calculated on its forbearance. They imagined that in the south of France they would find a stage on which to arm themselves in safety; a friendly camp in which they might collect their forces; and a secure retreat, should they meet with an unexpected reverse. The encouragement given to the army of the Faith by the Bourbon government in 1822, might be expected by the army of the patriots from the national government of 1830.

Animated with these hopes, the Spanish exiles hastened to France from all quarters where they had found an asylum—from England, Belgium, and Germany, surrendering all regard for foreign homes, and all dependence upon foreign charity, with a

resolution like that of Cæsar's Helvetians, who burned their cities and villages before they set out in quest of happier settlements. In passing through Paris, they were received in the most flattering manner by the active party of the revolution, and were assured of every aid which could be afforded them, consistently with the doubtful relations of peace between a revolutionary and an absolute government.

General Lafayette in particular, then at the head of the national guard, and exercising great influence on the new functionaries, promised them all the assistance in money and arms which he could command. Their cause was so popular, and their success so certain, that they were joined by a considerable number of Parisian, Belgic, and Italian volunteers, who hoped to reap laurels and wealth on so promising a field.

In a short time we heard of the arrival of the invading force at the foot of the Pyrenees, and were almost every post entertained with some account of their movements. There was of course, as usual with Spanish patriots, no lack of juntas, councils, cabals, and proclamations. All wished to command, and none to obey. The unhappy differences which divided them in their season of prosperity, began again to ferment among them at the prospect of success. The distinctions of *communeros* and *masones*, which agitated the administration and the legislature in the reign of the cortes, again attained that prominence at the foot of the Pyrenees which they had in the political lodges of Madrid; and opposing juntas or bodies of officers quarrelled for precedence

and command, when they had nothing to share in common but their poverty and their perils. The party of masones to which Mina belonged, and which embraced the exiles of the most eminent political talent and highest military rank (such as Arguelles, Count Torreno, Martinez de la Rosa, Calatravo, Cuadra, and Galliano, and Generals Espinosa, Placensia, Butron, Quiroga, Lopez Bânos, and others), were nearly denounced as traitors by the communero party, who chose Torrijos for their leader, and who were represented on the Pyrenees by Colonel Valdez, Polarea, Gurria, Vigo, and their friends. The governing junta established at Bayonne* was composed of four of the partisans of Mina, whose name and services were properly reckoned indispensable to the success of the patriot cause. But the orders of this junta, and the commands of their general, were resisted and contemned by the more fiery and impetuous members of the rival club, who already, in their imaginations, divided the highest offices of the state and the army among themselves and their adherents.

Most of the patriot force arrived at Bayonne, or at Perpignan, on the eastern end of the Pyrenees, towards the end of August; and from that time to the end of October, the French and English public were daily in expectation of hearing of a blow struck at the tyranny of Ferdinand. As an army, the corps of the exiles was perfectly insignificant. It was even ridiculous to suppose that it could undertake any military operation against the smallest

* Its members, Isturez, Calatrava, Vadillo, and Sancho.

state or the weakest government unless supported by internal allies. It probably never amounted, along the whole line of the Pyrenees from sea to sea, to five hundred Spaniards, and about as many volunteers of different nations. The former consisted of more officers than common soldiers; as the latter had been too insignificant to think themselves in danger, or to seek refuge in exile, after the overthrow of the constitution in 1823.

Such a force might rally revolt against tyranny, if the people were prepared for rebellion; it might provoke rebellion, in cases where parties were hesitating between allegiance and insurrection, by giving a preponderance to the latter; and if the people, ready to break out, only wanted a plan and a leader, it might stimulate their courage and direct their efforts; but it is plain that it could neither effect any thing against a hostile or a passive population, nor withstand the attack of even a small detachment of a faithful army. In such a case little would be gained, though the government were taken by surprise, and had made no preparations for receiving the invaders on the point of the bayonet. But the exiles seem not to have relied on the effect of surprise. In order to ascertain the number of their friends, or to extend the circle of disaffection, they remained on the frontiers for two months, issuing patriotic proclamations, and menacing petty inroads. If this delay and these manifestoes gave the constitutionalists in Spain information of the presence and intentions of their exiled brethren, they likewise had the effect of warning the government to provide for their reception. Accordingly, the king not only had time

to send a considerable body of well-equipped, well-paid, and faithful troops to the frontiers, under officers on whom he could rely, and with promises of rewards and distinctions calculated to increase their zeal, but issued, towards the end of September, a sanguinary proclamation, ordering the constitutionalists who might pass the frontier in arms to be shot without trial, and declaring those local authorities or inhabitants to be traitors, and liable to be tried and executed by military commissions, who should harbour them, assist them, or neglect to give notice of their arrival in their towns or districts. Such a cruel decree must have hastened the revolt which it was intended to suppress, had any general spirit of revolt existed; but it was also well calculated to prevent partial defection, where the great body of the people were indisposed to rebellion.

But neither the arrival of Ferdinand's troops nor the menaces of his proclamations could deter the exiles from making an attempt to regain the soil, and to overthrow the despotism, of their country; and their enterprise, though unsuccessful, forms one of the most romantic and interesting episodes in the history of the period.

They resolved to penetrate into Spain through the rocky barrier of the Pyrenees, by two or three routes; on the side of Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia. Accordingly, one party resolved to tempt fortune by crossing the Bidassoa on the highway to Madrid; and another, to penetrate to Barcelona by Figueras, and the road followed by Marshal Moncey in 1823. Though fully provided with a governing

junta and numerous general officers, no concert was introduced into their movements. Colonel Valdez, of the *communero* party, after a violent quarrel with General Mina, whom he accused of treachery because he proposed delay, resolved to enter Spain on the west, with as many troops as were willing to join his standard. He accordingly passed the frontier on the 17th or 18th of October, with a band of about 250 men; took possession of some villages; dispersed some detachments of royalist volunteers; maintained himself some time in the mountains, or hovered along the frontiers, with one foot on the French and another on Spanish ground; and allowed it to be supposed that he was succeeding in the object of his expedition. He, however, made no impression on the country, was joined by no deserters, and encouraged in his advances by no portion of the inhabitants. His hasty and ill-judged inroad, without information of the feelings of the people, and in perfect ignorance of the localities of the province, would have exposed his little band to complete destruction, had he not been rescued by the prudence of Mina. This chieftain felt himself obliged to follow up a movement which he would not advise; because, after the first attack, the French authorities threatened to send his troops into the interior,—because, however imprudent the inroad of Valdez, he could not hear of the sacrifice of his countrymen without an attempt to assist them,—and because, if he had remained inactive while his fellow-citizens were exposing their lives in the cause, he would have given a kind of sanction to all those charges of treachery and cowardice which had been

propagated against his character. He therefore, contrary to the dictates of his better judgment, marched across the frontier with his little army on the 20th of October. This army did not exceed, in foreigners and Spaniards, 300 men. Among them were four or five generals and officers, of all ranks, from the general down to the lieutenant, whose names were known and celebrated in the peninsular wars.* The enterprise might almost be considered a failure before Mina appeared on the scene, from the reception given to Valdez. No part of the inhabitants welcomed their approach, or supplied their necessities; and therefore all the co-operation on which they had calculated was proved to have been fallacious. They saw that their means were scanty, and knew that a large force was marching against them. After wandering in the mountains for several days, and enduring the greatest privations, the patriots took up a position on the heights above Vera, a town on the frontiers, a few miles to the left of Irun, on the high road leading to Madrid. Meanwhile El Pastor was despatched with a small column to that town, and succeeded in taking possession of it, after expelling the royalist garrison.

The object of Mina, upon seeing the disposition of the people, was to avoid an engagement with the troops of the government — an engagement which evidently must turn out to his disadvantage. His only chance of success lay in maintaining himself in the mountains, and continuing as long as possible a guerilla warfare, similar to that which had procured

* Such as Generals Butron, Lopez Bânos, Alexander O'Donnel, Sancho, and Colonel Tauregui or El Pastor.

him so much reputation in two former wars. A mass of regular forces to the amount of 5000 was advancing against his party, under the governor of the province, Llander, and commanded by the governor himself, by Santos Ladron, Juanito, and other able commanders. Having despatched one part of his troops to Irun, and ordered another to support Valdez at Vera, he himself, with a few followers, remained in the neighbouring mountains. The royalist force advanced to attack the position of the latter party, on the 27th of October. The patriots, contrary to the advice of Mina, and the dictates of common sense, endeavoured to maintain their position for some time against such odds, but were finally driven back into France, with the loss of a fourth or a fifth part of the number in killed, wounded, or prisoners. Had it not been for Mina, who surveyed the battle from a distant height, and who directed the measure of retreat, the whole band would have been surrounded and cut off. The hardships which the fugitives endured in their flight are difficult to be described. They were pursued by the victorious parties to the French lines, and some of them were even massacred in the territory of France. Mina arrived at Cambo, on the French frontier, in a state of perfect destitution. He was accompanied only by an aid-de-camp, a priest, and a servant. As he was the chief object of pursuit, the hardships which he endured, and the perils which he encountered in making his escape, were of the most appalling description. Both he and his followers on their passing the French frontier were disarmed and ordered into

the interior,—a command with which they reluctantly, and after energetic protests, complied.

It was thus proved that Navarre and the provinces bordering on the Western Pyrenees were indisposed to the gift of constitutional freedom offered by the provisional junta of Bayonne and the patriot troops. The other columns of the exiles in the east were equally unsuccessful. Two or three attempts were made by them to penetrate into Aragon and Catalonia, under Gurrea, Vigo, and Milans, which did not prove so disastrous, merely because the invading force did not expose itself to such dangers. This division of the patriot army which acted by itself, and which for two months seemed animated with the most certain hopes of victory, was driven back in a state of such absolute destitution, that the French authorities were obliged to supply the officers with provisions after having disarmed them. The pass of Roncevalles, and the other defiles of the Pyrenees, which had anciently resounded with the shouts of hostile nations, was thus destined to witness hostile bands of the same nation arrayed against each other, to the sounds of "Long live liberty!" and "Long live the absolute king!" The "absolute king" in this instance succeeded, as the days of Rinaldo and chivalry were past.

The French government, which had at first encouraged and long connived at the hostile expeditions preparing on its frontiers—expeditions of which it would have been pleased to witness the success—could not exhibit the same indifference after attention had been called to their existence by their failure—by the violation of French territory in their

pursuit, and by the repeated remonstrances of the Spanish government. The exiles, with their foreign partisans, were therefore, about the end of November, disarmed, disbanded, and sent into the interior, after angry remonstrances and vigorous protests against the injustice and persecution to which they were subjected.

The Spanish people, who showed themselves thus indifferent to the offer of liberty in the north, were not more disposed to shake off the yoke of despotism in the south, as appeared by the long inaction and subsequent defeat of Torrijos, which do not come within the limits of this narrative. The nobility could not be desirous of countenancing a revolution brought about by the party which, at two recent epochs, had stripped them of their privileges, and condemned them to insignificance. The church, with all its wealth and power, must be thrown into the scale of the court; the superstitious rabble, where not passive to forms of government, must be subservient to the clergy, which rules them by its monastic charities and auricular confession; the wealthy inhabitants of towns, together with men of professional eminence, though possessed of liberal sentiments and opposed to the present order of things, are too timid, from the experience of recent transitory changes, to hazard their lives and properties for political innovations, which are so uncertain in their attainment, and have so narrow a basis of society for their support. The wounds inflicted on the country by the party who administered the constitutional government in 1812, and from 1820 to 1823, are still fresh in the minds of the

people, who, not seeing the justification of their conduct in the difficult circumstances in which they were placed, ascribe all the plunder and anarchy of the period to constitutional freedom. Add to these considerations the fact, that the Spanish army is now in a higher state of discipline, and enjoys more regular pay, than at any time for half a century; that the Spanish finances, though still badly managed, are better directed than formerly; and that the peasantry, though ignorant and superstitious, are the most independent people on earth; and we have the cause of the late failure of the exiles to excite the north or the south to insurrection, though encouraged by the example, and assisted by the volunteers, of France.

If from Spain we go to the other kingdom of the peninsula, we shall find a people still less prepared for the adoption of political improvements.

The unhappy kingdom of Portugal has been, during the year 1830, the scene of desolation and misery. Its petty tyrant continues to reign over a people degraded by the influence of priestcraft, and stimulated by the fanaticism of the pulpit. The irreverend abuse of ecclesiastical authority has been carried so far, under the impious pretext of upholding the interests of religion, that vengeance has been publicly denounced against individuals and families whose only crime was the offence given to the ruler of Portugal by their attachment to constitutional principles. It would be difficult to communicate even an outline of the wretchedness into which the capital is plunged. Trade is at a stand; coin is scarcely to be seen in circulation, and the paper money loses

35 per cent. The country people dare not bring in their provisions,—the young men, for fear of being pressed into the military service; and the women, because they are afraid of meeting with freemasons, the worst of all malignant spirits, as their confessors tell them. The streets are deserted, particularly after sunset, every one being afraid of insults or arrests, while the police and the royalist volunteers appear the only inhabitants of the once populous city of Lisbon.

So great and universal is the debasement of the people, under the discipline of the church in Portugal, that men of cultivated minds in other respects entertain an absolute dread of any enquiry into the moral character of their clergy. This feeling approaches more nearly to that awe and reverence with which the pious man contemplates the character or the attributes of the Deity, than to the disposition with which he ought to discuss a question of merely human interest.

It may be ascertained beyond a doubt that there is a secret understanding pervading the whole of the Portuguese clergy; that the system of tyranny exercised by their present ruler is indispensable to the preservation of their own body. Hence their rage against the constitutional charter, or any other representative system that would check their power and rapacity.

Admitting in its full extent the pernicious influence of the priests, we must likewise state that the magistrates have been, after them, the most active supporters of the present despotism. Through these corrupt organs of the law, the scaffolds have

been deluged with blood, and thousands of victims have been thrust into dungeons. No other except political offences have of late been punished; and the number of such offenders conveys an exact idea of the real state of the government.

We subjoin an estimate of the persons suffering for alleged political crimes, of the accuracy of which we have been assured by an intelligent native of Portugal, who supplied it:—

Political offenders in the prisons of Lisbon	3600
——— at the Fort St. Julian	800
——— in Peniche	400
Cascaes, Belem Castle, and Trafaria	300
On board the hulks in the Tagus	600
——— at Oporto	2000
In the different prisons of Traz os Montes	1200
In the province of Douro and Minho	2000
——— of Beira, including Almeida	5000
——— of Estremadura, including Abrantes	3000
——— of Alemtejo, including Elvas	5000
——— of Algarve	1200
Transported as convicts to Angola	400
——— to Cabo Verde and other islands	500
——— to Cabinda, Agonche, Mozambique	700
EMIGRANTS.	
In the island of Terceira	7000
In Brazil	2000
In different parts of England	800
In France	1800
In the Netherlands	1100
In different parts of Europe	1000
	40,400 men!

To this number may be added near five thousand persons now concealed or wandering in the different

parts of the country, in order to escape persecution: 45,400 victims of political vengeance and resentment, out of a population amounting to abou. 2,600,000, furnish the strongest proof of the tyranny of the government!

Such being the situation of Portugal during last year, a history of the emigrants, who are so numerous, must be a part of the history of the country. A great number of these unfortunate exiles embarked from England and France, and went partly to Terceira and partly to Brazil; whilst the regency appointed by Don Pedro, as guardian of his daughter, Donna Maria, Queen of Portugal, continued in London, endeavouring to obtain pecuniary resources to afford the means of putting an end to the usurpation. The scanty sums allowed by Brazil for the payment of the strong garrison of Terceira and the maintenance of the emigrants being exhausted, the regency sent to Rio different messengers with despatches to the emperor, and to Count Sabugal, its ambassador at that court, stating the real situation of Portugal, and demanding the necessary sums to carry on the plan of restoring the crown to its young queen. Don Pedro received the several despatches, and admitted Count Sabugal to a public audience, giving to this nobleman every possible assurance of a speedy settlement of Portuguese affairs; whilst, at the same time, he ordered that the regency should immediately proceed from London to Terceira, and there be duly installed. Don Thomas Mascaranhas, second son to Count d'Obidos, and chamberlain of the young queen, was despatched to Europe with this special mission, and

appointed at the same time agent in England for the emigrants during the absence of the regency. Don Thomas reached London at the latter end of January. On the 24th of February, 1830, the regency embarked at Plymouth, and on the 15th of March was installed in the island of Terceira. The same day the decree of the emperor was published, and the members of the regency, viz. the Marquess of Palmella, president; Count de Villa Flor, who defeated the Miguelites on the 11th of August, 1829, when they attacked the island; and J. H. Guerreiro, formerly minister of justice in Lisbon in 1827, begun their regal functions.

As soon as the arrival of the regency at Terceira was known in Portugal, the liberal party testified the greatest rejoicing, and began to think that a brighter era of their political struggle was at hand. The opposite party did not appear to be much intimidated by the circumstance, aware that the new regency had only changed the place of its residence, without increasing in physical strength. The change, however, was generally reckoned in Portugal as useful to the cause; and the anomaly in the history of diplomacy, of a Portuguese regency sitting in South Audley street, was at least at an end. The steps taken by the regents, and their courage in forcing their way through the blockading squadron of Don Miguel, in a small and unarmed vessel, were duly appreciated.

In this state of things, the ministers and counsellors of Miguel pursued their plan of oppression, encouraged on one side by the secret councils of the Tuilleries, and on the other by the cabinet of

Madrid. The long-talked-of amnesty, which was the condition of the usurper's recognition, became the object of fresh negotiations, but was refused under different pretexts till the occurrence of the French revolution in July. This memorable event, on reaching Lisbon, spread alarm through the leaders of the usurpation, and principally amongst the nobility; Cadaval the prime minister having lost, in the followers of Charles the Tenth, his most valuable supporters and counsellors. All the Miguelites seemed panic-struck by the event, and concealed it from the people during a fortnight, intending to have lengthened the period, if by chance a French vessel with the tri-coloured flag had not entered the Tagus. The next day the Lisbon Gazette published some of the circumstances which had taken place in Paris, but expressed great hopes that the dethroned king would yet be able to quell the popular effervescence. Public opinion appeared highly satisfied, when the expulsion of the Bourbon family was officially known; but no popular excitement took place, the mob showing perfect indifference to the events of July.

The lower classes of the Portuguese remained during all this period totally indifferent to the great events of France, and the example of Belgium did not rouse them from their apathy. The reasons of such indifference may be found in the ignorance in which they have purposely been kept by their rulers, and the influence exercised over their minds by the priests.

When the ministers and counsellors of Miguel found that the doctrines of popular sovereignty were

still exotic plants in their national soil, and that they had little to fear from the *barricades* of their slaves, they began to court the favours of the soldiery, who appeared not much disposed to continue the support of Don Miguel's throne. The payment of the arrears to the privates, and to the working classes employed in the naval and military arsenals, was the first measure adopted; and a loan to supply the deficiency of such payment, the second. Different agents to raise money in other capitals were despatched to London, Paris, and Amsterdam; but all failed in the attempt, the credit of their master being valued at its worth.

While these things occurred in Lisbon, the Marquess de S. Amaro, Portuguese by birth, and a Brazilian grandee, arrived in England as plenipotentiary of the Emperor of Brazil and of the Queen of Portugal. The marquess was entrusted with full powers to bring to an end the Portuguese question, and to agree to all the terms proposed by the three allied powers, England, Austria, and France, with the sole exception of the non-recognition of Don Miguel as king. The marquess had an interview with the prime minister, the Duke of Wellington; but nothing of a definitive nature was stipulated. Convinced that the policy of the English ministry was to wait a better opportunity for the settlement of the affairs of Portugal, the marquess thought proper to go to Paris, where he remained till the Portuguese agent of Donna Maria claimed his presence in London.

It was by this time that the Duke of Wellington disclosed in parliament his internal and external

policy, and declared his resolution of acknowledging Don Miguel as king, provided he would grant an amnesty to the political offenders.

On the arrival at Lisbon of the speech from the throne at the opening of parliament, the court party expressed their great dissatisfaction at the proposed amnesty. They had before been assured that the recognition of their master was unconditional; and consequently their disappointment was unbounded to hear of the terms. So far did they carry their resentment, that some of the British residents were insulted in the streets by the royalist volunteers. To check the effects of the promised amnesty, new arrests took place, additional rigour was exercised towards the unfortunate inmates of the prisons, and a ship loaded with 200 victims was despatched with its freight to the pestilential coast of Africa.

The French revolution has thus been unable to produce any effect in the interior of Portugal or Spain, from the moral degradation of the people; while the Portuguese exiles could not, like the Spaniards, approach their country so as to try the effect of a movement from without. The discontent of those whose opinion ought to have weight in the management of public affairs was deep and strong; but something more was necessary to rouse it to action, than the news of a successful resistance to power in a distant capital, and in a state of society entirely different. The great mass of the people, along with the privileged orders, who make use of it for their own purposes, were unprepared for a change; and it was easier and safer to continue oppression, which affected chiefly certain classes, with the genius

of the people in its favour, than to attempt reform with the temper of the people against it. What support for a constitutional movement can be expected from a population who are taught to believe that every constitutionalist is a freemason, and that every freemason is a demon incarnate? The constitutional charter given by the Emperor Don Pedro might have been maintained, with the court and the court nobility, the army and the active population of Lisbon and Oporto, in its favour; and if so maintained for a few years, would have taught the people a sense of its benefits, and freed them from the gross delusions arrayed against it by its interested adversaries: but it was evident that in such a country it could not stand in the first instance, with the sovereign, the nobility, and the church combined for its overthrow. The attempt to connect it with the legitimate rights of the young queen does not promise it much better success; for the rights of a female, a minor, and a stranger, must seem to such a people feeble and evanescent, compared with the title of a full-grown prince already seated on the throne, and upheld not only by possession of present power, but by the same prejudices in favour of hereditary rank to which his niece is made to appeal. It seems to us, therefore, that nothing promises any support to the constitutional cause in Portugal but a defection in the army; and the army of that country, changing masters and systems of government as it has done four or five times within the last eight or ten years, seems a very unfit instrument for the establishment of permanent freedom.

While the population of Portugal was below the

level of being touched by the events of the French revolution, it was generally supposed that the free republics of Switzerland, whose constitutions have been praised by Montesquieu and the historian Müller, would be equally exempt from agitation, being raised above them. No idea could be more erroneous. The political state and civil government of the Swiss cantons, as settled by the congress of Vienna, and watched with jealousy by the holy alliance, have been to the great body of the people a source of uneasiness and dissatisfaction. Though republics, nothing could be less republican than many of their laws, customs, and institutions. Privileges of orders, privileges of corporations, privileges of localities, and privileges of family, almost universally interfered with the equal rights and free action of the majority of the citizens. A narrow oligarchy engrossed the offices and advantages which belonged to all, prevented the development of talent and intelligence, and restrained the enjoyment of industry and civil liberty. The holy alliance domineered over the diet or federal directory; the diet tyrannised over the cantons; the chief towns of the cantons tyrannised over the country districts; and trades or families tyrannised over the chief towns. The taxes were not imposed according to the abilities of the tax-payers; and several exemptions were enjoyed by particular classes.

The people in most of the cantons complained that all the powers of the state were monopolised by the minority. In some of them, places of trust and emolument were concentrated in a small junta in the cities, and had become the patrimony

of a few families. The representation of the republic was often so unjustly distributed, that the towns, though the minority, enjoyed the privilege of returning two thirds of the supreme council, while the country could only send one third. Thus, in Fribourg, for instance, the capital sent 108 members to the canton legislature, while the country only sent 36. In Zurich the grand council consisted of 212 members, of whom the capital elected 130, and the rest of the canton only 82. The small council at Fribourg engrossed all the executive, administrative, and judicial appointments of the state. It nominated the parish clergy, appointed the judges, and directed public instruction. In discharge of the latter duty, it afforded an asylum to the Jesuits when expelled from France, encouraged them by their patronage, and protected them against their enemies. In other cantons, such as that of Berne, the government was entirely in the hands of a privileged nobility, who not only robbed the people of their equal rights, but insulted them by their aristocratic haughtiness. At Bâle and several of the other cantons, patrician insolence and patrician oppression were the subjects of as heavy complaints as with the people of Rome before they retired to the *Mons Sacer*. In cantons where no nobility existed, the town inhabitants enjoyed advantages of trade and immunities from duties which were denied to the peasantry or the inhabitants of the country. Sometimes those Swiss officers, who had returned with some fortune and consideration from waiting in the ante-chambers of foreign despots, insulted their coun-

trymen by the enjoyment of political immunities to which they could not aspire.

But domestic oppression and injustice were not the only evils that resulted from these oligarchical powers and institutions. The parties thus exercising authority, exempt from the control of their fellow-citizens, leagued themselves with foreign potentates, and often surrendered from complaisance the just rights and independence of their confederation. Hence they sent away the refugees from Piedmont at the request of the King of Sardinia, and the German students on the demand of the German princes. Hence they allowed the press to be enslaved by the holy alliance. Hence they permitted the discussions in the diet to be bridled, and the character and movements of strangers who visited their mountains to be reported upon at Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. If an article of too liberal a tendency was published in a journal, or a speech of too bold a spirit was delivered in a cantonal assembly, the diplomatic spies of absolute monarchs censured the former, and remonstrated against the latter. The authorities, not always sympathising with their fellow-citizens, submitted to these indignities; and the liberty of discussion was as much restrained on the mountains of Switzerland as in the heart of the Germanic confederation. Since the Helvetians have ceased to migrate in a body, like their ancestors of Cæsar's day, in quest of new settlements, they have ceased to be formidable to neighbouring states by their ambition of conquest, and therefore might have been allowed to discuss their own interests,

and enjoy their own franchises, without molestation from the absolute sovereigns of Europe.

These evils, whether less or more severely felt, might have been endured much longer, or have been gradually removed without an explosion, had it not been for the occurrence of the French revolution. This event acted upon the Swiss as upon the Belgians, with the compound effect of vicinage and similarity of institutions, multiplied by political sympathy, identity of language, and certainty of protection. While the inhabitants of each canton had their attention called to this opportunity of rapidly bettering their condition without interference from neighbouring absolute governments, the attention of the whole confederation was roused to the means of preserving its neutrality in the midst of the conflict which the convulsion in France might provoke. Thus it was impossible either for the separate cantons or the general government to remain inactive spectators of the events on their frontiers.

Towards the middle of October symptoms of popular effervescence began to appear, which an exhortation from the directing canton could not allay; and by the end of November or middle of December, eleven out of the twenty-two members of the confederation had either risen against their executive and supreme councils, to demand a popular change in their constitution, or had been promised a revision of their constitutional act without an insurrectionary movement. The cantons which thus demanded fundamental reforms were Zurich, Bâle, Berne, Vaux, Lucerne, Soleure, Fribourg, St. Gall, Argovie, Thurgovie, and Schwitz. The diet, or

general government, did not interfere, and in the midst of such a general agitation could not have been heard. As the grievances of all were nearly the same, redress was demanded by nearly the same class of persons, enforced by the same kind of means, and extended to nearly the same articles of reform.

The usual mode of proceeding was for the reformers of each canton to meet in smaller bodies in their separate districts, or in large masses, and petition the government for a revision of the constitution or fundamental law of the republic on certain bases, of a more enlarged electoral system and a more equal representation,—of the abolition of privileges, and the equal partition of political power between the town and the country. On receiving these petitions, the administration referred them to the grand councils, who usually appointed a commission, of a smaller or a greater number of members, to draw up a reformed constitutional law, to be submitted, first to the council, and then to the people. The petitioners, in the mean time, kept their eye closely fixed on the work preparing in the council, and either stimulated the commission to activity in its undertaking, or prepared to resist its propositions if they were not sufficiently liberal. Sometimes the people and their rulers agreed without any demonstration of physical force on the part of the former; sometimes, on the contrary, the petitioners found it necessary to assemble in great bands, to proceed armed to the chief town, and to dictate to the council both the time of completing its labours and the principles of its intended work. In some instances these peti-

tionary assemblies were of a very formidable and tumultuous nature. They had learned from the civic sharpshooters and political clubs of Paris the doctrines of popular sovereignty, and could practise the lesson as well as their masters. Excited by agitators, who assured them that they were oppressed, and that now was the time for redress, they gathered from hill and dale, and formed themselves into troops, to invade the towns and overawe the councils; proclaiming a war of the country or villages against the capital,—of the peasantry against oligarchical privileges,—of the body of the citizens against corporations and monopolies.

It may be enough to state what occurred in two or three cases, to give the reader some idea of the singular manner in which they effect a revolution in Switzerland. The people in Zurich demanded a revision of their constitution. The work was entrusted to a commission of the grand council, which made its report on the 25th of November. This council consisted of 212 members, 130 of whom belonged to the chief town of the canton. The commission reduced the representatives of this town to 82, and gave 118 to the country. Still this popular change did not satisfy the rural inhabitants of the canton, who imagined that their share of influence was left too small. Discontent spread; meetings took place, speeches were made, and petitions were drawn up against the new project. At last, to give more effect to their representations, a meeting consisting of more than 10,000 men assembled at Uster, a village about three leagues from the capital. This meeting was harangued by several patriotic

orators, who agreed to a petition, which was signed by thousands of names, appointed a deputation to carry it to the government, and resolved to remain in permanent insurrection till an answer should be received. The petition insisted on the principle, that in all free countries the people are the sovereign; it represented that the revision of the constitution ought to be submitted to the majority of the citizens as well as to the grand council; that the decision of the grand council in this case was not conformable to the will of the people; that the due representation of the canton would give two thirds of the deputies to the country, and only one third to the capital; that a better system of election should be introduced; that the privileges of trades should be suppressed, the duration of military service shortened, the rights of parishes to choose their pastors established, and other grievances redressed too tedious to be enumerated. The deputation arrived in Zurich when in a state of alarm at hearing of the great assemblage in its neighbourhood. It had an interview with the chief magistrate; it was called to the grand council, and represented the state of ferment in which it had left the meeting. The council met at eight o'clock in the morning, and sat till six in the evening, having been addressed by eighty speakers. It then came to an agreement to adopt the principle laid down by the assembly at Uster, giving two thirds of the representation to the country, instead of one third as then existed; and the effervescence ceased.

On the 5th of December the canton of Berne,

comprising nearly a third of the confederation, held a grand council, consisting of 217 members, in which, after an address by the chief magistrate on the state of Europe, and the dangers which beset the confederation, he showed, that in case of a war the independence of the cantons could only be maintained by unanimous councils and firm resolutions. The turbulence which had appeared in some cantons it was supposed would end by timely concessions to the popular will. In their turn, the council appointed a commission of 11 to examine all propositions for a change in the constitution, either emanating from the government or from other parties. This was reckoned a victory by the petitioners for a change, and was celebrated with every token of joy.

On the 5th of December a popular movement was directed on Arau, in the canton of Argovie, at the head of which was an innkeeper and a physician. The government prepared to oppose them by a corps of militia, some gensdarmes, and four pieces of cannon, on Monday the 6th, and ranged them in order of battle near Stansberg. The innkeeper and his party, being reinforced by the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed, formed themselves in order of battle, and prepared to attack the government force. Some shots were fired, and the militia fled; the malcontents got the cannon, which had been abandoned by the artillerymen, and, having made some prisoners, entered Arau. The government offered to resign in their favour; but the insurgents declared that they were not desirous of power, and that they only wished the prayers of the people to be granted. On this

the government retained its authority, and convoked the great council for the 9th. This council named a constituent commitee, with orders to present its project to the grand council in fifteen days. The insurgents then dispersed quietly, leaving the town with a garrison of 600 men. The innkeeper Fisher maintained strict discipline: the arsenal, the town-house, and all public property were guarded and respected.

Lausanne, or the Pays de Vaud, was among the last of the cantons to raise the standard of insurrection; but when it declared itself for reform, its resolution was decided and effectual. At the request and earnest entreaty of a great body of the country population, a commission was appointed to revise the constitutional act, and to propose such changes as would render it consistent with the more enlarged notions of liberty which time and knowledge had introduced. The movements of this commission were too slow for public impatience, or its dispositions too narrow for public confidence. The patriots, therefore, who had compelled its formation soon began to clamour against its delay, and to mingle rumours of intrigues and treachery with their expressions of dissatisfaction. The popular mind became greatly irritated against the council; and on the 17th of December, about 300 or 400 armed petitioners arrived in the town to urge more expeditious measures. They addressed themselves to the council, and believed their prayer rejected. On this they conceived that a display of force was necessary; and force was ready at their command. They had previously placed bonfires at proper distances, to be

kindled in case of need, as gathering signals for their friends. The one above the town was lighted, and almost immediately a line of revolutionary beacons blazed along the lake. The people gathered at the signal, and 8000 petitioners were soon assembled at Lauzanne. The tree of liberty was planted in the middle of the town; and the insurgents, without arms or violence, engrossed all the powers of the state. They sent a deputation to the grand council in the name of the people; but the council had suspended their sittings, and nothing could be done. All resistance to the assembled villagers of the canton was vain; and no violence being offered, no excess was committed. On an assurance of redress from the most respectable people of the canton, this crowd dispersed, and its chief demands were complied with.

In only one case was there any continued resistance or bloodshed, and that was at Bâle, where the authorities, supported by the town's people, resolved not to yield to the demands of the country districts. In this canton, therefore, hostilities were kept up for some time. The peasantry surrounded and besieged the town. Collected from their farms or their flocks, from their cottages in the mountains or the fastnesses of their rocky land, with fowling-pieces, pistols, pitchforks, or any kind of weapon which they could lay hold of, they followed the banner of liberty to the seat of government, to demand a change in their constitution. The drifting snows of winter did not interrupt their campaign, or arrest their attempts to storm the ramparts of oligarchical privilege. For a whole fortnight they bivouacked on the wintry ground in the neighbourhood of the town, which

was regularly defended with artillery. As they approached, the citizens flew to arms,—the tocsin sounded,—and the walls were mounted with soldiers as against a foreign enemy. As many of the Swiss officers who had returned from foreign service took part with the government, and as Bâle is a defensible position, the number of undisciplined peasants were unable to make any impression, and dispersed after being repulsed with some discharges of artillery. The council, notwithstanding its success, resolved to revise the constitution, and to grant those fundamental reforms promised by the other cantons.

Such was the position of this interesting assemblage of republics at the end of the year. The people had every where demanded a change in the distribution of political power, to which the constituted authorities had consented, on the basis fixed by the majority of the citizens; and a constitutional reform, amounting to a revolution, was every where in progress. On the history of these transactions two or three remarks naturally occur.

In the first place, the revolution evidently resulted from the influence of the events at Paris, and from the consequent removal of the pressure of other governments on the people of Switzerland. Nothing internal had occurred in 1830, any more than in 1820, to create a change, or to lead the people to demand the revision of their fundamental laws. They had a right to object to the privileges of the towns, to the power of particular classes, and to the undue influence of certain families. They had a right to desire a more equal distribution of office, a more just representation of the people in the great coun-

cil, and a better control over the executive. They had a right to suggest improvements without force; and if disregarded, with such an imposing array of power as could not be resisted. They had a right to desire the freedom of opinion, a renunciation of foreign influence, and a more independent intercourse with foreign governments. But all these causes of complaint, or subjects of reform, have existed for the last fifteen years, and most of them for the last three hundred years. No little tyrant had appeared in their cantons to usurp the powers of the state; no new tax was imposed; no fresh calamity could be traced to the government; no set of officers chosen by the people had foresworn their oaths, and used their power to oppress them. The Switzerland of 1830 was tranquil, till the report of the Paris revolt resounded over its hills and valleys; and the sovereignty of the people would have slumbered in established usages, had it not been awakened by this neighbouring shout of resistance to privilege and arbitrary power.

In the second place, it deserves to be remarked, that the reform has been effected without bloodshed in ten out of the eleven cantons, and in most cases without tumult or demonstrations of resistance;—a circumstance which sufficiently indicates that knowledge was spread among the people; that their grievances were more theoretic than practical; that their vengeance against power had not been excited by insult or abuse; and that the monopoly which was so universally objected to by one class, was not so profitable to the other as to pay for a struggle.

The work of reformation was entrusted to the

constituted authorities, and the people in confidence awaited the result; a circumstance which speaks both for the good character of the people and their rulers.

In the third place, the consequences of these reforms must be most important in their effect on the relations of Switzerland to the states of Europe. These relations were fixed by the treaty of Vienna. The separate cantons and the confederation had sent plenipotentiaries to that congress. These deputies applied themselves to a commission of the great powers, called the Swiss committee. After explanations given and changes suggested, the powers agreed to certain stipulations in favour of their perpetual neutrality, and its protection. They likewise added three new cantons to the confederation. The meeting of the diet which took place in May, 1815, agreed to the stipulations, and thanked the great powers of congress for their guarantees, and have since rested secure of their observance. If, therefore, the late changes were to weaken these guarantees on the eve of threatened wars in Europe, the revolution of Switzerland would be a subject of regret to all the lovers of peace and national independence.

An effect entirely opposite, however, we think will be the consequence. The recent changes, by increasing the satisfaction of the people in their institutions, and giving them a greater control in the management of their own affairs, must in the same proportion invigorate their patriotism, and augment their public spirit. The mass of the population will hasten with greater alacrity to the defence of a

country which is no longer the patrimony of an oligarchical faction, but whose advantages are open to them all. A love for internal liberty and external independence will grow up together, and mutually strengthen each other; and the Swiss peasant, who, armed with his fowling-piece or pitchfork, proceeded to the seat of government, and obtained by his courage an improvement in the constitution of his canton, will hasten with more alacrity to his mountain passes to preserve it from the violation of hostile armies. Indeed, a subserviency to foreign powers was one of the charges lately brought by the patriots against their rulers; and the same party which demanded constitutional improvements insisted on putting their common country in a more imposing attitude of defence against external aggression. The diet, stimulated by this party, at its extraordinary meeting in the end of December, issued a renewed declaration of its neutrality, which it addressed to all the cantons, and transmitted to the great powers of Europe. In this manifesto they proclaim to the world, that they will use every means to make the independence and neutrality of their territory respected; that, desirous of peace, but not dreading a painful struggle, the confederates will wait events with calmness; and, "relying on the God of their fathers," defend the integrity of their soil, their national independence, and their ancient freedom, against all foreign aggression. Thus, by the late revolution, "the guardians of the Alps" may become more powerful and independent than ever; and, instead of allowing their

country to be a thoroughfare for hostile armies, as in recent times, be able to defend their mountain barrier against all violation, and thus, by diminishing the facilities of invasion, reduce the chances of war between the great nations by whom they are surrounded.

CHAP. VII.

STATE OF POLAND. — INSURRECTION AT WARSAW. — POLISH REVOLUTION. — CONCLUSION.

WHILE the attention of Western Europe was fixed on the changes going on in France and Belgium, or was watching the progress of events in Switzerland, and looking across the Alps or Pyrenees for similar movements, the gleam of insurrectionary arms flashed across the northern sky, and the brave and free heard with a transport of joy that "Poland had risen!" The rousing intelligence recalled to mind the ancient renown and recent misfortunes of this noble people — their turbulent, but warmly cherished liberty — their irrepressible and ever enduring patriotism — their striking services to Europe, repaid with ingratitude — and the infamous conduct of the partitioning despots who had abolished their government, parcelled out their territory, and deprived them of the very name of country. It recalled to mind the disgraceful apathy with which this dismemberment had been viewed by the civilised governments of Europe — the indifference with which the fall of so bright a star from the political firmament had been witnessed — and the total derangement of the whole European system which had followed, as a just retribution, the permission of so great a crime. In the eager feeling of the moment, the public in France and England anticipated the complete resurrection

of a celebrated kingdom—the reversal of an attainder of half a century passed upon it by foreign tyrants; and though it likewise foresaw that blood must again flow in torrents before Russia would relinquish her prey, it at the same time hoped that, as in some surgical operations, the bleeding members of the partitioned state might again be brought to unite, under an independent government.

The news of the insurrection was at first vague and contradictory. Fears, therefore, began to be entertained that, like the northern lights, with which it was compared, it might be at once bright and transient. But every successive post confirmed the intelligence, and added to our admiration of the patriotic resolution of the people; so that by the end of the year, to which our *Retrospect* extends, those political arrangements had been made, and that extraordinary energy displayed in warlike preparations, which have since led to so brilliant results.

It is almost needless to state that this revolution bears a stamp and impress entirely different from that of any other which has occurred within the year. It was not begun to assert a doubtful right, as in Belgium, or to resist an attempted promulgation of arbitrary decrees, as in France. It did not involve a contest for a greater share of civil liberty, or a more perfect system of domestic government; it was not undertaken to have the satisfaction of framing a new charter, or raising the structure of power on the new basis of popular sovereignty. The Poles rose to expel a foreign despotism, whose oppressions had become intolerable; to punish violations of the Polish constitution by foreign barba-

rians; to obtain a domestic government, and to be ruled by domestic laws, according to the stipulations of treaties; to assert, in fact, their title to a country; to be able to call their persons, their lands, and their homes their own; to have their own army, their own treasures, and their own institutions, according to the sworn engagements of their foreign master; to prevent their fellow-citizens from being dragged out of their native land to foreign prisons; in short, to be ruled according to their constitutional charter, or to be freed from the tyranny of those by whom it was daily violated. Doubts may exist as to the beneficial nature of those changes introduced by the late revolutions of other countries, and different opinions may be formed of the policy of carrying so far the principles involved in them; but no doubt can be entertained of the right or duty of the inhabitants of Poland to act as they have done, provided they could rely on their own virtue and resolution for success.

Before we give the very brief narrative of the events of the Polish revolution to which we are restricted by our limits, it may be useful for some readers to recall a few facts to show how the Poles were in the situation to assert their national rights, and what infractions of their constitution they could plead to justify their insurrection.

The Polish nation, though invaded by foreign armies—though torn in pieces by domestic factions—though trodden under foot by barbarous conquerors—though insulted, occupied, partitioned, and finally annihilated as a kingdom, republic, or state, never lost two of its noble qualities,—its love of country,

and its love of liberty. Neither in its partition, nor in the abolition of its very name, did it abandon the hope of a glorious resurrection. Forced to become the slaves of a foreign master, the Poles never lost the pride of nationality, and refused to be confounded with their conquerors; obliged to veil their household gods in the presence of their tyrants, they worshipped them only the more fervently in secret, or carried them abroad to worship them with more freedom in a foreign land. After the third partition of their country had swept away even the name of Poland, the Polish nation existed in the Polish legion. It became, like the Jews, a nation without a country. The people had not forfeited their independent existence by corruption or effeminacy; they had not become fit subjects for slavery, like the modern Italians, or the Greeks of the lower empire, by luxury, selfishness, or cowardice; no: they were overpowered by the vices of their system of government — by their internal divisions, fomented by foreign intrigue — by the very excesses of a freedom which if properly regulated would have constituted their strength. That splendid anarchy, where order was so often sacrificed to liberty — where justice gave way to courage — where arms often decided the election of chief magistrate, and revolt formed the usual check upon power — where confederation met confederation in council or in the field, and sabres flashed as often as eloquence — where all treaties with foreign powers, and all important matters of state, were submitted to popular control — where the sovereign enjoyed little authority, was bound to swear any charter that his people chose, and was often

deposed and exiled — where any citizen could aspire to supreme command — where no law could be introduced or changed except by the unanimous consent of the diet — and where the *veto* of one defeated the will of all the rest; such an organisation of power, we say, though it exposed the nation to foreign aggression, did not destroy its capacity for high achievements, and left many of its noblest virtues untouched. The Empress Catharine, even before the first partition, could, by balancing party against party in their unhappy system of government, command sometimes as absolutely at Warsaw as at St. Petersburgh; and could write to her discarded favourite, "I am sending my ambassador Keyserling to Poland with *orders to make you or your cousin Czartorinski king.*"* But even after the third, the national patriotism and love of independence blazed forth as brightly as ever in the heroic bands of Kosciuszko, and among the Polish legion in the service of France.

It was this legion which, after the abolition of the laws and political existence of the Poles, — after Poland, in fact, had been blotted out of the map of Europe for upwards of ten years, — was the means of its restoration to its former independence, if not to its former rank. The following account of the manner in which this was accomplished, copied from a recent publication, is as short as any statement which we could give: — "After the unhappy event of the battle of Macieiowice, when Kosciuszko and Niemcewicz were led prisoners to Russia, Dombrowski, a name second to none of the heroes of his country, conceived the idea of uniting all the scat-

* See "Histoire de l'Anarchie de la Pologne," par De Rulhière.

tered exiles under the national banner, and offering their services, not as mere auxiliaries, not as mercenaries, but as a '*nation* sans patrie,' to France, the only power whose protection seemed to offer the recompense they looked to. This recompense was the re-establishment of Poland; and it is a fact that, after the most brilliant services, whenever the thanks of the French nation were voted to the gallant Polish legion, Dombrowski invariably replied by an answer, reminding France of her engagements towards Poland. A civil committee, the shadow of the Polish government, was also sitting, sometimes at Paris, sometimes in Italy, scrupulously observing the minutest rules of the diet, in order that the constitutional character of their acts might not afterwards be called in question. This respectable punctilio is perfectly in the character of the nation.

" Napoleon fully appreciated the merits of the legion as soldiers, but his mind was not great enough to feel the value of their patriotism. But, after spending their blood in Italy, Spain, St. Domingo, and in various campaigns, where neither the cause of Poland nor the principles of liberty were advanced by him, they ultimately succeeded, after a campaign against Prussia, partly carried on in their own country, in extorting from him the formation of his Polish conquests into the duchy of Warsaw. Then it was that the survivors of those that had shed their blood in seemingly hopeless warfare met the recompense they deserved. Since that time they cease not to repeat to their countrymen, that not one of their fellow-soldiers who died in Egypt or the West Indies died in vain. In Poland, the

lowest esteems himself useful, the highest believes not himself essential, to his country. Thus, a wandering nation of 15,000 warriors restored Poland, if not to her rank, at least to her independence."*

This was probably one of the few political arrangements of Napoleon which will command the applause of posterity: but his name would have stood higher had his policy been more generous; had he re-erected the kingdom of Poland, instead of merely erecting the grand duchy of Warsaw, and added all the Polish provinces which his arms had conquered to the new state, including the almost indispensable cession of the port of Dantzwick, and the whole of Gallicia. The grand duchy thus formed was composed of the spoils taken from Austria and Prussia, who had themselves obtained their respective portions of the ancient kingdom of Poland by perfidies and cruelties, the account of which will for ever constitute one of the blackest pages in the history of modern Europe. From Austria the French emperor stripped five departments, Cracow, Radom, Lublin, Siedlec, and a portion of Warsaw, with a population of 1,572,839 souls; and from Prussia he severed seven other departments, the chief of which were Warsaw, Posen, Bomberg, Kalisch, Plock, and Lomza, with a population of 2,761,817 souls.

The defeat of Napoleon in Russia overturned his arrangement as to the duchy. The King of Saxony, who had adhered to the fortunes of the French emperor so long as to cause a forfeiture of some of his hereditary dominions, was not to be allowed to retain any portion of Poland. The duchy of War-

* "Thoughts on the Present Aspect of Foreign Affairs"

saw was occupied with Russian troops, and, as the fruits of their first victories, was again divided among the three former partitioning powers. By the second article of the treaty of Reichenbach, concluded between them on the 27th of June, 1813, it was stipulated, "That the duchy of Warsaw should be dissolved, and that the provinces of which it consisted should be divided between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in such parts as should be afterwards agreed upon between the three powers, without the intervention of France." Thus Russia, which had the lion's share of Poland at former partitions, again laid claim to a new portion; and a fourth partition of that unhappy country was agreed upon by monarchs who only just turned the tide of conquest, and who had not yet recovered their own dominions from the grasp of their conqueror. Events proceeded so rapidly — conquest followed conquest in such quick succession, and the horizon of the conquerors was every day so much enlarging, as to embrace other lands for partition, that the treaty of Reichenbach was never executed; and this additional crime was, therefore, not perpetrated when the congress of Vienna opened, to decide on grander interests than had in the beginning of 1813 entered into the contemplation of its authors.

The great powers of the congress, before they proceeded to their allotments of territory, appointed a statistical commission to take an inventory of all the conquests which they had made from Napoleon; and consequently of all the spoils which they had to distribute among themselves, or restore to their former owners. They found that this inventory

gave them 31,751,639 souls to dispose of, in Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, on the Rhine, and in Italy. It did not occur to them, that in destroying the tyrannical appropriations of the conqueror whom they had overthrown, they ought to have consulted the habits, feelings, and happiness of nations, by restoring them to liberty, and giving them the independent management of their own affairs.

The British plenipotentiary, Lord Castlereagh, on this occasion at least showed himself the true representative of British feelings. He knew the abhorrence with which the different partitions of Poland had been viewed in this country; he knew the importance attached by English statesmen to this first great breach of international law; he knew the ardent desires expressed in parliament, in society, and through the press, to see the independence of Poland restored, not only as an act of justice to that gallant people, but as a barrier against the encroachments of Russia on the west of Europe. He therefore demanded, in the name of England, that this celebrated kingdom should be re-established; and though on many other points at this congress he was either a mistaken or a lukewarm expounder of the national will, on this he appeared both its enlightened and zealous advocate. The archives of the congress contain evidence of his perfect appreciation of the nature of the question, and his sincere desire to effect so great an act of justice, liberality, and policy. "It was England's wish," said his lordship, "to see some independent power established in Poland, as a separation between the three great empires of Europe." His lordship was sup-

ported by Prince Talleyrand, the French plenipotentiary, who observed with great justice, force, and truth, in a letter to Prince Metternich, dated December 19. 1814, "that, of all the questions to be discussed at this congress, he considered the affair of Poland as incomparably the most important to the interests of Europe, if there be any chance that that nation, so worthy of regard for its antiquity, its valour, its misfortunes, and the services which it has formerly rendered to Europe, might be restored to complete independence. The partition which destroyed its existence was the prelude, in some measure the cause, perhaps even to a certain extent the apology, for the subsequent commotions to which Europe has been exposed." The Austrian government was so far from wishing to see the grand duchy either again partitioned, or united with Russia, that it was willing to surrender even a portion of its own territory to establish it into an independent kingdom. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia, though he had previously founded the holy alliance, from which fighting for territorial aggrandisement was excluded, insisted that the duchy should be united with his empire, and opposed the restoration of Poland under an independent dynasty of its own. Unhappily the troops of his imperial majesty at that time occupied the territory in dispute, and his power had been too well proved in the war which had just terminated, to render it advisable to recommence hostilities to drive them out, even for the most righteous of all objects. By an adroitness and finesse, of which he possessed so large a share, the emperor not only contrived to defeat the expressed

wishes of England and France, but to make the Poles themselves accomplices in their own continued subjugation. He had announced, more than two years before, his intention of forming a kingdom of Poland, dependent on Russia, as one of the means of gaining the zealous support of the Poles against Napoleon, and had even given orders to draw up a constitution for the Polish provinces which had been incorporated with his empire. These promises he still continued to repeat to the most distinguished Polish patriots — among the rest, to the illustrious Kosciuszko himself — and by that means gained their confidence. They would thus have all that they desired, or could hope to attain — a national existence, and a free constitution. The Poles of the duchy of Warsaw easily believed in engagements so solemnly made and so frequently repeated to their brethren of the dismembered provinces; and when a prospect arose that Europe might not acquiesce in the pretensions of Russia, the grand duke Constantine, in order to continue the delusion, addressed them in the name of his brother, as their protector and their friend. His imperial highness hurried from the congress of Vienna to Warsaw, and, in a proclamation published the 11th of December, called upon the Poles "to rally round the standard of their august protector, to arm for the defence of their country and the *preservation of their political existence.*" The utmost that could be done by the British and French plenipotentiaries in this state of things, without incurring the dangers and expense of a new war, was to enter a solemn protest in favour of Poland, and to engage the Emperor of Russia, who then

professed liberal sentiments, to respect the national existence and political freedom of the Poles. His lordship earnestly requested the sovereigns, on whom the fate of Poland depended, not "to leave Vienna till they pledged themselves that the Poles in their respective dominions, under whatever form of government they might think proper to place them, should still be treated as Poles."

The sovereigns in question readily concurred in these views. The Emperor Alexander declared, that he considered that "no power could guarantee the universal repose of Europe, like that principle of cohesion which arises from the attachment of a people for their native land, and from their consciousness of well-being; and that such were the bonds by which he hoped to attach the Poles placed under his government to his empire." The government of Prussia made a similar engagement; and the Emperor of Austria, more liberal than his two imperial and royal fellow-partitioners on this occasion, declared "the re-establishment of Poland as an independent state, with a national representation of its own, would have accomplished all his wishes; and that he would have been willing to make the greatest sacrifices to promote the restoration of that ancient and beneficial arrangement." His imperial majesty added, "that he concurred with the liberal views of the Emperor Alexander, and approved of the *national institutions which it was the intention of that monarch to grant to the Polish nation.*"

But this was not all. The three governments did not limit themselves to vague and general promises made to each other, or to more solemn en-

gagements addressed to the more disinterested members of congress; they embodied these promises and engagements in the sacred stipulations of a treaty ratified in the name "of the holy and indivisible Trinity." The first article of the final act of the Vienna congress, which effected the new settlement of Europe, transfers the grand duchy of Warsaw, under the title of the kingdom of Poland*, to the Emperors of Russia for ever; but stipulates, at the same time, "that the Poles, the respective subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain *a national representation, and national institutions*, framed according to the mode of political existence which each of the governments to which they belong shall judge useful and proper to grant them." Prussia and Austria have thought it "useful" and convenient not to give such national institutions; and the Emperor Alexander only promulgated a constitutional act, to have it violated in all its essential points.

This Polish charter was promulgated in the end of November, 1815, not many months after the rising of the Vienna congress, and consists of one hundred and sixty-five articles, which, if honestly executed in all their protecting clauses and provisions, would have secured the allegiance and promoted the happiness of Poland. The fifth article guarantees

* Out of the grand duchy, as existing at the congress of Vienna, Prussia received back Posen, and Austria some small districts of Gallicia, before it was created into a kingdom for Russia. The city and circle of Cracow was likewise detached from it, and formed into a free and independent republic, under the guarantee of the three powers of Prussia, Austria, and Russia.

the direction of the government, under the name of lieutenant of the kingdom, to a native of the country, unless one of the imperial princes be appointed viceroy. This article was rendered nugatory by the presence of the emperor's brother, Constantine, as commander in chief of the army. The eleventh article secures protection to the Catholic religion, as the religion of the majority, with a perfect toleration to every other worship, and a perfect equality of civil privileges to all religious sects. The Catholic church is to send eight bishops to the senate. The nineteenth article declares that no citizen can be arrested but in the forms prescribed, and in the cases determined by the law. This provision of the charter was subject to the most capricious and arbitrary violations. The next article, which ordains that a notification of the cause of arrest shall be immediately given to the person arrested, was violated with equal frequency and cruelty. Years sometimes intervened between a man's imprisonment and the notification of his offence. Another article declares that no punishment can be inflicted except in virtue of existing laws and the sentence of a competent magistrate. The Poles have told us how seldom this law interfered with the passions of their Russian masters.

As if to show an utter contempt for public opinion, and to give an opportunity of outrageously insulting a solemn engagement, the following article is introduced on the rights of the press:—"The liberty of the press is guaranteed. The law will regulate the means of repressing its abuses." It need

not be said that this article was broken; it never was executed, nor was intended to be executed.

The twenty-fifth article secured to the Polish people an entire possession of all places of trust and profit in their own country, by limiting to the Poles all employments civil and military. With such a provision they ought to have been freed from the tyranny of Russian agents, and might have considered their country as their own but for the sight of Russian garrisons. But the Russians employed generally the very worst natives of Poland, and made them the instruments of an oppression which they would scarcely have dared to exercise without their intervention. In order to secure these rights, the thirty-first article provides a national representation, consisting of the diet, composed of two chambers, and the king, or his lieutenant. This national representation had no power. Its sittings were interrupted for five years at a time. All the acts of the king must be signed by a minister, who is responsible for their conformity to the laws and constitution of the kingdom. this article was always eluded.

The two chambers of the diet are to deliberate publicly, by the ninety-fifth article. This article was violated by the founder of the charter, who shut the doors of the senate and house of deputies.

In the composition of the two chambers, and the mode of electing that of representatives, a great degree of independence might have been secured, had the law been faithfully executed. The senate, by the 108th article, is to be composed of the princes of the blood; nine bishops, one being of the Greek

church; and of Palatins and Castellans, orders of nobility, who are appointed for life by the king out of a double list presented by the senate itself, and who must pay an annual contribution of 2000 florins to the state. The lower chamber consists of 77 nuncios or representatives of the assemblies of the nobility, being one nuncio for every district, and of 51 deputies of communes, or representatives of the artisans, traders, and proprietors who are not noble. The functions of the deputies returned by these bodies last for six years, unless the king dissolves the chamber, being renewed by thirds every two years. Both chambers have for presidents, or marshals, one of their own body nominated by the crown. The noble proprietors of the country, assembled in a little diet, nominate their representatives, who must be thirty years of age, and pay 100 florins of direct contribution. The commercial assemblies, consisting of citizens not noble, of manufacturers, of shopkeepers possessing property to a certain amount, of priests, and of artists of any name or standing, elect the deputies.

These more important provisions are followed by an article which shows the homage which the emperor was obliged to show to the proud spirit of the Poles. It is declared, towards the conclusion of the charter, that "the Polish army preserves its colours, its uniform, and every thing that belongs to its nationality."

Such a charter, if executed with good faith and in the spirit of freedom, was calculated to secure the most essential blessings of independence and popular government to the nation. But the history

of Poland since its grant has only been a continued violation of its provisions and guarantees.

The Grand Duke Constantine, as commander-in-chief of the forces, acted on a system of military despotism which entirely overpowered the action of the civil government, and rendered nugatory every constitutional safeguard of freedom. Without regard to the separate rights of the kingdom, his great object was to destroy the nationality of the Poles, and to convert them into Russian vassals. Inaccessible to any feeling of political rights, or to any desire for the progress of knowledge or liberty, he considered the Polish kingdom as a province which he could rule on the principles of a Turkish pacha. Knowing nothing but military discipline, and placing his whole pride and duty in the sinister activity with which he tortured the troops by useless and vexatious exercises, he was in the habit of punishing or degrading both officers and men for the most minute and trifling faults. Even the highest ranks of the army were not safe from his brutal insults; and often the general and the ensign met in the same prison for defects of discipline or neglect of orders, of which neither could see the importance. Courts-martial were employed as the instruments of his never-ending tyranny; but when their decisions did not accord with his views, he annulled their sentence, and inflicted punishment by his own sole authority. He even endeavoured to change the uniform of the Poles, notwithstanding the charter, and to destroy all distinction between them and the Muscovites.

The citizens were as much oppressed and in-

sulted as the army. The grand duke made himself master of the secret police, and employed spies to watch the movements, words, and actions of every person in the least elevated above the common level of society. On the slightest suspicion of dissatisfaction with his government, the most noble and honourable citizens were dragged before him, and punished in his presence without law or justice. Individual liberty, guaranteed by the charter, was never allowed to stand between him and the indulgence of his brutal caprices. Rich proprietors, wealthy merchants, professional men of eminence, were all treated with the most insulting indignities, and often condemned to the most degrading punishments.

It is needless to say that the freedom of the press did not exist in such a state of things. No stricture was allowed on the conduct of the administration. Discussion of every kind was prohibited, and knowledge was treated like an enemy.

By the charter it was decreed that the chambers should be convoked at least every two years, and that all the financial measures of government should be submitted to their examination and sanction. This security for national rights, the best that could be devised, was openly violated. The grand duke decided on the budget of the army without consulting the diet, and admitted no check on his authority from the civil government.

Thus the meeting of the diet was rendered a mere ceremony. It had no power of refusing supplies; it had no freedom of debate; it could successfully oppose no arbitrary act. The government sub-

mitted to its deliberations projects of no interest or importance to occupy the time of its necessary session, and withheld from it the cognizance or discussion of questions connected with the public administration and the financial interests of the kingdom. When money is demanded, grievances may be stated; but when a budget can be obtained without the sanction of the legislature, no opportunity is left for checking the excesses of the executive.

Thus the army, both in its numbers and management, was entirely at the mercy and under the direction of Muscovite despotism; the resources of the state were employed, without the legal control of the diet, to strengthen Russian tyranny; the press was enslaved, that no remonstrance might be made against Russian oppression; the citizens were arrested, imprisoned, and punished by a Russian military chieftain, without being brought to trial before the proper native tribunals; the legislative chambers were deprived of their just prerogatives; the national customs, habits, and feelings were hourly insulted; the citizens were beset with an infamous police, and deprived even of the melancholy consolation of complaint; thus, in short, every Polish right was violated—every article of the charter broken—and the whole efforts of an imperial savage, at the head of a strong military force, directed to efface from the countrymen of the Sobieskis and the Kosciuszkos all the remains of the Polish character.

This, it must be allowed, is a picture of tyranny and misgovernment sufficiently appalling to justify the resistance of any people, but more especially that of a people which had long been accustomed

to even a licentious freedom; which was proud of its national honour and ancient renown; which entertained such a veneration for its laws and usages as to preserve for two centuries the *liberum veto* and the rights of elective monarchy, the source of all its calamities; and which had the positive stipulations of its sovereign for the preservation of its national rights. But, like most general pictures, its impression may be diminished by its generality. We shall therefore make no apology for introducing, on the authority of an Englishman who had been twelve years in Poland, a few facts, to give the character of precision and truth to the outline. In the fortress of Zamosc twelve state prisoners were found, some of whom had been incarcerated for six years without having undergone a trial, and whose names were only known to the commander of the castle. In the dungeons of Marienanski, in Warsaw, was found a victim of the Russian police, who had been kept in solitary confinement for ten years, and whose fate was entirely unknown to his friends and relatives. Respectable inhabitants of Warsaw were often taken and flogged before the grand duke without the formality of a trial, or the specification of a charge. Some were even, in the same unlawful manner, made to break stones or wheel barrows on the streets or highways like galley slaves. Persons of rank were frequently taken from their homes, immured in prison, and dismissed after several weeks' incarceration without knowing what alleged offence had provoked such a wanton exercise of power contrary to the charter and the privileges of Poland; state offenders were carried out of the

country to Russian prisons, and attempts were made to give them a journey to Siberia, which were only prevented by the threat of suicide on the part of the victims. The resources of the kingdom were squandered entirely for Russian objects; and the people were oppressed to maintain a Polish and a Russian army. Peculation and pillage was the order of the day. The president of the town of Warsaw, with a salary of between 500*l.* and 600*l.*, contrived to amass a fortune of 100,000*l.* in fifteen years, besides living in splendour and squandering twice his legal income. The same unprincipled peculation was practised by other municipal or state officers. The Russian generals were in league with the magistrates and billet-master, to divide the booty received from the inhabitants as the price of exemption from the oppressive quartering of troops on their houses.* Spies

* The following statement of facts on this head, to which we have seen no allusion made in the public prints, but the authenticity of which may be relied on, will give a better idea of the system of Russian government in Poland than any general description could convey. We have received it from the quarter to which we have above alluded: —

"According to the laws of Poland, a commission, chosen by the citizens, has the right of examining and auditing the accounts of the town. From the tyrannical system adopted by the officers who were continually about the person of the grand duke, they dared not perform their duty from fear of his displeasure, and probably, at the instigation of the miscreants around him, being consigned to a prison: remonstrances were, however, generally made at the half-yearly meeting of the commission; though, up to the period immediately before the revolution, nothing was done to check the evil. In the month of September a circumstance occurred, not important in itself, but of great weight in the future course of events. *Janiszewski*,

were employed by the police to watch every man of the least consequence in society, and the nobility

a ci-devant officer in the army, had sent several petitions to the president of the town, which were treated with neglect and insult. He and the president met in the street, when the latter again insulted him. This was immediately resented by the former, who inflicted severe corporal chastisement on the latter. The grand duke refused to interfere in the affair. A trial ensued, in which some abuses of the president were exposed, and *Janiszewski* sentenced only to forty days' imprisonment. This affair, and this decision, created a strong sensation at the time; and emboldened the commission appointed to investigate the affairs of the town-house to insist on their rights. The commission, being at length roused by the numerous abuses that were pressed on their attention, obtained an order from the minister of the interior to proceed in the execution of their duties. They immediately formed themselves into branch committees, each two taking cognizance of a department. The task of investigating the abuses in the quartering of the officers devolved on two citizens, called *Schuch* and *Czarnecki*. They found, on enquiry, that the owners of large houses were induced to compromise with the billet-master for a sum in cash equal to one fourth, and in some instances to one half of the amount of rent, in lieu of having a general or any number of inferior officers quartered on them. In Warsaw many of the houses contain from fifty to a hundred families; consequently, the billet-compensation money was a grievous tax. The mass of extortions were found to exceed in reality any previous estimate. A new scene now opened to view. Those gentlemen received evidence that the Russian generals *were participators in the pillage of the town*, and in league with the president and billet-master. Feeling that they should be detected in proceedings so disgraceful, they consulted a lawyer (*Wolinski*), to know if the researches of the committee could not be legally prevented. His opinion was given in the negative; but, in order to divert the public mind from the investigation, he advised *Czarnecki* to provoke one of the commission to strike him, when he should be able to prosecute him

were often driven to the country to avoid such dangerous intruders. In several instances members

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for attacking an *employé*, and by that means get rid of the investigation. *Czarnecki* used the most insulting language to Mr. Schuch, and in a fit of desperation seized hold of his arm, with the intention of putting him out of the room by force. The committee-man being on his guard, the manœuvre failed. *Czarnecki*, seeing himself foiled, his iniquity discovered, and his ill-gotten wealth likely to be confiscated, committed suicide, and thus left the president and generals to fight their own battles. The artillery of Messrs. *Schuch* and *Czarnecki* was now directed against the whole of the Russian and two Polish generals, the notorious and unprincipled *Raznieki*, the head of the secret police of the kingdom, and *Kossecki*. Means had in vain been tried to bribe Messrs. *Schuch* and *Czarnecki* through the commissary of the circle, that the investigations should cease, or that the generals should not appear to be implicated in the affair. It was ascertained by the investigation that General *Lewicki*, Russian commander of the town, independently of the lodgings he occupied, received payment for more *than a hundred lodgings*; that General *Gendre* received payment of 212*l.* 10*s.*; that *Philippeus*, cashier to the grand duke, received from the same fund 225*l.* annually, which was sweetened by a prompt payment of 2500*l.*, being ten years in advance; and that the coachmen and lackeys of the grand duke and generals received money from the same fund, instead of wages from their masters. As the inflexibility and integrity of those gentlemen were proof against all bribes, the generals foresaw the impending storm which threatened to break and overwhelm them. In this critical situation, they conceived one of the most atrocious plots on record. Its object was to create a disturbance, by which the town-house should be set on fire, and the documents which implicated them in the pillage should be consumed. They agreed to produce this by arming a number of students; and their agent was an officer in the army, known to belong to the secret societies. The sum of 200 ducats in gold was paid him as a reward for anticipated services, and 200 stand of

of the diet were banished to their estates, and made to pay the troops that guarded them, for having

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arms was provided him. For such a project this man seemed a fit agent. He took lodgings in the house where the students met to hold their deliberations, opened to them his revolutionary views, and represented himself as one qualified to rescue their common country from the grasp of despotism. He so far ingratiated himself into their confidence as to obtain some knowledge of the general plan for the freedom of Poland. Circumstances, however, created distrust of this new and zealous auxiliary; and the students refused to act with him, or to receive the muskets the generals had provided for distribution. Communication having now ceased between Petrikowski and the students, he took lodgings in the next room to that in which they met to hold their deliberations; what he overheard was communicated to the generals; and ten students were in consequence denounced, arrested, and severely flogged (by an arbitrary order of the grand duke's), to make them divulge their associates. Though writhing under the whip of the executioner, not a word escaped their lips to inculpate their friends, or impart a knowledge of the schemes that had so long engrossed their thoughts. The severity of the punishment may be conceived by the fact, that one of the number died soon after its infliction. The students were kept in solitary confinement, and their punishment remained uncertain; universal sympathy was felt for their sufferings by their comrades, coupled with an ardent desire to relieve them; but by this time danger threatened to implicate a great part of their body, and it was ascertained that an order to arrest a great number was to take place on the 30th November. On the 27th November an order arrived in Warsaw from the emperor, to send to Riga with all possible despatch 42,000,000 of florins, equal to 1,050,000*l.* sterling, of which 2,000,000 were to be furnished from the treasury of the minister of war, 28,000,000 from the government treasury, and 12,000,000 from the bank. These two circumstances concurring, created great activity in all persons connected with the overthrow of despotism and the free-

ventured in the assembly, whose discussions ought to have been free, to express a suspicion of the government, or to hint an opinion contrary to the taste of the grand duke.

In the affair of the conspiracy on the accession of Nicholas, to which we have alluded, the grossest iniquity and barbarities were practised. Hundreds of persons, from eighty to nine years of age, senators of the kingdom and boys in the schools, were thrown into solitary dungeons. There they were deprived even of the benefit of daylight; and some of them are still nearly blind from the effect of their treatment. Four times were some of them driven from Warsaw to St. Petersburg, with more than the rapidity of a courier, in carriages without springs, in direct violation of one of the most important articles of the charter. An ordinance was drawn up speculating on their death. The senators refused to condemn them, guided by a president who paid for his heroic exertions, in keeping at his post to see justice administered, by his death after the trial. The vengeance of the government was not satisfied. Several of the acquitted prisoners were transported to the dungeons of St. Petersburg, where, at the Polish revolution, one of them still groaned in close confinement.

Such oppressions and insults could not be continued without leading to projects of resistance, and the formation of secret associations to carry such

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dom of their country; and it was determined only on the memorable morning of the 29th to commence their patriotic work in the evening."

projects into effect. When men cannot declare their sentiments on the conduct of their governors in public, they must whisper them in private; where free discussion is debarred from the journals and legislative assemblies, it must take refuge in clubs or mason lodges; when men cannot combine to remove obnoxious rulers, they must conspire to overpower them. Accordingly we find that a very considerable number of Poles were engaged in the plot which exploded on the accession of the present emperor, in 1826; and that the late insurrection was brought about by a society instituted in 1828, for gaining over the officers of the army to the cause of independence. These associations, which are the creation of concealed discontent or suppressed disaffection, can never be effective but by the concurrence of the general will. The students of a university or the pupils of a military school would call "to arms" in vain, unless the people by their previous sufferings were prepared to join them or second their efforts. They may lay the train and apply the match, but the combustible materials must previously have existed.

The French revolution produced a greater effect in Poland than could have been anticipated from the distance and different organisation of that country. This was owing chiefly to two causes:—1st, The intimate connection of the Polish patriots with the French liberal party through the Polish legion; and 2dly, The unwise resolution formed by the emperor Nicholas, and now officially known, to declare war against the revolutionary party in the south of Europe, and to employ the Polish army as the vanguard of his

holy alliance crusade. To this extent we believe the influence of the one revolution on the other; but we see no clew by which the connection can be farther traced. They had no common principle; they could offer each other no probability of common support; and there appears no evidence that emissaries from the fauxbourgs of Paris could have infected Polish society, under such a vigilant system of quarantine laws against political contagion as was administered by the grand duke and his spies.

Nor, according to the official declarations of the Russians themselves, did the Poles require such a stimulus; for the *Gazette of St. Petersburg*, after taking considerable time for reflection, ascribed the rising at Warsaw, not to French emissaries or to French principles, but to a plot of *rebellious subalterns* acting upon a body of fanatic students, who had been conspiring against the government for the last two years. There is no question that the insurrection was at last the result of a conspiracy acting in unison with the feelings of the nation, and calculating with certainty on national support. The method taken to extinguish it, by getting up a sham plot, by inducing a number of young men to betray their designs, and by cramming the prisons with the victims of suspicion and political seduction, only hastened its explosion. By this time nearly all the young Polish officers in the garrison at Warsaw, all the youth of the school of cadets, and all the students of the universities, had been gained over to the cause of the patriots. Behind them the greatest part of the citizens, and the chief nobles of the land, were ready

to encourage the generous efforts which they had not provoked, and to establish civil order on the basis of a national victory. They saw, as is evident from the correspondence between the Russian and Polish administrations, found among the papers of the grand duke, that the Polish army was to be moved to the south of Europe; that a Russian army would soon enter their territory to supply its place; that the treasures of the nation were to be squandered for anti-national objects; and therefore that if a blow was to be struck, it must be struck speedily, or must fail. The epoch had arrived when the instinct of the rash had only anticipated the counsels of the wise, and in which a change had become so necessary that the oppressors themselves were the real revolutionists. The youth of the military school had been assured that the grand duke, who had already subjected some of their number to barbarous treatment, had declared, in a passion, that he intended to surround their establishment with Russian troops, to try them by martial law for their alleged plots, and to condemn them to death or degrading punishments by his creatures. This report was easily believed from his previous severities. He had lately appointed them a new governor in the person of General Trombicki, who subjected them to the most rigorous discipline, with the view of taming their spirit.

When thus disposed, a young officer in the plot entered their school on the evening of the 29th of November when they were at exercise, and called out, "To arms! to arms! the hour of liberty is struck." The young men, who were prepared for

the summons, instantly seized their arms, and unanimously obeyed the call. None of them hesitated; none of them acted the traitor; none of them evinced reluctance or timidity. One of them is said to have just risen from a bed of sickness, to which he had been confined for two months, and to have insisted on joining the enterprise, of which he had been previously apprised by his comrades. Their first object was to proceed to Belvidere, the palace of the grand duke, about two miles from the town, not for the purpose, as has been said in the Russian official accounts, of assassinating his imperial highness, but to obtain possession of his person as a hostage for their safety should they fail in their undertaking. They were joined on the way by some of the more ardent of the students of the university, who were likewise in the plot. In their progress to the palace they attacked and overpowered a regiment of Russian chasseurs, and thus obtained a supply of horses. A party of the cadets, who were acquainted with the apartments of the grand duke, entered the palace, ran through the winding passages, burst open the doors, and penetrated to the cabinet which he had just left. On their way they were opposed by the most hateful of his agents, the vice-president of police, Lubowicki, whom they instantly despatched. His imperial highness had been apprised of his danger by a faithful servant, who, having heard a noise at the gates, roused his master, threw around him a cloak, and concealed him at first in a clothes-press, till he enabled him to make his escape by the garden. The object of the attack on the palace had now failed, and there was no time for

further search or delay. Surrounded with the Russian guards, this detachment of cadets and students therefore, to the amount of 180 or 200, hastened back to reinforce their friends in the town. In their retreat they were harassed along the whole line by a regiment of the Russian guards, among whom they committed great havoc. With this regiment they had to maintain a continued fight for two miles on open ground. The courage which they displayed, and the skill which they evinced in resisting veteran troops, who endeavoured to cut off their retreat to the town, is not the least brilliant exploit of this extraordinary revolution.

While one party of the cadets and students was thus occupied at Belvidere, another detachment was equally active at the southern extremity of the town. Both paraded the streets, crying out, "Poles, to arms! to arms!" At the hour previously agreed upon, they were joined by the 4th Polish regiment of the line, by a battery of twelve guns, by a battalion of sappers, and detachments from the grenadier companies of all the regiments in the garrison of Warsaw. While some of these troops maintained order and protected property at the bank and other establishments, others watched the Russian troops. The students and cadets, having been joined by the pupils of the school of law, made an attack on the posts of the Russians at the arsenal and prison. From the latter they released all persons confined for political offences; and as soon as they mastered the former, they delivered arms to the people. When they had thus obtained the power of arming forty thousand citizens, and found citizens

willing to accept of arms, their cause was gained. In order to quicken the rapidity of the insurrectionary movement, an officer ran to the theatre, and called out, "To arms, Poles! the Russians are massacring us!" The house was instantly cleared, and the citizens ran to the arsenal to provide themselves with the means of defence. It was after this general excitement, and this general arming, that the most of the Russian officers who were killed in the struggle lost their lives. Without knowing the extent of the insurrection, they mounted their horses and rode about, endeavouring to appease the people, and put down the insurgents by menaces; they were thus unfortunately recognised and massacred. Among the generals who thus fell sacrifices to their own temerity or to popular vengeance, were General Hauke, General Trembicki, General Scemioutkowski, General Blumer, and the Polish general Stanislaus Potocki. Another Polish general, Nowicki, who had joined the insurgents, was killed, from being mistaken for a Russian general. No less than five Russian generals and two Polish were made prisoners, together with five or six colonels of regiments.

All the Polish troops, with the exception of a single regiment and some companies, having joined the armed citizens, and the Russians being too weak to oppose such a force, by the morning of the 30th, or, in other words, within the course of ten or twelve hours, the revolution may be considered as complete, and the Russian authority overthrown in Poland. On the morning of the 30th, the number of troops and

armed citizens ready to defend their independence amounted to nearly 40,000.

During the night, while the Polish troops were employed in securing the posts of the town, particularly the arsenal and the bank, the grand duke found his way on foot beyond the barrier of Mockatow, where he was joined by the Russian regiments, who had attempted several times to enter the town, but had been at each attempt driven back with loss.

So great was the terror and hurry with which his imperial highness escaped, that he could not wait for sufficient clothes to protect him from the inclemency of the weather. If this was the condition of the commander-in-chief and brother of the emperor, his staff and his troops were in a still more deplorable plight. The troops were not only without shelter from the severity of the frost, but without provisions. Had an opportunity been looked for to attack them, not a man of them could have escaped. Both the grand duke and his army might have been retained prisoners at Warsaw, instead of being allowed to leave the country, to swell afterwards the ranks of its invaders. But such was not the policy of the nobility and men of rank who composed the government, to which the revolutionists now offered a ready obedience. They discouraged any attempt to follow the grand duke, or to molest him in his retreat, for reasons which will presently appear.

They even took an early opportunity of assuring him that he was at perfect freedom to depart with all his artillery and baggage; that he would meet

with no obstacle in marching to the frontiers, on their part; but so slow was his progress, owing to the badness of the roads, and such were the privations to which his troops were exposed, that he gave orders, about two posts from Warsaw, to leave his baggage and heavy artillery behind, that he might reach more rapidly the Russian frontiers.

On the morning of the 30th the grand duke and his janissaries had been overpowered and driven from Warsaw. So far, therefore, as the overthrow of the governing power was concerned, the Polish revolution was complete, though as yet it appeared nothing else but a tumult among the youth of the schools, combined with a mutiny among the native troops of the garrison. Now, therefore, was the time to show its real character,—to decide whether it was a mere local disturbance or a national movement. The point was not left many hours in doubt. The administrative council was called on the night of the insurrection. Though composed of natives, it was not popular; it was therefore obliged to invite the most eminent men in the capital, distinguished by their patriotism and love of freedom, to take part in its deliberations, and to give validity to its measures for restoring order. These were Prince Adam Czartorinski, the first nobleman in Poland, and allied to royal families; Prince Michel Radzivil, a man of admirable character and extensive possessions; General Clopicki, so distinguished in the Polish legion; General Pac; the Castellan Rochonowski; and the first name in Polish literature, M. Niemcewicz. This council immediately issued a proclamation to tranquillise the public mind, by giving the

inhabitants the assurance that the grand duke had agreed to retreat. This proclamation was written in the name of the king and emperor, whose title and rights the provisional government at first agreed to respect. They were as yet uncertain of the designs of the insurgents—the success of their cause beyond the capital, and the disposition of some Polish troops who still remained with the grand duke. They were therefore afraid that, by a frank adoption of the revolution to its full extent, as understood by its first movers, they might provoke to a civil war; whereas by demanding only the due execution of the charter, without attempting to change the dynasty, they could calculate upon the concert and co-operation of the whole people. Their noble characters and unbounded patriotism were fully developed in subsequent events, when they saw more evidences of the national unanimity. No sign of Jacobinism—no attempt to destroy the influence of wealth or rank, appeared among the youth who had brought about the revolution. They gave way to the princes, nobility, and high administrative characters of their country, and ranged themselves under their banners. The provisional government, after having given pledges of their patriotism, were obeyed without suspicion.

The equivocal character in which they stood to the Russian government, as at once insurgents and subjects,—as adversaries of the king's authority in the king's name,—did not prevent them from taking the measures necessary for securing the fruits of their victory, from exciting the patriotic enthusiasm of the nation, and preparing the means of defence against

Russian aggression. They immediately ordered the formation of a national guard, and a re-construction of the police and municipalities. General Clopicki took the command of the army, and displayed extraordinary energy in increasing its ranks, completing its organisation, and stimulating its zeal. The fear entertained of a division among the troops was removed on the third day after the insurrection, by the arrival of the Polish regiment, and the separate detachments which had accompanied the grand duke out of the town. Constantine on this occasion betrayed a weakness, a cowardice, a generosity, or a humanity, which gave the utmost offence to his imperial brother and the court of St. Petersburgh. Had he kept, at all hazards, a portion of the Polish troops mixed with his own, he would have distracted the councils of the provisional government,—have perhaps retained some of the garrisons in the interest of the emperor, and thus have facilitated the entry of new troops for the re-subjugation of the country. By agreeing to send back a faithful body of soldiers who had adhered to his fortunes in the hour of danger, and combated their brethren under his standard, he severed the last link which connected the Polish army with the empire, released it in reality, if not formally, from its allegiance to the emperor, and announced to all the Polish garrisons that they might, as soon as they chose, hoist the national colours. When he acted this extraordinary part (on the 2d of December, four days after the insurrection), he was still in the neighbourhood of Warsaw, with three regiments of Russian cavalry, two regiments of Russian infantry, the Polish regi-

ment of chasseurs of the guard, a part of the Polish infantry of the guard, and some companies of the third regiment of the line. He was, no doubt, induced to surrender such a vital point by the fear of being attacked if he showed any hostile disposition, and by the persuasions of the provisional government; a deputation of which waited upon him on the 2d of December, at his own request, to inform him of their demands. The party who then represented to him the national will were not likely to fail in their patriotic mission. They told him that the Poles demanded the full execution of the charter given by the Emperor Alexander, and the fulfilment of the promises of that emperor to re-unite the other Polish provinces incorporated with Russia under the same charter. Having answered the enquiries of the grand duke, they begged in their turn to ask his intentions, and to know if he had sent orders for the Lithuanian troops to come to his assistance? To the latter question he answered in the negative; and said nothing in reply to the former, but that if the Poles submitted, he would beseech his brother to grant an amnesty for what was past. He then consented to the return of the Polish detachments which still remained with his army. The whole of the Polish army soon declared for a provisional government, and hoisted the white flag of Poland. On the 3d, the grand duke evacuated the neighbourhood of Warsaw, after having written as follows to the administrative council:—"I permit the Polish troops, who have remained faithful to the last moment, to join their countrymen. I am about to set out with the imperial troops; and I hope, from Polish

good faith, that they will not be harassed in their movements to reach the empire." They were not harassed; and his imperial highness passed the frontier about the middle of the month.

The history of Poland from this time to the end of the year was only a chronicle of the most active preparations for defence, and an enumeration of deeds of the most devoted patriotism. All fear of a civil war disappeared amid the enthusiastic unanimity of the nation. The administration was ameliorated, and conducted with as much regularity as if no convulsion had happened. In order to check extreme parties, and to give unity to the operations of government, General Clopicki was, on the 5th of December, proclaimed dictator till the meeting of the diet, which was convoked for the 18th.

The news of the insurrection at Warsaw and the expulsion of the Russian troops reached St. Petersburg before the grand duke had reached the frontier. It was heard by the emperor in a transport of rage, in which the Russian nobility participated. No offer of accommodation — no concession — no compromise, could for a moment enter into the calculations of such a master. He considered the insurrection as a personal insult; he denounced a whole nation as traitors and rebels. The lord of so many tribes could not safely permit an instance of successful revolt; and therefore nothing was left to the Poles but absolute and instant submission, or military massacre and extermination. On the 17th of December he issued a proclamation to the Poles, in which, after telling them that "an odious crime had been committed," and that he had "learned it with

just indignation," he ordered the former administration to re-enter on their functions; all the commanders of the army to assemble their troops and march upon Plock, the place destined for their rendezvous; and all persons who had taken up arms in consequence of the disturbances at Warsaw, to lay them down immediately. He concluded by telling them, that "if they imagined that they could *obtain concessions by taking up arms, their hope was vain.*" The "concessions" which they demanded had been the solemn promises made by his predecessor, and the ratified stipulations of treaties to which all the great powers of Europe were parties; but, accustomed to oriental despotism, he could not brook the thought that even acknowledged justice should be demanded with a display of physical force, and therefore resolved to treat the Poles as he would have done a tribe of Calmucs.

——— "Forward rolls
His regal car through nations, who in arms,
In ordered ranks, unlike the orient tribes,
Upheld the spear and buckler; but, untaught
To bend the servile knee, *erect they stood* —
Unless that, mourning o'er the shameful weight
Of *their new bondage*, some their brows depress'd,
Their arms with grief distaining."

In order to comply with all the laws of wisdom and honour — in order, if possible, to obtain their rights without a further effusion of blood, and to retain the dynasty while they asserted their constitutional freedom and national independence, the provisional government sent two commissioners to St. Petersburg, to explain the events of the insurrection, and

the conditions on which the authority of the emperor might be restored. Before these commissioners could be received, they had to employ certain equivocations respecting the source of their diplomatic powers, which left no hope that their explanations or demands would meet with a patient or respectful hearing. They were even treated like prisoners, and their representations were answered with threats of vengeance. At last, on the 24th of December, the Emperor Nicholas issued a proclamation to his Russian subjects, which left no hope to the Poles but in submission or the sword. In this furious manifesto they are told, that "a terrible treason has convulsed the kingdom of Poland;" that "the Poles have again precipitated themselves into an abyss of revolt and misery; that *troops of these credulous people, though struck with fear of approaching chastisement, dare to think of victory for some moments, and to propose conditions to us, their* LEGITIMATE MASTER." The Russian hordes are then reminded of their prey in the plunder of Poland, and desired to prepare for the march. "God," says the imperial blasphemer, "is with us; and powerful Russia is *able, in a single decisive battle, to reduce to obedience those who have dared to disturb the peace.*" The Poles, who had never for a moment expected a compliance with their just demands, were prepared for such an issue. They had never relaxed a moment in their exertions; and having drawn up and published to Europe one of the most noble manifestoes of modern times, in which their grievances are exposed with becoming indignation, and their rights asserted with unshrinking firmness, took re-

fuge in the consolation, that, whatever might be the event of "the single decisive battle" with which they were menaced, they could not be worse for standing its shock.

> "Tuta petant alii, fortuna miserrima tuta est;
> Nam timor eventûs deterioris abest."

Their situation did indeed appear to be desperate. They had enraged their "legitimate master" and his Russian vassals to the highest pitch; they heard of armies marching against them, more numerous than the whole of their male population capable of bearing arms; they knew that these troops were commanded by officers who brought European skill, science, and tactics, to direct oriental submissiveness; they possessed no mountain passes, where a handful of men could resist an invading force till the nation was prepared, and no fortresses that could stand a siege; they were hemmed in on all sides in a corner of Europe, surrounded with the Prussian and Austrian fellow-plunderers of their late tyrant, through whose jealously-watched frontiers they could scarcely send a messenger or receive a musket*; they could expect nothing from the free nations of the south and the west but their sympathy, though they might have calculated on their guarantees to the treaties which their "legitimate master" had violated; and they had no sea-port by which they

* We could mention facts on this subject which would astonish those who have any faith in professions of Prussian neutrality. The newspapers have alluded to the stoppage and unsealing of letters, to the arrest of passengers, and to the interception of funds. We could mention additional facts, but, as complaints of the mischief might suggest its aggravation, we refrain.

could obtain from abroad arms and ammunition. Thus, without any assistance from without, they were left exposed to the whole force of an empire of 50,000,000 of inhabitants! Their own army, though brave and well-disciplined, did not amount to 40,000 men; and all their force, regular and irregular—the people under arms, and the national guard—the peasants armed with scythes—all the male population, in short, capable of taking the field, or of fighting for their fire-sides, did not amount to 300,000 men.

But their unanimity and their energy made up for their deficiency of numerical strength. No instance occurred of defection, indifference, or treachery. From the princes and nobles, with estates like provinces, and with ability to equip squadrons of cavalry at their own expense, down to the peasant, who could only purchase a scythe to fight the enemy,—all prepared for the struggle. Deputies and senators enrolled themselves as privates in the national guard, and handled the spade or the wheelbarrow in constructing batteries to defend the capital. Capitalists sent their money, and ladies their jewels, to establish funds for the defence of their national rights: those who had no other contribution to bestow, gave their own persons, by entering the ranks of the army as volunteers; and if ever a nation of so small an extent was destined to be saved from such a mighty invader by miracles of courage and patriotism, Poland was destined to be free and independent. Whatever may be the result of the struggle, the powers of Europe, bound as they are by treaties to interfere for the protection of Polish

rights, cannot, as formerly, remain inactive spectators of the proscriptions of Catharine or the massacres of Suwarrow; the long list of perfidies, atrocities, and barbarities which has already excited the indignation of the world must be avenged, and the justice of Providence vindicated, in the restoration of so noble a people to their national independence.*

We have now concluded our review or retrospect of the chief events of 1830; and have introduced into our narrative as many facts as a due appreciation of their importance and a regard to our narrow limits would permit. It was our design to have given a brief notice of the progress of French legislation for the last three or four months of the year, and to have described the organic laws promised in the charter, and intended to complete it; but none of them had received the final sanction of the chambers when the year closed. Neither the law for the organisation of the national guard, nor

* If Poland were restored, the following is the amount of the population which the kingdom would contain: —

The present kingdom	3,700 000
The republic of Cracow	100,000
Russian Poland and Courland	9,400,000
Gallicia	4,000,000
Polish Prussia	800,000
Grand duchy of Posen	980,000
Total	18,980,000

Such a restoration is rather to be desired, than hoped for. The junction of the Russian provinces of Lithuania and Volhynia with the present kingdom would satisfy Polish patriots.

for the establishment of municipal and departmental administrations, nor for regulating the composition and rights of the electoral colleges, had passed at the time that our account closes. Many isolated events, which would have been of great interest and moment on ordinary occasions, have likewise been omitted in our limited sketch. Had we intended to write a chronicle or an obituary, how could we have passed over the deaths of Mr. Tierney, Mr. Huskisson, or, more recently, that of Bolivar? how could we have neglected that of several crowned heads — the pope, the King of Naples, and the Queen of Portugal? An unprofitable volume might have been made on the changes of government, the internal squabbles, and the external negotiations of the South American states within the same period. Our own colonial policy; the proceedings of the two parties who divide the nation on the question of slavery; and the result of our negotiations with the United States for the regulation of their intercourse with our West India possessions, would all have demanded and deserved a history and a discussion. Even the war of O'Connell against the lord-lieutenant's proclamations, and the session of parliament before the Christmas recess, short as it was, would have furnished matter for a considerable volume. Our object has not been to enter into such details, however separately interesting, but to record at some length the most prominent events which seem destined to produce greater ulterior changes. Hence we have been at some pains to trace the progress and to describe the character of the French and Belgic revolutions, which have exercised so over-

powering an influence on the world within the last six months of the year.

The curtain of the year 1830 dropped on Europe in a state of ferment and agitation, of which it was impossible to check the progress or to foretell the result. The masses of the population had been stirred up from the bottom by the concussion of the French and Belgic revolutions, and could not be expected for a long time to subside into order, or resume a determinate arrangement according to their weight and affinities. The partition wall of privilege, rank, or subordination, interposed between different classes of the European community, had in some cases been forcibly broken down, and in others had been more silently undermined. Antiquity, custom, usage, or legitimacy, which formerly became a shelter to abuses, could not now protect justice and right from threatened innovation. Every where power was challenged on its rounds, and compelled to give the popular watchword before it could be allowed to pass. Whether it was a nation that demanded its independence from a foreign power, as in Belgium and Poland; or a people that cashiered their dynasty, as in France and Saxony; or a parliament that changed its administration for a more popular party, as in England; or republics that liberalised their institutions, as in Switzerland,—all was movement and change. The breath of revolution sometimes blew from the suburbs of a capital, as in France; sometimes from the cottages of the peasant, as in the Swiss mountains; but it was every where powerful. No institution was held venerable, no authority sacred, that stood in the

way of the popular will. The people had every where got a purchase against their rulers, and had fixed their engines for a further pull. The power of domestic military protection had diminished, in proportion as rulers required its aid; while, at the same time, all Europe seemed arming for a general trial of strength, or a recommencement of conquest. Every kind of reform was the order of the day; financial reform, legal reform, ecclesiastical reform, and parliamentary reform. The year that has just commenced must resolve the character of many of those vague tendencies to change, to war, and confusion, which alarmed some and inspired hope into others at the close of 1830.

THE END.

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